




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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA IN THE POST-SOVIET WORLD

*Proceedings of the
Third Indo-U.S. Strategic Symposium*

Co-sponsored by

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C.

and

THE INSTITUTE FOR
DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES
New Delhi, India



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THIRD INDO-U.S. STRATEGIC SYMPOSIUM

PROCEEDINGS

The third Indo-U.S. Strategic Symposium took place on 21-23 April 1992 at the Airline House, near Warrenton, Virginia. Dr. Alvin Bernstein, Director of the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and Air Commodore (ret) Jasjit Singh, Director of India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) co-hosted the Symposium. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. James Lilley, headed the U.S. delegation, which included representation from the Departments of Defense and State, the White House and National Security Council, the Department of Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. Pacific and Central Commands, the American Embassy in New Delhi, and INSS. Defence Secretary N. N. Vohra, and the Indian Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Dr. Abid Hussain led the Indian delegation. The Indian delegation also included representation from the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Defense Research and Development Organization, the Indian Embassy in Washington, and IDSA. Both delegations also included select groups of scholars and former government officials. Twenty-three of this year's participants (twelve American, eleven Indian) had attended at least one earlier session; nine (three American, six Indian) have attended all three meetings.

The agenda was developed in order to move discussion from general to more specific issues. This would enable policy makers to leave the Symposium with a list of issues on which the interests of India and the United States converged, as well as to identify issues on which significant differences remained. The agenda focused on opportunities and prospects for closer Indian-American security cooperation and aimed at progressing from agreement reached in the two previous sessions. Four major topics were discussed over two days. Each session included brief presentations outlining Indian and American perspectives, drawn from more detailed commissioned papers distributed in advance to participants. (The papers are reproduced following this summary of the proceedings). The presentations encouraged lively discussions.

The four topics were:

- I. Defining the "Emerging Global Environment";
- II. Opportunities and Prospects for Cooperation on Asian Security Issues;
- III. Opportunities for Indo-U.S. Cooperation on Non-Proliferation in Asia; and
- IV. Indo-U.S. Security Cooperation: First Steps.

The following provides a summary of the proceedings reflecting the perspectives of both the Indian and American participants. Because of the non-attribution policy, comments or summary of comments are not ascribed to any particular participant.

General Impressions

Members of both the American and Indian delegations displayed sincerity about further improving relations between the two countries. All participants proved willing to ensure constructive discussion. In addition, Defence Secretary Vohra had just visited the U.S.. two weeks earlier as part of Defense Minister Pawar's delegation. His return emphasized the importance the Indians attached to continuing the dialogue. Secretary Vohra has now attended all three sessions; the first as Secretary of Defence Production and the last two as Defence Secretary.

American participants approached the symposium with varying views on the role of the United States in the post-Cold War world. None believed that the U.S.. would act as global policeman, but most agreed it would intervene when its interests were perceived at serious risk. The more optimistic view was that the U.S.. has an opportunity to take advantage of its Cold War victory by encouraging world peace and stability. No one on the American side anticipated that the U.S. would return to isolationism. Both Indian and American participants expressed concern that the American domestic situation heavily influences American foreign policy. One participant observed that domestic issues are going to occupy a larger portion of the national agenda. The consensus appeared to be that the U.S. would be more selective about foreign involvement, with economic interests as a major determinant.

While American global actions are likely to be circumscribed by domestic economic constraints, the Indian delegation emphasized that their country's social and economic development is its primary goal. To this end, India's defense establishment is also limited by economic realities. Indians stressed that their defense spending had declined steadily over the past four years. But, in the opinion of the Indian delegation, foreign observers appeared not to notice. Instead, Indians

hear constantly about India's growing power projection capabilities, even though no new systems have been introduced or are likely to be, given continuing fiscal realities.

The leaked American Defense Planning Guidance draft also prompted considerable debate—specifically the section identifying India as a potential regional hegemon. The American delegation forcefully argued that the leaked document was an early draft, selectively interpreted by the press, and did not reflect official American policy. While this eased Indian concerns somewhat, muted references to the document continued throughout the conference. Concerns over this point may continue to be an irritant in Indian-American relations.

Despite the expressed concern over the leaked Defense Planning Guidance draft, the Indian delegation strongly indicated that the U.S. has a trustworthy image. The Indians cited President Bush's September 1991 unilateral declaration to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from overseas bases and deployed naval forces as crucial in this regard.

In seeking a better understanding of the Indian view of their regional and global position, the Americans considered a major Indian argument: Indians envision their region as greater than just the subcontinent. Indians believe that the American government defines their region too narrowly. The Indians see their area of maritime concern (and desired influence) stretching from the Persian Gulf at least to the Straits of Malacca and, on land, including China. Viewing India only as a South Asian power, with a narrow focus on Pakistan, creates an inaccurate assessment of India's actual regional concerns.

American and Indian participants sought to identify India's place in the post-Cold War world. Indians see their country as a major participant in the new multipolar international order. In this context, Indians are concerned about their position relative to the Chinese. If China is considered a world power, then India should be also. Indians are troubled by China's attempt to become the Third World's principal spokesman, a role India has long claimed for itself through its leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement. The Indians insisted that it is in American interest to support Indian aspirations in the Non-Aligned Movement and among Third World states.

The Americans stressed that Indians should be aware that economics would heavily determine American attitudes toward India's world role. India had to develop a stronger economy if it hoped to have major global influence.

Both delegations agreed that the non-proliferation issue presents the greatest impediment to improved Indian-American relations. The Americans urged India to join the group of nations seeking to curb proliferation. Indian delegates sought an American recognition that only a nuclear restraint regime could be realistically applied in South Asian. Although most Americans accepted the rationale for nuclear

restraint, rather than a nuclear weapons-free zone, the latter remains the American policy goal for the region.

Most American and Indian delegates expressed satisfaction with the pace of military-to-military cooperation; one senior delegate even acknowledged the possibility of a combined military response to some future threat to peace.

Some American participants argued that the East Asian Arc would emerge as the economic and technological center of global power in the coming decade. Furthermore, participants on both sides agreed that the Soviet collapse had altered Asian, as well as a European, interstate relationships and that, therefore, the global influence of East Asia will undoubtedly increase. Nonetheless, all appreciated that the degree to which Russia recovered the old Soviet position in eastern Asia would determine the degree of that region's weight in the world balance.

Topic I: Defining the "Emerging Global Environment."

Four papers were presented: two dealt with American and Indian views, respectively, on the future role of the U.S. in the emerging global order; the other two examined India's international future from both an Indian and American perspective. Major points in the papers and comments from the discussion follow.

Summary of American Paper on the Role of the U.S.

The first American discussed how the United States could (and, perhaps, should) act as the most powerful democracy, following the Cold War. The U.S. should form a global concert of like-minded democratic states which would maintain peace; ensuring that the trillions of dollars and the tens of thousands of lives expended in the Cold War achieved permanent results. The United States alone could create this consensus because of its unmatched military power.

It is a universal interest that the U.S. and its allies, present and future, prevent a return to a mutually hostile bi-polar world engaged in an arms race. The pre-eminent American policy should be the avoidance of a new Cold War. But it should not attempt the impossible by trying to carry out this policy alone. It should and could do so only in concert with its democratic allies.

The speaker presented a dual strategy to curb any challenge to this democratic global concert. First, an aggressor should be confronted by a coalition of democratic states. Second, the U.S. must maintain technological military superiority to dissuade any state from threatening American interests.

Summary of Indian Paper on the Role of the U.S.

The Indian view of the U.S. in the new global situation was heavily influenced by the U.S. Defense Planning Guidance draft which had been the subject of recent press reports. The draft posited four major sets of tensions.

The first arises from conflicting forces, some promoting worldwide integration and others disintegration. Improved communications, the spread of liberal democratic ideas and the interdependent world economy promote world integration. At the same time, renewed nationalism, ethnic strife and religious intolerance are encouraging national and international division.

The second set of tensions springs from contradictory tendencies toward either a uni-polar or a multi-polar world. The actions of the American-led coalition in Desert Storm suggests that the world has not really become uni-polar but multi-polar. It is in the interest of the United States to exert world leadership through cooperation with other powers, even though some Americans favor isolationism, particularly since no clear threat presently confronts the U.S..

Another set of tensions is created by the American approach to collective security. In particular, the Defense Planning Guidance was criticized for its failure to emphasize American participation in United Nations peace efforts. The U.S. should increase its commitment to collective international action and should seek to strengthen collective security and collective internationalism projects. The American stress on balance of power in Asia might open opportunities for American-Indian cooperation, provided the U.S. did not attempt to balance or curb legitimate Indian ambitions.

The final set of tensions is created by the peaceful management of the international system and the preservation of state sovereignty, in conflict with outside efforts to promote internal reform and democratization in many societies.

Summary of Indian Paper on India's Role

Six powers—the U.S., Japan, the European Community, China, India and Russia—will fill the dominant world position previously occupied only by the U.S. and Soviet Union. This presents India with an opportunity for enhanced global influence. But India's primary goal must remain its own social and economic development. India today has a population of 864 million, with sixty-three percent under the age of 30. However, this development can be accomplished only with a secure international environment.

Maritime security is an essential element of this environment. India is dependent on imported energy sources. Forty-two percent of its oil comes from across the sea and another forty-two percent comes from its continental shelf. As a result, security of the sea lanes is a convergent area for Indian and American interests.

India also is a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, which is supportive of the larger common interests of the U.S. and India. A dominant role by India in the Non-Aligned Movement would be preferable for the U.S. to a dominant role played by China.

Summary of American Paper on India's Role

American strategic analysts should be aware that a number of states in the South Asia region face severe social and political challenges. However, India is structured to cope with such divisive problems, comparing favorably with China in this regard.

Pakistan and India dominate South Asia.. Although India is predominant, Pakistan challenges India strategically, within certain limits. Both states are officially supportive of many American interests. However, both can threaten certain large interests of the U.S., especially nuclear non-proliferation. One Cold War issue that still divides India and the United States is different conceptions of how to achieve a just international order.

The U.S. can either contain or co-opt India. India's internal politics by themselves will contain India. Therefore, the U.S. should pursue co-option, defined as tough-minded cooperation. The American government seeks to influence Indian domestic politics to continue in the direction in which it is moving. Additionally, the U.S. wishes to influence India's regional relationships, trade policies and non-proliferation policies to fit American interests.

Since India has been very concerned about American use of force, it is an Indian interest to coordinate foreign policy with that of the U.S.. This would help India to avoid becoming a target (which is rather unlikely) and, more importantly, to understand and, perhaps, alter American policy when that conflicts with Indian interests. American military cooperation with India would also be useful for a larger reason. That could demonstrate that cooperation is possible in a heretofore most sensitive area, thus desensitizing it.

Summary of General Discussions

Differing concepts of alliances, even among like-minded democratic states, raised questions among the participants. American participants wondered how such an alliance would be defined. One participant asked "...is moral agreement sufficient?

Does the alliance have to be more formal?" Someone observed that the U.S. might be attempting to have more foreign policy influence and choices than is realistic. In response, the first American speaker explained that regionalism will dominate the future international environment and regional concerns will be greater for regional powers than for the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. will not be a world policeman but will act in a more detached manner.

American participants stressed that Indians should be aware of the importance of economics in determining American actions internationally. Therefore, India needs to develop a stronger economy if it intended to interact with the U.S. in foreign policy. There has to be greater complementarity between the Indian and American economies. To this end, India needs to allow greater foreign access to its economy and to institute further reforms, such as intellectual property rights protection.

Both delegations agreed that domestic pressures and economic constraints will increasingly determine both countries' foreign policies. This underscores the mutual advantages if the Indian-American relationship is complementary, not competitive. However, while the Indian government seeks to be a global and regional partner to the U.S., the Indian delegates noted that the U.S. government—given its narrow definition of India's region—tends both to see India only in regional terms and as part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. One American emphasized that India should join more international organizations, accept their rules and work as a cooperative member to modify organization positions and policies, rather than staying on the outside.

An American questioned whether India's role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) amounted to more than just the leadership of the poor. Indian participants argued that Indian NAM leadership was preferable to Chinese. Furthermore, leadership of the poor is necessary because of the uncertainty of world events. Indians emphasized that NAM is not defunct but merely in need of redirection. Under India's continued leadership, it can focus Third World efforts and energies. Both the NAM and the U.N. need restructuring and refocusing to respond to new strategic realities. The Indians indicated their desire for American help in ensuring that India, not China, emerges as the leader of the Third World. In response to a question about Indian attitudes toward the United Nations role in peacemaking or peacekeeping, Indian participants pointed out in detail that India has a long history of support for and participation in such missions.

Americans asked what maritime role Indians now saw for themselves and, in view of recent events and the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean, what maritime threats they perceived. Indians replied that maritime security remains essential to their survival, given India's dependence on seaborne commerce, particularly oil imports. They also noted the inflexibility India would suffer if it were dependent on the U.S. Navy for its security. However, all agreed that sea lane

security is an area where India and the U.S. could and should cooperate.

Indians described human rights atrocities and anti-democracy actions in Burma as a growing concern to them. They urged cooperation in promoting democracy in Burma. (One American suggested that India cooperate with Pakistan to try to solve this problem but no positive response ensued.)

American participants noted that India faces a serious decision about what position it will assume in the new international order. Countries which wish to strike deals with the U.S. need bargaining chips. It is questionable whether simply being a democracy committed to certain shared moral principles will give India the counters it requires to bargain successfully. Americans suggested that to deal best with the U.S. or to resolve doubts about American predictability, India should "...get close and stay close." Both delegations agreed that maritime cooperation would be an important focus for future Indian-American cooperation.

American participants concluded that Indian social, political and economic success is in the interest of the U.S... But that does not entitle India to an automatic claim on American resources or support. American sympathy and understanding does not equate to a veto over American relations with Pakistan. India must offer proof why it should be considered one of the important geo-strategic powers and make clear which international organizations or efforts it is willing to join.

Topic II: Opportunities and Prospects for Cooperation on Asian Security Issues

Four papers were presented; two providing Indian and American views, respectively, on China and Southeast Asia, and two dealing in with developments in Central and West Asia.

Summary of Indian Paper on China and Southeast Asia

West Asia, Central Asia and eastern Southeast Asia converge in India, culturally, geographically, and strategically. Indian autonomy is closely linked with the independence of other Asian countries. India has been a major force behind many Asian and African independence movements. However, India's internal troubles recently have limited its actions in these regards and forced it to concentrate on domestic issues.

Despite the end of the Cold War, many of its features are still evident in such places as Korea and China. But there significant though gradual changes taking place in Asia. One of these is a general relaxation of tensions throughout the region.

A second major development in the China-Southeast Asia area has been immense economic change in the region. State socialism has made a significant retreat, while large scale investments by great powers have flowed in. This, however, makes these countries vulnerable to policy changes in the U.S. and Japan.

Still, instability continues to disturb the region, particularly in Burma and Cambodia. Indians are deeply concerned with Chinese involvement in Burma. China is Burma's chief military supplier and is also building a naval facility there. Cambodia is another troubled country in which the chief opposition is backed by China. Additionally, China is causing international trouble over territorial and oil and gas rights in the China Sea and Spratly Islands. India supports the creation of democratic, federal and secular states in the entire area, including Burma. Unfortunately authoritarianism still rules in China and generally throughout Southeast Asia.

China's own future remains uncertain. The Chinese economic structure suffers from major flaws. The potential breakup of China could produce extremely serious consequences. If political reforms are not made and stability is only maintained by force, China may eventually descend into chaos, afflicting the entire region.

Additionally, both China and Pakistan have increased their defense spending. Chinese expenditures have reportedly grown by 12 to 15 percent annually. The U.S., India, China and Japan must seek ways to cooperate to reduce conventional weapon levels.

There is enormous scope for the U.S., India and others to restrict the flow of drugs, encourage arms control and prevent the transfer of weapons military and technology within Asia.

Summary of American Paper on China and Southeast Asia

There is a close relationship between China's domestic and foreign policies. China's internal goals have been internal coherence and stability, and economic development, with emphasis on economic development to achieve stability. The Chinese leadership appears committed to maintaining a minimum level of positive interaction with the outside world.

The author anticipates a change in Chinese leaders by the end of 1992. He expects the new leadership to shift from the historical emphasis on revolution to stressing its competence in managing political and economic reforms. This change will have far reaching implications for American-Chinese relations. A second factor will be continued instability in China. Pressure for reforms leading to a greater political pluralism will continue. But economic progress will preclude the violent overthrow of party because there is no clear alternative. All factions will remain

committed to the concept of China as a unitary state, particularly since the military will hold the state together. However, China may come to resemble the Taiwan model.

Despite its relative weakness, China has been able to maintain an unusual international influence. The Chinese will likely attempt to strengthen their international position by encouraging a multi-polar world system. Chinese foreign policy will generally emphasize peace, accommodation and stability, provided their position on Hong Kong, Taiwan and certain border disputes is not contested.

Summary of General Discussions

An American participant contrasted Chinese and Indian preoccupation with international issues. He emphasized that the Chinese are paying more attention to the issues in the international arena. Rhetorically he asked, "... is India going ahead with business as usual saying these people have it (nuclear weapons), or those people have it, therefore, we're just going to go ahead without paying any attention to the international regimes?... Is India willing to be part of the global effort to solve problems of nuclear and missile proliferation?"

An Indian question about whether the U.S. was neglecting defense of the Pacific and Indian Ocean routes was answered in the negative. The Indians were reminded that the U.S. has defense strong ties with Australia and a new logistics facilities in Singapore.

Speaking of China and North Korea, one American observed that the present leadership in Pyongyang suits the purpose of the Beijing government. Also, China's relations with Cambodia continue to reflect the obsolete policy of the older leadership in China. An American noted that contemporary Chinese diplomats fall far below the standards set by Zhou En Lai. In the opinion of one American participant, it is also important to challenge the anachronistic Chinese concept of sacrosanct national sovereignty, a concept unsuited for the late 20th century.

The American delegation emphasized that an ongoing relationship with China can be maintained but only through a series of carefully managed incentives and disincentives that provide face saving ways out of difficult situations. One must deal with the Chinese very specifically on issues on which there is agreement and very toughly in cases of non-agreement. The Americans emphasized that it was imperative to communicate clearly, to ensure that the Chinese do not miscalculate intentions.

Americans stated that such a negotiating approach would bring stability to the region. They emphasized, however, that this would require a multilateral effort, not just one by the U.S... In the coming decade, China's foreign policy would be in a state of flux and this could provide an excellent opportunity for the United States and

India to adopt a cooperative policy toward China. This might include commercial, cultural, educational, and military initiatives.

Indians pointed out that the U.S. had spent two decades improving its relationship with China, often at the expense of other countries, including India. With some obvious suspicion the question was asked, "...if the U.S. was now suggesting that the U.S. is looking at India and its role differently?" If the U.S. would consider the region as a whole inclusive of China, India and other states, then the dialogue would more likely lead to some specific areas of Indo-U.S. cooperation. However, such a partnership should not be an axis against China, but should facilitate normalization in South Asia.

Americans believed that the Japanese have developed great influence over the Chinese. But although there are good reasons for common action between the two giants, there still remain constraints on cooperation. The Japanese have transferred very little modern technology to China and have strengthened their position in states bordering on China considerably. The Chinese are impotent to counter this. However, the Chinese view the American-Japanese security alliance and the continued presence of U.S. troops in Korea as very important in restraining the Japanese. Additionally, these factors are very useful for U.S. policy. An Indian observed that China had been so emphasized in the discussions of Indo-U.S. cooperation, that Russia had been totally neglected. However, for many of the Indians, Russia still remains a force in Asia.

The Indians noted that after the Communists came to power in China, the two states had had the closest of relations. But this friendliness had been destroyed by the Chinese attack in 1962. Today, China poses two challenges for India - the border problem and the nuclear threat.

One Indian participant suggested that India's goal should be the conversion of either China or Pakistan into a benign neighbor. The Indians did agree that China is a country with which India could cooperate. They admitted that Americans had told this to the Indians. However, the legacy of the 1962 war, the unresolved border problem and China's influence in Pakistan remain obstacles to any normalization of relations with China. India has tried to overcome the bitterness of 1962, to increase the dialogue and to establish confidence-building measures with China. Although detente has been strengthened between China and India, a number of difficult issues in this complex relationship remain unresolved.

Indian participants cautioned that there is great potential for instability in China with serious implications for the security of Asia and the Pacific region. The U.S. was urged to consider this in its strategic planning.

The Indians agreed that regional nuclear non-proliferation was a worthy goal. However, they expressed genuine security concerns about Chinese monopoly of nuclear weapons in the region. China's international status is linked to its nuclear prowess and Indians believe that this linkage must be severed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increased possibility of nuclear proliferation in Central and West Asia, the issue is no longer one which involves only India, Pakistan and China.

Summary of American Paper on Central and West Asia

Trends in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf area are much more important for India than the U.S. because of the former's proximity to those countries. American policy in the Gulf has been to insure the free flow of oil to the world and to assist its allies and clients to protect themselves. This policy remains unchanged and American public and political opinion will sustain it. But there is much uncertainty in the region. Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet Union gravely concerns India because it had been accustomed to cooperation with the USSR in South Asia.

Some stability has been temporarily established in the area because both Iran and Iraq have been weakened militarily. But they will rearm. Iran is the more dangerous destabilizing force because it is potentially more powerful than Iraq. Iran could accelerate its drive for nuclear weapons and extend its ability to project force. Iran could then command much greater influence over Islamic political movements. Under these circumstances the interests of India and the U.S. in the Gulf would likely converge.

The outcome Afghan situation could be an indicator of the potential threat to stability in the Central Asian republics. Also, unstable Kazakhstan poses a possible nuclear danger. These states could develop radical political and religious blocks linked with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, albeit unlikely. For the near term, the Central Asian states are more concerned with establishing their identity and insuring their survival. Furthermore, they are divided by numerous differences and are not prone to collective unity.

These republics are not significantly concerned with Kashmir. Additionally, they have previously enjoyed good links with India through the Soviet Union. India's multi-ethnic government appeals to them as a possible model.

What is important will be the degree of American resolve to play a role in key areas within the region. For stronger and better American-Indian relations, India should cooperate with the U.S. and with its neighbors. In dealing with the U.S., India should trust the U.S., but verify.

Summary of Indian Paper on Central and West Asia

There are very few areas where the U.S. and India differ regarding the nature of the situation in Southwest Asia. New instabilities have been added to old ones in the region. Numerous instabilities in the region will have potential for causing security problems and will concern both India and the U.S.. Central Asia is emerging as a core region of interest.

Of concern to India is the significant rearming in the region, much of which is being done by the U.S., Russia and other major powers. Additionally, the independence of Kazakhstan creates another nuclear state in the region. Iran will possibly obtain a nuclear weapons capability, as well.

The world should be concerned with Islamic revivalism but it does not have to be a threat. If politicized and focused against principles of democracy, equality between people and tolerance it may become a threat. India is concerned with the emergence of fundamentalist regimes in the region and the ramifications for India. With 120 million Moslems, the second largest Islamic population in the world, India cannot ignore such events. India's policy of pluralism is undermined by the rise of fundamentalism which, therefore, is a possible threat to the Indian form of government.

Terrorism is a threat within the region. The situation in Kashmir has been brought to open conflict because of Pakistan's aggression sponsored across the border. Additionally, developments in Afghanistan are of particular concern to India because of the potential influence on Kashmir.

Summary of General Discussions

Indian participants observed that discussions of the Indian-Pakistani rivalry in regard to nuclear weapons development went back many years. However, they stressed that India had not reacted to the recent announcement of Pakistan's nuclear capability. On the other hand, the Indians suggested that a true rivalry over the nuclear issue is likely between Pakistan and Iran. They also emphasized that the advent of two nuclear powers on the southern flank of the ex-USSR is a very important development and is likely to create a new dimension for proliferation in the region. On nuclear proliferation, American delegates agreed with the Indians that the issue now extends beyond China, India and Pakistan, and that there is a need for discussions encompassing a wider scope.

Indians stated that Central Asia is now in flux but added that it is less disturbed than other areas, such as former Yugoslavia or Azerbaijan. They emphasized that the number of visitors from the Central Asian republics to India indicates the great interest and hopes which exist in some of the republics with

regards to India's role in the region.

An American participant observed that Central Asia's future will depend on how each of the republics solves its economic problems and how the nationalist issue will develop in each republic. Another American suggested that the Pakistanis had initially looked toward Central Asia in search of like-minded Moslem brothers. However, they did not find the Moslems whom they sought. Because these republics had been isolated with secularism imposed under the Soviet system, the present leadership is not truly Moslem. This has caused Pakistan to recently alter its policies toward Afghanistan, in part because of what they have not found in Central Asia. Additionally, Pakistan's policy towards the Central Asian republics now strikingly resembles India's. Both governments began with a sentimental hope of finding in Central Asia the strategic depth they have long sought. Now Pakistan is concentrating on state-to-state relations and on establishing a diplomatic presence, and increasing trade and investment.

The Indians agreed that, because of pressure from the Central Asian republics, Pakistan had shifted its policy away from the fundamentalist Islamic Jihad and has now shown a willingness to conduct relations on a more rational basis. They emphasized that there was now an unprecedented opportunity to come to agreement with Pakistan. However, improving relations with Pakistan could not be done by India alone.

Notwithstanding this call by the Indian participants to take advantage of a change in the policies of the Pakistani government, the Indians on several occasions stressed that Kashmir and Pakistan's involvement remained the principal obstacle to any peace and security in the region. They pointed out that the failure of the world to condemn Pakistan rewarded Pakistani military aggression.

On Afghanistan, Americans noted that Pakistan appeared to be seeking a political solution among the warring factions. Afghanistan is different from other Central Asian states because it has the potential of being very destabilizing for the region. For the moment, the ethnic rivalries within Afghanistan have overshadowed other areas of danger, particularly the various geographic divisions afflicting the Uzbeks. Americans were not yet certain what Russia's attitude would be toward the Central Asian republics. The Russians are considering Pakistan as a new area of opportunity. As a country with whom they might now work, but so far, not at India's expense.

Americans emphasized that Moslem fundamentalism in itself was not a disturbing issue. The worrisome question is extremism in any form, including that within Hinduism. The Indians effectively agreed, suggesting that Muslim fundamentalism, as such, did not pose a threat to India. Americans also pointed out that the rise of the ultra-right opposition BJP party has created a very destabilizing

situation in India. Fundamentalism should be examined closely to understand how ethnic or religious resurgence influences political ideology.

Readdressing the previously mentioned issue of the relative defense budgets of India and Pakistan, it was noted by an American that Pakistan's defense budget may have increased in response to the cut off of American aid.

On the issue of Pakistan's and India's military spending, Indians admitted that Pakistan's stability, integrity, strength are essential to India's national security interests. However, to demonstrate India's goodwill, they argued that India's defense budget has come down since 1987 by something close to twenty-one percent. They stressed that India had made not acquired new weapons systems nor had undertaken any modernization efforts. The Indians asked rhetorically, "Is this a defiant defense budget?" The Indians offered to provide American government officials with documents for the past ten years detailing the annual defense budgets which, in their opinion, will confirm that the annual budgets have declined for the past four years.

Indians criticised the U.S. for rearming countries in the Middle East. Americans explained that, to the extent that the U.S. is not able to prevent rearmament, it will pursue a balance of power policy to prevent any one state in the region from growing too powerful. It is not yet clear just what Indians think in regard to this problem. However, this might provide the foundation for a serious discussion of national strategies between India and the U.S.

Americans pointed out that the Gulf Region will continue to be primarily an American area of responsibility and concern. Because of its oil resources, the region remains of critical importance for both the U.S. and India. Although access to the region through the Mediterranean has lessened the importance of the Pacific-Indian Ocean route, the Mediterranean route is vulnerable. The importance of the Pacific-Indian Ocean route in American policy has not diminished. On this issue, the U.S. and India might have serious discussions. these could include a situation in which the U.S. could make considerable use of the subcontinent to defend the oil in the Middle East.

An Indian suggested that the U.S. and India should develop certain areas of shared strategic interests. Once defined, a deeper understanding should be pursued. To do this, detailed working-level study groups should be established. One area that might be explored would be a greater understanding of Central Asia. How to define it? How will it develop? Another might be the security ramifications of radical Islamic fundamentalism. Is it a real security threat? Might it pose a threat to the regional interests of the U.S. and India, as well as their mutual interests? Another issue is terrorism. However, Indian participants cautioned that this subject would have to be studied carefully, since India has many political factions which have to be

considered for the development of a broad national consensus on policy.

Topic III: Opportunities for Indo-U.S. Cooperation on Non-Proliferation in Asia.

The topic three session centered on one paper from each side, providing perspectives on non-proliferation issues, followed by commentary by an American and Indian discussant.

Summary of American Paper on Non-Proliferation

The U.S. and India could cooperate more closely on non-proliferation than they are doing at present. Both face very severe threats in the region, particularly the emergence of a nuclear weapons threat in the Central Asian states. Even more dangerous is the possibility of further proliferation in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

Although the non-proliferation community within the U.S. government has been quite vocal, American policy towards nuclear proliferation has been unclear from the beginning. In key cases, American non-proliferation strategy cannot be separated from broader strategic and political questions. There has clearly been a linkage between broader geo-political strategy and American concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. The case most obvious to the Indians is American ambivalence towards Pakistan's nuclear program, particularly during the height of the Afghanistan War. Then, clearly, a strategic decision was taken not to press Islamabad on the issue because of the vital importance of Pakistan as a conduit to the Afghan mujahideen. So long as India and Pakistan have a nuclear weapons potential, there is a consensus in the U.S. government that it is better that these capabilities not be used to produce nuclear weapons.

On the missile issue, it is very much in America's interests to persuade India to join the Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR. If India were to sign up to the MTCR, the U.S. would be more forgiving of India's program. This would put no restriction on India's program, but India would not, under any circumstances, export missiles or related technology to its neighbors. It would also give the U.S. leverage to use against China and Pakistan on missile proliferation.

The nuclear issue is much more serious and it is in America's interest to achieve some ironclad guarantees that no nuclear technology will leak out of the subcontinent. The most dangerous scenario is that Pakistan or India would assist another country in nuclear weapons development.

It is unwise to expect too much right now from formal agreements between the U.S. and India on proliferation. Instead, limited agreements on the MTCR and on no nuclear exports are the way to go. Also, it is in America's interest to explore further the possibility of a five-power conference on a nuclear restraint zone and pursue the details of other bilateral Pakistan-Indian nuclear agreements. Americans should stop lecturing Indians on the high cost of nuclear and missile programs. Instead the U.S. should adopt a quiet but constructive approach to arms control which does not undermine India's security prerogatives.

Summary of Indian Paper on Non-Proliferation

A nuclear-free zone is not possible but a nuclear restraint regime in Southern Asia should be the goal. Pakistan acquired nuclear capability because that was the only way in which Pakistan could claim parity with India. Pakistan will not surrender this capability. The breakup of the Soviet Union has resulted in a diffusive, pervasive, universal type of proliferation. Now, one cannot preclude access to a nuclear weapon by anyone with the means to purchase one. The U.S. has demonstrated its honesty about non-proliferation with its signing of the START Treaty and its decision of September 26, 1991, to unilaterally withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons. This established American credibility as a superpower on non-proliferation.

The proposal for a five-power conference originally put forth by India was very sensible. However, the Pakistani government chose to express its agreement for such a conference at the most inopportune time, when there was effectively no government in India. Pakistan's proposal to discuss a nuclear-free zone is insincere, since it is not likely to give up its recently acquired nuclear capability. Although the success of the proposal was spoiled by the way in which the Pakistanis initially handled it, Pakistan and India have at least agreed that a nuclear-free zone is a non-attainable goal. India has taken the initiative of proposing a no-strike agreement against the nuclear installations of both sides.

As for the five-power conference, the problem now is that two of the principals, Pakistan and China are adversaries and Russia is much weaker than was the USSR. Therefore, India wants to improve its bilateral relations with the U.S. before going into such a conference. There has to be constructive dialogue in any such conference. Additionally, work must first be done domestically to change the Indian perception of the U.S. in order to show that the U.S. can be trusted.

In view of the Iraqi experience, it is not feasible to try to destroy Pakistani nuclear capability. Nor is it possible to convince the Pakistanis that India has no nuclear weapons. Therefore, any regime in the subcontinent can only be an arms-control or nuclear restraint regime. This has to be agreed between the U.S. and India

before any such conference. Therefore, India has proposed technical discussions to this end. There is a very good chance that such a conference would resolve the problems of verification and the kinds of restraint regime that all would like to see.

Summary of American Discussant's Comments on Non-Proliferation

American concerns arise from the fact that there are two countries in the subcontinent which are very near to having a nuclear weapons capability. Additionally, these two states are long-time adversaries with a major unresolved problem dividing them. It is not just the spread of military nuclear technology, which it is the U.S. policy to prevent, but also, the danger that this technology might be used.

In regard to an appropriate non-proliferation goal with respect to South Asia, the long term goal of the U.S. is a nuclear-free weapons zone. But nobody suggests it is a short term goal. Universal NPT adherence is what the U.S. would like to achieve, with a nuclear-free zone being an acceptable second choice. In the short term, there is the possibility of a nuclear restraint regime. However, the U.S. may not except this concept immediately because it implies a degree of acceptance of reality. U.S. representatives stress measures which reduce the trend of nuclear competition.

The region may be large, but any restraint regime should initially include only China, the U.S., Russia, Pakistan and India. The short term problem, as articulated by an Indian, is to promote a security regime in the Asian region which will attenuate the dangers arising out of the threat of nuclear weapons. There are several short term activities which might be pursued to include confidence-building measures, such as increasing the confidence of the international community that nuclear materials are not going to be exported, monitoring transfers by the nuclear weapons states, and verification and transparency of compliance. The nuclear issue is the biggest single threat to the much improved American-Indian relationship and the bilateral goal should be to turn that from a threat to an opportunity.

Summary of Indian Discussant's Comments on Non-Proliferation

Because the nuclear issue is in the public domain, it will be very difficult for any Indian government to be seen as moving in any significant way from the existing established position. What the Indian public most often perceives is pressure from the U.S. on India to do certain things.

In spite of expanding cooperation, there seems to be a total absence of structured, high-level dialogue between the U.S. and India. Therefore, meetings that do take place are usually dominated by the NPT issue. There is a requirement for sustained high-level political dialogue in order for the U.S. to understand the

concerns of India. Indians believe that their country is singled-out on the non-proliferation issue at every opportunity and that on this issue it is all give by India and no take. This issue must be taken in the context of the larger Indian-American bilateral relationship if there is to be any progress. Echoing the American discussant, the Indian stated that the non-proliferation issue, which is a vicious circle spoiling the relationship, must be transformed into a virtuous circle enhancing the cooperation.

India is cooperating with the U.S. on the chemical issue. Additionally, the India government has avoided the export of sensitive technology and has shown tremendous restraint in preventing further proliferation. However, India does not perceive that such restraints have been appreciated by the U.S. government. If in return for Indian cooperation, there was an understanding that India could have better access to technologies and, in return, India would cooperate in the prevention of further diffusion of these technologies, then there might be grounds for cooperation. These are the things that must be seriously considered in a discussion on nuclear issues and related objectives.

It is difficult to fit China into this equation. The U.S. has clearly demonstrated that it has two standards, one for China and one for India. More important, the question is "How are India's security concerns resolved without raising the issue of one nuclear power being singled out for doing certain things?" From the Indian perspective, the question is how to manage Chinese arms in a way that is satisfactory to India. It will be very difficult to verify whether Chinese assurances are credible. The real issue today is not keeping South Asia nuclear-free but how to keep a nuclear or semi-nuclear South Asia from going to war. The focus must be on how to avoid war in the subcontinent, given the existence of major political tension between India and Pakistan, and between India and China.

Summary of General Discussions

In regard to the reliability of verifying a nuclear freeze, an American explained that there is no difficulty in verifying the cessation of production of nuclear materials. It is also possible to verify the shutting down of reactors, reprocessing, and enrichment activity. However, what cannot be verified is the inventories of weapons which already exist.

Indians stated that verification in general is very difficult, particularly in the gray area and in the clandestine market, where it requires cooperation of a large number of countries to track down violaters. Even with sensors, it is difficult to determine what is happening inside a building designed for concealment. They emphasized that only if the verification process is to some extent, a very large extent, or preferably completely under UN auspices are countries likely to find verification measures acceptable. Both delegations agreed that in future workshops it would be

useful to have a few more professionals on verification, to assist the strategists in the discussion of what can or cannot be verified. American delegates were quick to point out that the U.S. does not treat China better than India, particularly in terms of American export controls.

One American warned that UN inspections in Iraq have revealed the unexpected successes of Iraq's nuclear program. He suggested that this would spur Iraq's neighbors, such as Iran, to redouble their efforts at obtaining a nuclear capability. Therefore, the possibility of a regional multi-polar nuclear environment of which India is only one part is a new factor which has to be considered.

Americans agreed that if a country already has nuclear weapons, the destruction of these is unlikely. They emphasized that if the goal is a nuclear-safe zone in South Asia, then it is time to start talking about procedures, doctrines, custody arrangements and command and control arrangements that are nuclear-safe.

In response to a question from the Indian delegation whether it is possible that the Pressler Amendment might be waived, Americans stated there is no likely prospect. Also, Americans did not believe that India is criticized more than Pakistan on the nuclear issue. The U.S. government does not consider Pakistan's nuclear capability acceptable. However, the U.S. has accepted, in the sense of recognizing its existence, both the state of Pakistan's nuclear program and the state of India's nuclear capability.

On whether the U.S. would consider a limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan acceptable, the American response was a categorical and emphatic negative.

Indians made a strong argument that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs have not been similar, nor are they now. India has pursued a low cost, low risk strategy, which essentially has emphasized technology demonstration or a display of technological capability. Although India has demonstrated its capabilities, India has not deployed weapons or missiles. Indian participants admitted that this strategy has depended upon a certain degree of ambiguity. However, after Pakistan's declaration of its nuclear capability, there is increased pressure on India to abandon this strategy.

Additionally, one Indian argued that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, India's diplomatic and strategic maneuverability has been reduced. Under Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty it was implicit—almost explicit—that India had a security guarantee from the Soviets. The implication was that India could rely on Soviet strategic assistance should it be threatened by China. This assurance no longer exists. Although not all Indians agreed, it does represent a new situation which India must consider in pursuing a policy of ambiguity. Americans tend to see

and, perhaps, to force a symmetry of motivation and goals in the policies and activities of both Pakistan and India, an Indian argued. This has weakened pursuit of American policy to a considerable degree.

Indians also noted the difficulty of the Indian public to understand the differences between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. Since the Indian public views one weapon as much like another, the public would equate giving up the nuclear option with giving up conventional security. Indian participants expressed apprehension that to stir up public opinion over non-proliferation now might force India to drop its policy of ambiguity. To do so would not be in the best interest of either the U.S. or India. In their opinion, ambiguity has been a good policy because it was based on the clear idea that India would not make nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, an American stated, the Indian strategy of ambiguity and option, while it may suit Indian interests, has propelled the Pakistani program. Although such a policy preserves options, when misunderstood and misinterpreted by neighbors, it drives them to seek a nuclear option. On the issue of Indian public opinion, an American noted that there has been an increasing percentage in favor of India acquiring nuclear weapons. Concomitantly, there is a large percentage in favor of not going nuclear, provided that Pakistan does not do so, either. There appears to be strong support for reciprocal restraint in both countries. Indian participants also argued that there is an effort to educate public opinion in India. Many people have been urging Indian representatives to talk with the U.S. government and to also talk with the Pakistanis.

In India, a major important political trend is pro-peace and anti-war. Most people would like to avoid building nuclear weapons. However, it is difficult to persuade politicians to agree, because the issue tends to focus on whether or not the Indian government is surrendering to American pressure. It was suggested that this subject needs to be discussed in a more relaxed manner and publicity surrounding the nuclear issue between India and the U.S. needs to be reduced.

Indians emphasized that underlying the nuclear issue is a lack of political trust and economic linkage between Pakistan and India. As an example, efforts to negotiate with Pakistan on chemical weapons have not been fruitful. The Pakistanis have held the proposed treaty since 1990. Furthermore, the problem with an "open skies" treaty suggested by an American, is that Pakistan will not sign it, since most of its military force is on the Indian border and vulnerable to Indian airstrikes, while Indian military forces are widely dispersed. Additionally, India's efforts to open up trade with Pakistan have failed. There is a serious problem of creating constituencies in Pakistan that would be for peace. Indian participants suggested that the U.S. might play a role in encouraging Pakistan to be more forthcoming. Some Indians were optimistic that Pakistan might be more flexible as the political situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate.

Putting it rather bluntly, one American emphasized that ambiguity or candor is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The end should be to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons. The American stressed that it is necessary to talk to one's adversaries. Additionally, there is a need to give the nuclear issue appropriate emphasis in the present Indian-American bilateral exchanges. The underlying problem of how to keep India and Pakistan from going to war must be addressed if the nuclear issue is ever to be resolved. An Indian responded that the key problem in trying to negotiate with Pakistan is the fragmentation of political authority in Pakistan and lack of clarity about who controls their nuclear program. This represents one of the most difficult obstacles in trying to discuss any kind of arms control situation in the subcontinent.

Turning the discussion back to China, Indians explained that India's efforts to involve China in nuclear restraint discussions have proven unsatisfactory. The Chinese always respond sarcastically that, since India is not a nuclear state, there is nothing to discuss. However, Indians expressed concern that any future political instability in China would raise the frightening issue of who controls the nuclear weapons. As one participant explained it, "India and Pakistan are not the 'wildest' lot around." An American suggested that President Bush's May 29, 1991 proposal for the Middle East applies better to South Asia. The proposal talks about various types of restraints and freezes on all weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Such a restraining policy, in the participant's opinion, would be much easier to implement in South Asia, even with China.

Americans emphasized that although present American policy in the subcontinent has not involved a concept of restraint, Indians should understand that the trend is toward tighter controls on the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. Indians need to understand this and not let questions about their sovereignty prevent Indians from continuing relevant discussions. Members of both delegations agreed that a joint task force should do a study on the promotion of a nuclear restraint regime in Southern Asia. One American urged that now is the time for the U.S. and India to enter into serious discussions on the nuclear question, because "...if we do not, we're going to be overtaken by events."

Topic IV: Indian-American Security Cooperation: First Steps.

Two papers on the fourth topic dealt with potential first steps toward greater Indian-American security cooperation. The Indian paper focused on cooperation in the field of defense technologies while the American paper focused on military service-to-service cooperation.

Summary of Indian Paper on Security Relationship

The defense and security relationship is like a pyramid. At the base is technological cooperation between two countries. Next is development, specifically joint development. Continuing up the pyramid, the third level is co-production. The fourth level is the outright purchase of weapons and systems and at the top of the pyramid are the service-to-service relationships. In the present Indian-American relationship there is a very active service-to-service program. However, this should be the last phase of the security relationship.

Self-reliance, and research and development continue to be the basis of the new Indian economic development policy. Even in the changed Indian trade policy, defense-related sales by the U.S. to India will continue to depend upon the American government's policies for export of defense-related equipment.

The new wave of economic liberalization has not affected India's defense industrial complex. Change has been limited to the commercial sector and has not created opportunities for American defense companies to invest in India. Additionally, the new policies do not facilitate the export of defense related goods and services from India to the U.S. However, India needs access to the international research and development community, if its defense industry is to remain competitive. Indian R&D ranks sixth worldwide, according to constant dollars in 1986 and according to the U.S. Department of Defense, India ranks high in a number of critical technology categories. Therefore, if the U.S. is looking for foreign R&D in critical technologies, it should consider the benefits of the Indian infra-structure and resources.

Summary of American Paper on Security Relationship

The Cold War prevented the U.S. and India from engaging in a meaningful dialogue on security issues and often the two clashed. With the ending of the Cold War, India and the United States are now in agreement on broadly defined goals of peace, prosperity and security. However, there are limitations to military-to-military relations.

The American goal in a multi-polar world remains the promotion of peace and stability throughout the Pacific area and support of U.S. national interests there. This is accomplished by maintaining strong bilateral relationships throughout the area. Future reduction of U.S. Pacific based forces was anticipated (due to a diminished threat and to budgetary constraints), but these cuts would not prevent the U.S. from protecting its interesting the Pacific region.

Americans recognize that there may be some in India who view the Indian-

American military-to-military relations as inconsistent with India's non-aligned status and its leadership of the Third World movement. To reassure those with such concerns, the U.S. has no plans for a regional security coalition in the Indian Ocean which would force India into an alignment with the U.S. Nor does the U.S. view its relationship with India as a zero sum game, with the U.S. either in India's camp or in Pakistan's.

There are limits to U.S. military activities with India. The U.S. will not become embroiled in internal sectarian violence which threatens India. Nor will the U.S. conduct activities that would be offensive in nature and thus destabilizing. Additionally, the speaker noted the U.S. will not take sides in territorial disputes nor recognize one claim over another. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated technologies is an international concern and, as stated before during the Symposium, the U.S. encourages India to participate in the NPT and IAEA safeguard agreement.

U.S. government goals in the Indian-American programs proposed by the Pacific Command are to normalize military-to-military relations and enhance Indian Ocean regional stability. It appears that India's foreign policy has steadily been converging with American interests and, as a result, a series of high-level exchanges has already commenced. These service component programs and exchanges, in the opinion of the speaker, foster inter-operability, confidence, friendship and understanding. However, the process must be gradual so that policy makers can keep pace. Essentially, what has been agreed to is a series of confidence-building measures to include reciprocal visits by senior officers, professional seminars and conferences, information exchanges, exchange of functional experts, individual training, observer training, and small unit overseas training exercises. Collective security requires three things: a common perception of the threat, the resolve to do something about that threat and the military power adequate to gather, organize and coalesce allies.

Summary of General Discussions

Both delegations observed that the Indian presentation had emphasized technology transfer as the base of the security relations pyramid with military-to-military cooperation at its apex. Conversely, the American view emphasized the service-to-service cooperation as the base of the pyramid and the top, and more difficult, as technology transfers. However, both delegations admitted, although with varying degrees of enthusiasm, that times have changed and service to service cooperation is now possible. But technology transfers have not proceeded at the speed hoped for by Indians. There was little optimism regarding defense technology cooperation, given the reticence on both sides. There was, however, some hope for modest international R&D cooperation. Another possibly fruitful area for cooperation is in developing verification techniques.

Americans suggested that India needed to join some of the international restraint regimes controlling the flow of technology transfers. In response, one Indian participant asked candidly whether anyone really wanted India in any of these organizations. For India, he explained, there remains the embarrassment of the constraint on India's sovereignty in participating in such membership. It was stressed by the Indian that his country should be concerned with the symbols of reciprocity. Americans countered that there were good reasons for India to join the MTCR. Indians admitted that, in joining the MTCR, India would gain some advantage. The regime would have less influence on India's ability to develop its space program than it would have on other states in the region, especially Pakistan.

One American explained that U.S. Army activities in India are no different from those carried out with over thirty countries in the Pacific Rim region. The Kicklighter proposals were drawn from existing army programs with other countries. It was noted that although both the U.S. and India participated in aid to Bangladesh, they did not do so together. This is one example which demonstrates the need for inter-operability. Indians found concepts such as inter-operability and the ability to plan for collective action, despite the absence of an imminent threat, somewhat unclear. Once inter-operability was explained as the ability to communicate and facilitate cooperative efforts, it seemed more understandable and acceptable to them.

One Indian participant stated his belief that Indian soldiers and NCOs would not be prepared to participate in joint exercises. However, other Indians over criticized this view. On participating in joint U.S.-Indian military activities, an Indian participant emphasized that India has a long history of exercising with other navies and that it is important to show the U.S. Navy that India can operate with it. Also, the Indian military has a long and successful history of overseas operations with the UN.

Indians expressed concern that if there is a need for a common threat then it could not be certain that the U.S. and India have arrived at a common perception of the threat, let alone are ready to take common action. Americans noted that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new threats in the Middle East had modified the U.S. threat perception. It was agreed that India is also reassessing its threat perception. When the definition of common interests was expanded to include disaster relief, search and rescue, and other humanitarian efforts, collective action appeared more likely. Navy-to-navy cooperation was seen as a natural activity, which promoted tranquility in the Indian Ocean and thus served India's security interests.

Indians expressed concern about the pace of the service-to-service cooperation. There continues to be a tendency for the Indian press to argue that the political leadership has not thought the issue through and that the services have moved too fast on the issue. Several Indians observed that although India had previous service-to-service relations with the U.S. from 1962 to 1965, Cold War thinking still prevails.

among journalists and politicians.

However, one Indian participant noted that there is a breathless quality in jumping the stages of the pyramid. He was quickly reassured by other Indians, as well as Americans, that there was nothing precipitate about the pace. Most agreed that the pace has been cautious. The apprehension that this military-to-military relationship is out of control is misplaced. In each instance, each program has been approved by both governments. The military is not moving too fast, it is moving at a speed which is comfortable for both countries. Americans emphasized that their government does not see military-to-military relations as the centerpiece of the bilateral relationship but only as one element. Concurrently, the Indians agreed that the military-to-military relationship was not the centerpiece of the growing cooperation. In the total structure that has been agreed to by both governments, there is monitoring going on at the senior level by representatives of both defense and foreign affairs. If, for the maintenance of peace, an occasion arises that requires a military response, the Indians expressed the hope that, "... we would be capable of responding together." On a theme echoed throughout the two days of discussions, both sides agreed that it is mutually beneficial that the Indian and American services acquire better understanding of each other.

Summary of Concluding Remarks

The Director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis observed that the Symposium marked a real milestone, a landmark in the bilateral relationship. He chose the opportunity to talk about a few issues which he thought might give a sense of direction for the future. He emphasized the need to pay attention to the framework of the relationship between the United States and India. A framework which he suggested is not easily defined. A summary of his remarks follows:

Although there has been a certain unevenness in the relationship, there is a strong sense of agreement on those broadly-defined goals between the two countries. The major task ahead will be to continue the policy to meet those goals. As long as the larger perspective is kept in mind, perhaps it will be easier for each side to make those adjustments which appear to be more a concession by each side. The whole issue of the stability of the territories of the ex-Soviet Union is critical not only to the international system, but to peace and security in a whole range of areas concerning India. This was also true--for the United States. Greater sensitivity to India's security needs and concerns has emerged even out of this dialogue and discussion.

This co-option term is unsettling because in popular perception perhaps co-option does tend to give a slightly different connotation. On the other hand a partnership requires a certain amount of pushing and pulling, also. But it is a

partnership that just might provide the direction into the future. But the two countries should not allow any single issue to hold the relationship hostage, however important it is.

There are specific aspects that need to be examined much more closely. There is much scope for more workshops and joint studies, and a whole range of other activities: verification, for example, or creating an expertise in verification. Another area could be cooperation in security for the maritime environment. The strategic interests in West Asia, Persian Gulf, Middle East region is yet another subject. On the more serious issues of nuclear, missile, chemical and other proliferation, the government of India has to have the support of Indian public opinion, at least the so-called intelligentsia and the press, in order to proceed.

India needs to advance its understanding and knowledge of verification, the technical aspects of verification, verification technologies and these processes. There needs to be some inter-operability in verification processes. The issue of regional conflicts needs considerable attention. This is extremely critical to India, since such conflicts often encourage strife within India. Conventional arms proliferation needs to be addressed. It is an extremely difficult area and it is an extremely difficult process even to identify its true nature. Perhaps this is also an area where American-Indian cooperation would be extremely useful.

The Indian military's primary experience outside the Indian territorial borders has been in peacekeeping or a peace-enforcing role. In terms of security cooperation, the maritime environment and the security in the maritime environment across a broad range of issues, from poaching up to possible conflict caused by an undefined threat, are vital for India's national interests. This may lend itself to working together at different levels. On the issue of India's military strength, there has to be a certain level of self-reliance, not only in terms of weapons and equipment but in terms of the national confidence that there is a centralized capability that is available. In the area of defense industries, India and the United States could do considerable work together, not merely in the critical high technology areas or the futurist projects like the LCA, but at the medium and low level of technology, as well.

From the Indian perception, any control regime, besides the moral principle of discrimination and other things, automatically means restriction in the availability or access to technology. What will be the benefits of expanding the MTCR regime to give more incentives to more countries to join in? India should join the MTCR, but it needs to be quite clear, not necessarily what to look for in immediate gains, but what are the gains to India. That, of course, is part of that process of cooperation.

The symposium and the whole contribution made from the American side was not only stimulating and highly valuable. It was also a means for providing the opening for policy options to be explored without inhibitions, without any other

difficulties and problems, and to offer to the policy makers certain choices and better mutual understanding .

The Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies closed the Symposium with observations on the future of the bilateral relationship, the success of the symposium program and where does the program go from here. A summary of his remarks follows:

What is the end game for India and the United States, and then also, briefly, procedurally, what at least are the issues that this session has raised and the sorts of things to look at if, indeed, there is, a fourth strategic symposium?

One does not know how this is going to end up, whether it's going to end up in a formal alliance or just better understanding or a lot more cooperation. There has certainly been a sort of sea change in atmosphere and the relationship has moved from A to B, and the vantage point from B is substantially better.

In regards to a fourth symposium the success of this one may have diminished the need for a fourth one. The original function; namely, to provide sort of bypass surgery on a lot of arteries between our countries that, in fact, were blocked, has succeeded, and those arteries are, in fact, no longer blocked. There is the question about how the next meeting should be approached and whether, in fact, the institutes are the right way to go.

A lot of big picture work, a lot of analysis of new roles in the new world order, what some more operationally-minded analysts refer to as "globaloney" has been accomplished in these three symposia. If there is a fourth meeting the level should be depressed down to some very, very specific issues and actually do sort of less strategic and more operational and tactical issues.

Some examples would include a very specific look at avenues for greater economic cooperation between the United States and India. To look very seriously and very specifically at the whole area of tech transfer and what the limits of tech transfer could and should be. Confidence-building measures should be examined, but the specific confidence-building measures that might be suggested and created for the region. Fail-safe mechanisms should be explored, particularly if the goal for the region is not a nuclear-free zone, but a nuclear less-dangerous zone. The future prospects for military cooperation should be given a closer look.

To capitalize upon the prospects for a lasting world order which does not re-configure itself into bipolar hostility, will require our publics and, indeed, the media to be educated on the importance of the role of military forces in the absence of a specific threat.

The Institute has three main customers for whom it fundamentally works and sort of a fourth patron, the State Department, when institutional borders are crossed. Those three customers are the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commanders. A fourth symposium will have to be worked out in concert with all four parties. It is necessary to know if and how the dialogue opened and maintained by our Institutes can, in fact, be helpful for them. Above all, of course, it is important to make sure that the topics considered for a fourth symposium all mesh with these groups and with our distinguished Indian colleagues.

It may be desirable to start relatively shortly after this meeting commissioning a series of papers on these subjects, setting up joint U.S.-Indian teams whose job it will be to take each one of these subjects and whatever other subjects are suggested and agreed upon, and to produce papers. Papers which will set down the areas of agreement and overlap and the areas which, in fact, still need work. And then bring back the symposium format and criticize those papers.

It would be of great value to see those papers published in both countries with relatively high visibility, because one of the things learned from this symposium is the need not simply for people to sit and persuade each of the other's good faith, but to get the dialogue out into the public domain.

It has been enormously satisfying to watch the climate between our two great multi-racial democracies clear and brighten, and to see it come out from under the distorting pressures of the Cold War now that the Cold War is over. And to look forward to seeing that natural relationship develop the way it really should develop, a relationship which was unhappily put on hold for a few decades but which should now flourish and prosper. Hopefully INSS and its counterpart, IDSA, will continue to play some small part in nurturing this new partnership.

OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION ON CENTRAL AND WEST ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

by

Major General D. Banerjee, AVSM

EXORDIUM

There never has actually been a strategic discussion between the USA and India before. What did take place earlier were halting attempts at understanding each other's concerns. Even then, these meetings were perhaps more in the nature of talking at each other rather than a genuine dialogue. The Pune seminar was a major departure, where compulsions of the time led to a more meaningful discussion. As Professor Bernstein remarked, it was "a prelude to a strategic discussion, but not the strategic discussion itself." As we move on now, hopefully to this latter stage, the area under consideration during this session, Central and West Asia, may be a suitable place to begin.

THE GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

It may be useful first to spell out the geographic area constituting Central and West Asia. While the latter clearly includes the Asian territories bordering the Persian Gulf and Israel, there may be a need to delineate Central Asia more clearly as new nations emerge. A minimalist approach may wish to confine it to the area between the Caspian Sea and the Tien Shan mountains, encompassing mainly ethnic Muslim populations. A maximalist interpretation would include a region termed as "Inner Asia" and encompass a wider area of nomadic civilization including the frontiers of Russia and China to the Middle East and India. Indeed the UNESCO sponsored International Association for the Study of the Culture of Central Asia (IASCCA), includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Mongolia, Soviet Union, China (Xinjiang and Tibet) and India.¹

Many in the West may not favor India's inclusion in this region. But any serious student of history cannot fail to link the numerous interactions that have taken place between India and this part of the globe and their continued contemporary relevance. Indeed, all interactions of South Asia with the outside world, from the Aryan to the Moghul periods, spanning several millennia, were almost all with this particular region. A clear example is the enormous cultural and religious linkages that remain to this day between India and all these nations, including distant Mongolia. In any case, a study of security interactions here must take into account India's enormous ties as well as interests.

Geographically, politically, and demographically, the maximalist concept of Central Asia is not merely that of "Inner Asia", but one of being "Central to Eurasia." Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea with its Azeri population overflowing into Iran, the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, Turkic cultural and ethnic predominance, and the presence of large Russian populations in the five Central Asian republics irrevocably connect this area with Europe. The point is that irrespective of whether we adopt a minimalist or maximalist approach, Central Asia may more appropriately be considered as a zone of convergence of the major geo-cultural regions of Eurasia with security interactions spanning both Continents. This view is strengthened when one looks at the population distribution of the region:

Muslim Central Asian Republics' Population 1990

Republics	Population in Millions	Russians	Other Nationalities
Azerbaijan	7.1	6%	6% Armenians
Turkmenistan	3.6	10%	9% Uzbeks 3% Kazaks 1% Ukrainians
Uzbekistan	20.3	8%	5% Tajiks, 4% Kazaks
Tajikistan	5.3	8%	24% Uzbeks, 1% Tatars, 1% Kirghiz, 1% Ukrainians
Kirghistan	4.4	22%	13% Uzbeks, 3% Ukrainians, 2% Germans
Kazakstan	16.7	38%	6% Germans, 5% Ukrainians
Total	57.4	10.04 mil	1.50 million

Sources. "The Soviet Union's Unequal Parts: Diverse and Restless," *The New York Times*, September 11, 1990; *Time*, September 9, 1991; *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1990.

There are other dimensions to this demographic reality. Many of the 32 Muslim communities representing different ethnic identities have played a significant role in Russian history, including the Tatar domination of Russia from 1224-1480. The population growth in the Muslim communities is over 3 percent per annum, much in excess of the rate of increase in the Slavic population. The total Muslim population may well reach around 100 million by early in the next century and be a predominant segment. Afghanistan has almost 4 million Tajiks and 1.7 million

Uzbeks; this will be an important factor in any Afghanistan political order that is to follow. It would also be very surprising if it did not compete with Iran for influence in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan later.

Tumultuous events in recent years have had a profound impact on the world but nowhere perhaps as much as in this region. The Gulf War was fought here, and Soviet Central Asian Republics loosened themselves from the Russian bear hug. The changes that these events have wrought are fundamental, substantial, and irreversible. First, Humpty Dumpty has tumbled and the Wall itself has crumbled--all the Cold War warriors and born-again Communists cannot put it back or rebuild the Wall. Second, an area of the globe that had been turbulent throughout history, but was recently placid under the folds of the Russian embrace, is suddenly confronting new situations which have all the ingredients of reverting to its earlier turbulent phase. This will have a disturbing influence, not merely on these nations, but on the entire world. It is like the emergence of a new seismic zone adjacent to another, perhaps even more powerful one, both with potential to reinforce each other. Third, over the entire region is spread the overarching influence of Islam, presently passing through a new period of revivalism. Lastly, a major complicating factor is the presence of nuclear weapons in some of the Central Asian republics (at least in Kazakstan) and the urge of other oil-rich countries to have them. Their dreams have now come tantalizingly close to fulfillment. This has led to some calling this a sort of "Nuclear Great Game,"² where the major players are now from the south.

The Central Asian Republics have never been economically sound and the sudden severance from the Soviet system is bound to hit most of them hard. A degree of prosperity, certainly compared to that prevailing south of their borders, was possible because of positive discrimination from the Soviet Union. Without this support, and in the absence of other viable economic linkages or assistance, there is a danger of the region's slipping into underdevelopment.³ Should this happen, then there is every chance of the rise of militant Islam. Hunger, radical Islam and nuclear weapons indeed make an explosive mix.⁴

There is not likely to be any divergence in our perceptions of the geostrategic importance of West Asia; its enormous oil reserves ensure this. Though oil availability has eased considerably and the price is likely to remain low in the early 1990s, the prediction for the latter half of the decade is different. If Russian production does not revive, and recession ends in the West as expected, demand will soon outstrip supply. This will then lead again to serious imbalances and may become a cause for future conflict.

While the assured availability of oil is an important factor, and one over which external powers may consider going to war, the price of oil has another potential for conflict for the producing nations. Depression in the price of oil through abundant production by some, reduces cash flow in the less affluent producers and has been

used as an instrument of deliberate policy in the past. The oil price was purposely kept low by the Gulf states during the Iran-Iraq War to pressure Iran. Saddam Hussein was affected in a similar way in 1989-90 when Kuwait and Saudi Arabia continued their "over production," which he cited as one of his reasons for attacking Kuwait.

On the other hand, Central Asia may well be an area of peripheral concern to the U.S. Afghanistan was strategically important only in the context of the Soviet Union; after Soviet withdrawal, interest has understandably waned. The other trouble spots in the world all received greater attention and more efforts were made for their resolution.

It is perhaps necessary to put in perspective the different views of emerging developments in Central Asia. The nations of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan have many common features. All share an intense dislike of Russian domination and resent strongly its overbearing influence. Yet all depend on the Russian people for much of their skilled manpower. Their economies are deeply intertwined with Russia's. This link is difficult to break suddenly, even though it hurts them both during the transition. All Central Asian nations have a much higher degree of education and social awareness than their neighbors in the south, making them more resistant to Islamic revivalist influences. Still, religion has touched a long dormant chord in people's hearts, even if the resonance is as yet neither deep nor in unison. All republics except Azerbaijan have overwhelming Sunni Muslim populations that are more resistant to Iran, but are nevertheless susceptible to the Wahabi influence from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have launched a major campaign to propagate Islam through a program of heavy funding to build mosques and establish religious schools in an attempt to outflank Iran.

What the Central Asian populations crave is not religious dogma, but western technology and markets which are more likely to be fulfilled through their Turkic connections. Hence Turkey, with its secular characteristics, European identity, and free market economy is a more attractive model.⁵ This is indeed a great deterrent to the emergence of Islamic revivalism. But it is also true that in all countries there are elements which have positioned themselves skillfully to exploit the Islamic card should any weaknesses emerge in the ruling elite.

More interesting is the effort by Iran to win over the Central Asian Republics. It is strenuously attempting to develop a strategic and economic link with these nations and with Pakistan. A two day summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization was held on 16-17 February 1992 in Teheran in an attempt at creating a Muslim Common Market. Efforts are on to link these nations with Iran through a natural-gas pipeline and to provide them an outlet to the sea in the Persian Gulf.

Pakistan too is wooing the Central Asian Republics. Its Prime Minister has said that the Ummah must embrace these new Islamic countries within its fold. He claims that they were looking up to the Muslim world and that "We must not fail them." Pakistan is now sponsoring their membership into the Organization of Islamic Countries. Arrangements are being seriously considered to open trade routes through Pakistan. Such assistance to these countries is indeed welcome and cannot be faulted. There are many potential mutual advantages. In the first 45 years of its history, Pakistan did not have any direct relationship with this region in the fields of trade or culture. But it is in search of "strategic depth," a much vaunted concept initiated by the previous Pakistani Army Chief. Yet the emergence of a new Afghanistan with its Pashtoon aspirations fired by "victory," spilling across the Durand Line will cause the same instabilities to Pakistan as it did during the 19th and early 20th centuries to British India.

There has been no major development in the Arabian peninsula to bring about democracy in the region. The steps that have been taken recently in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been belated, halting, and limited. Will these satisfy local aspirations? If not, could these dissatisfactions be exploited by others to destabilize these monarchies?

China's western province of Xinjiang is part of Central Asia and is bound to be affected, probably for the worse, whichever direction these nations follow. Xinjiang has been restless since the riots of early 1989 which were quelled by China with substantial force. With over half its population being Muslims of Turkish extraction, Xinjiang—which was part of a semi-autonomous state of East Turkistan before the Communist took over—cannot but make Beijing feel concerned. Therefore, it wants to "form a steel wall to safeguard socialism and the unification of the motherland."⁶ But steel walls cannot shut out ideas of freedom, as China herself knows too well.

THREATS TO SECURITY

Given this backdrop, it is important to consider the crises that may emerge and the threats they pose to security. Three characteristics prevail in the region and contribute to insecurity. One is artificial borders. Almost all nations have borders that were bestowed by colonial dispensation, whether British or Russian. These were often designed specifically to divide and primarily to serve the interests of the colonial regime. As a result, there are many unsettled, if not disputed, boundaries. The one between Kazakhstan and China is one example which has been made even more complex by recent events.

Next is the potential for ethnic conflict which may be seen in two dimensions: one is inter-ethnic problems; the other the rise of radical ethnic nationalism. Inter-ethnic conflict is not restricted merely to different ethnic minorities, but is likely to

take on progressively an anti-Russian orientation. The situation could be aggravated as economic reforms hopefully bring prosperity, and conflicting demands develop for sharing in the expected gains. This is what happened in Kirghizia in June 1990, when some 200 people were killed, as Uzbeks rose against the Kirghiz. The former had strong economic interests whereas the latter controlled the political structure. The potential for anti-Russian pogroms is also huge, especially if anticipated economic progress does not materialize. Should this happen, it is difficult to imagine how Russia would remain immune to its consequences.⁷

Radical ethnic nationalist movements are more likely in the politically backward republics. Anti-Uzbek feelings are probably next only to anti-Russian sentiments in all the republics save Uzbekistan. There are 17 million Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and several millions more in the other republics, making them the largest ethnic community. Uzbek assertiveness has manifested itself frequently in the past and hence has a certain validity.⁸ There are other ethnic tribes that spill over national frontiers, complicating an already serious problem of national identity.

Conflict over territorial claims was exemplified by the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. What is not so obvious is the possibility of many such disputes being created during attempts to legitimize ideas of grandeur or achieve economic gains. Where annexation of oil fields under the barren desert can bestow untold wealth, excuses will not be difficult to conjure.

Islamic Revivalism or Muslim Fundamentalism

In a detailed and excellent presentation, Dr. Phebe Marr examined the essence of Islamic revivalism in the dialogue at Pune, in 1990.⁹ She drew a comparison with revivalism in other religions and identified their basic causes as spiralling population growth and adverse economic developments. She identified political tendencies and future trends and examined some regional scenarios. This study is indeed admirable and continues to be very relevant today in spite of the passage of 16 turbulent months.

Nonetheless, from a security perspective, one cannot help but note some very disturbing trends in the emergence of Islam. First, it is important to consider what revivalism has actually come to mean. It is not only resurgence or revival of an ancient and dormant religion. It is not merely a return to scriptural literalism, and hence one that may not be strictly termed as "fundamentalism." The idea of going back in history to adhere to tenets laid down centuries ago, in a different context, is what signifies its actual nature. Its basis of inequality between peoples and sexes, rigid adherence to Koranic strictures interpreted by Mullahs, denial of democracy in practice, rejection of a secular and tolerant approach, and the identification of State with the Mosque—all have enormous security connotations.

It is true that Islam has seldom unified nations and is perhaps more fractious today than ever before. There are numerous sects and the Shia-Sunni divide is real and deep. There are Arabic and Persian influences and Southeast Asian Muslims have a considerably different alignment altogether. Central Asian Muslims, after 70 years under Communist rule, have lost their Islamic moorings. Yet, the fundamentalist forces have a peculiar appeal, especially in times of economic distress, when the people's sense of wrong is heightened and where patriotic fervor is aroused by whichever ideologue has the pulpit at the moment. These sentiments have especially been fuelled by the rapid construction of mosques and Madrassas (Islamic schools). For example, in Tajikistan (population 4 million) there were 17 mosques and 19 churches only two years ago; today there are 2,870 mosques and 19 churches. There is growing adoption of Islamic symbolism by all opposition parties to mobilize the people against the local ex-Communist elite.¹⁰ It may be only a matter of time before they fall as ninepins, one by one, but fairly rapidly. Who and what takes their place remains unknown for the present.

The appeal to Islamic Ummah is natural and spontaneous even though not always effective. Saddam Hussein's sudden adoption of religious practices, captured in the State media, and his attempts to divert Muslim attention by trying to convert his aggression of Kuwait into a conflict with Israel, was according to this practice. Muammar Gaddafi, while facing UN sanctions, again appealed to the Islamic Ummah on April 4, 1992.

It is from this perspective that we may have to reconsider our earlier security related view of Islam, which essentially considered it to be a nuisance, but not a major threat. There is good reason now to concur with Amos Perlmutter's view that, "Islamic fundamentalism of the Sunni or Shia variety ... is not merely resistant to democracy but wholly contemptuous of and hostile to the entire democratic political culture.... There is no spirit of reconciliation between Islamic fundamentalism and the modern world."

Rearming the Gulf

The end of the Gulf War saw a massive rearming in the region. Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran were the major spenders. It may be sufficient to highlight the weapon acquisitions of the last two.

Saudi Arabia has decided to treble the size of its Army to 200,000 troops in eight combat divisions. Since the Kuwaiti invasion, Saudi Arabia has placed orders in the USA alone for \$30 billions worth of arms. Though there may be some stagger in the actual acquisition, the first phase of the deal of \$7.3 billion is one of the largest in history and includes the following principal components:

- An armored vehicle package, including 150 M 1 tanks, 400 APCs, 60 recovery vehicles, and 50 cargo carriers.
- 150 TOW-II missile launchers with night vision equipment.
- Nine multiple launch rocket systems.
- 384 Patriot missiles and six launchers.
- 12 Apache helicopter gun ships.
- 8 Med-evac helicopters.
- Upgrading of the Navy's C3I system.
- 10,000 smaller military vehicles.
- Seven Boeing KC-130 tanker aircraft.
- Ten C -130 transport aircraft.¹¹

The pity of it is that such large scale rearmament does not necessarily guarantee security. Saudi Arabia only hopes to achieve a delay capability through enhanced deterrence against an attack by Iraq or Iran. But this in turn leads to rearmament in a neighboring region, causing further instability. Iran's efforts are relevant in this context.

If there was a clear winner in the Gulf War, it was Iran. Not only did it find all its occupied lands vacated during the prelude, on the commencement of fighting it received a bounty of 91 Iraqi combat aircraft of Soviet origin. Subsequently, Iran gained acceptance in the world and found its influence greatly enhanced. Since then it has embarked on a remarkable arms build-up designed to restore its earlier status as a "superpower in the Gulf."

In recent years, Iran has purchased around US \$10 billion worth of arms from the Soviet Union. During Mr. Rafsanjani's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1989, arrangements were made to buy MIG-29 fighters and T-72 tanks worth a total of \$1.9 billion. A subsequent deal in July 1991 added another 100 MIG-29, 48 MIG-31, 24 Sukhoi-24s and 500 T-72 tanks. It has recently purchased some 24 MIG-27 D/J nuclear capable fighter-bombers. By refurbishing the 91 Soviet combat aircraft and including them in its own armory, Iran now has a strike force of about 400 modern aircraft which can be matched only by Israel in the region.¹²

Many countries apart from the Soviet Union have contributed to Iran's military capability and extracted a good price. North Korea has delivered advanced Scud missiles; the USA has supplied about \$60 million worth of high technology exports; and China has been a consistent arms supplier to it and has recently begun supporting Iran's nuclear research.¹³

In a fairly well documented study, Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, in its Special Edition of February 1992, explained how Iran acquired three nuclear weapons for a sum of \$130-150 million. It is also reported to have recruited

some 50 experts and 200 technicians from the Semipalatinsk-21 nuclear production plant near Kurchatov, Kazakstan.

What would be the consequences of a powerful Iran? With its adversary Iraq so thoroughly weakened and scores yet to settle, will Teheran remain quiet? If Iran were to bide its time and await an opportune moment, perhaps a few years hence, will there be a similar international response as in 1990 to compel it to adhere to international norms?

REACHING A CONSENSUS

To build a basis for a cooperative partnership it is important to reach a consensus on important issues. It is proposed to spell out a few of these as they pertain to this particular region and see if we can agree and, if so, to what extent.

INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS

The first issue is the principle of the inviolability of international borders which includes a moratorium on any alteration to existing boundaries. The present boundaries, however iniquitous they may appear to be, must not be changed for at least another two decades. Even the straight lines drawn on the map should remain what they are for at least another generation. This was after all the principle behind the war in the Gulf and international consensus was based on it. Any attempt to change even one boundary would lead to convulsive changes in other areas. There would then be no end to further divisions and mergers. In Central Asia alone, wars between the tribes would make the Yugoslavian civil war appear civil in comparison. The fall-out in surrounding states will be no less important.

ROLE OF THE UN

The end of the Cold War has brought the UN to center stage. Its legitimacy is not questioned and its role in international mediation and peace is being increasingly accepted. This needs to be reaffirmed. There is great potential in the organization, only some of which is being exploited. Its numerous peace missions have to be supported. India has consistently participated in its many operations for four decades and surely there is room for cooperation between our countries on this. Yet a note of caution is appropriate. The UN's powers for enforcement of peace is essentially based on consensus and support from all nations involved in a dispute. There should be no scope for coercive use of force or for imposing the UN in bilateral problems where other avenues are available for resolution. Some restructuring too is necessary in the composition of the Security Council where the developing world

is inadequately represented.

CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy is an aspiration of the people and no outside power can bring it to a nation as manna from heaven. Democracy, when it truly represents the will of the people, often leads to resolution of disputes without conflict and positive actions for the betterment of its populace. This is especially important in regions like Central and West Asia where it has not been given sufficient chance to take root. There must be areas where we can work together in this region to enhance its prospects.

RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

There are many trends against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and, especially in Central Asia, it appears that the people are genuinely not interested in it. But it will be quite wrong to underestimate its potential. The emergence of a fundamentalist clique in Afghanistan will, for example, be a very powerful signal and provide that very important linkage. There is a remote possibility of a single Islamic bloc emerging, involving Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics, and Pakistan. But only a few years ago Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, General Zia's intelligence chief, talked of a holy war against the Communist world that would not be confined to Afghanistan alone, and would be pursued into Central Asia as a continuation of the Jihad against Communism. Even the emergence of a fundamentalist grouping of a few nations will be destabilizing and should be prevented.

NUCLEARIZATION OF THE REGION

This is a reality that must be faced. There are many nuclear weapon states; Israel, Iran, Kazakstan, and Pakistan all have the Bomb. The question, therefore, is not merely one of proliferation, but of evolving security mechanisms that take into account this new reality.

TERRORISM

Lastly is the question of terrorism. There can be no two opinions on this most heinous crime which has come on to its own in the present century. Along with other forms, we are perhaps close to seeing nuclear terrorism emerge as a real possibility. Every effort should be made at all possible levels to tackle this menace. Much work needs to be done in this regard. First could be a condemnation of all such activities

already taking place in strong and unequivocal terms. Next we need to evolve mechanisms to counter terrorism. A new dimension is that of launching a proxy war through covert use of force. Unless checked, this may well become a new way to conduct future aggression. A more sophisticated and clever Saddam, adopting variations of these techniques, would have been very difficult to counter.

PROPOSALS FOR ACTION

There are certain macro measures that need to be considered to enhance our strategic understanding. First, may well be the acceptance by the US that India cannot be looked at only as a South Asian entity confined to the SAARC nations. This is not how India looks at itself. India is a part of Southern Asia, interacting closely with and being influenced by developments in West and Central Asia, China, and Southeast Asia. The Pentagon and the State Department may like to consider whether an integrated view can be taken of the region as a whole and whether structural adjustments within these organizations would help improve this perception.

The "Kicklighter proposals" as a basis of interaction at the military-to-military level are a welcome measure. They will help in understanding better each other's concerns and lead to cooperation at the operational level. However, they tend to limit India's security interaction with the USA only to the East. It is necessary, perhaps imperative, that a similar relationship should evolve with CENTCOM. This may need to be formalized with India's own regional commands.

It may be necessary to deepen our understanding of some developments that may have security implications for both our nations. Two issues may be considered: one is an analysis of strategic developments in Central Asia; another is a study of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism and its impact on security. A joint academic study may help in clarifying our doubts and overcoming our apprehensions. A detailed study of terrorism is a must. It should be analyzed both in a wider perspective, and at the training and operational levels. The macro aspects will identify sources of terrorism and means to counter it at the political level. State sponsored terrorism must be curbed at all levels. International financing, often with drug money, has to end. At the training and operational levels, there are many areas of cooperation and information sharing which need to be identified.

CONCLUSION

In the suddenly altered strategic environment today, the region that has been affected most is probably Central and West Asia. The end of the bipolar world and the break-up of the Soviet Union have created many instabilities which have the

potential to cause a shatter effect in the entire region. Every state is passing through a period of major adjustment. While many will be able to cope with these developments, the possibility of failures cannot be ruled out. The environment provides both opportunities and challenges. The start of the peace process in West Asia and a likely early resolution of the Afghanistan problem are the positive developments. Among the negative are the possible economic collapse of some Central Asian states and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Will these be seriously destabilizing? Will the rearming of the area coupled with unresolved issues create new scenarios of conflict?

Both our nations share the same visions of democracy and freedom, ideals which have been vindicated even more substantially in recent days. India is on the move. Adoption of market led economic policies are likely to see an unshackling of India's economic potential. Certain rigid policy formulations of an earlier era will also undergo changes. Given this environment and the regional situation, our mutual efforts are necessary and should contribute to stability in this vital strategic region.

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FORGING A GLOBAL CONCERT OF DEMOCRATIC STATES FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

by

Alvin H. Bernstein

"How, MacArthur asked himself, (when he learned that North Korea had invaded the South), could the United States have allowed such a deplorable situation to develop? In 1945 America had been the strongest military power in the world. But in the short space of five years this power had been frittered away in a bankruptcy of positive and courageous leadership toward any long-range objectives. Again I asked myself, 'What is the United States policy in Asia?' And the appalling thought came, 'The United States has no definite policy in Asia.'"

John Toland, "IN MORTAL COMBAT: Korea, 1950-1953"

INTRODUCTION

Now that the Soviet military threat to the western democracies has dissipated, it will take time before the foreign and defense policies of the United States are fully and properly reformulated. Inevitably, a great many ingredients will determine what strategy replaces the now obsolete cold war strategy of containment: the state of the U.S. economy, the effect limited demobilization will have on that economy, Americans' perceptions of the future threats the new international environment may generate, events that still lie hidden in an unseen future, the outcome of next November's presidential election and the vision of the leadership that emerges from it, to name but a few.

We are witnessing the early stages of what promises to be a prolonged national debate. It is always rash to predict the behavior of democracies. But it would be surprising if Americans now depart from what has become a central characteristic of their strategic culture. They will almost certainly avoid the extremes: we are unlikely to see the United States retreat into an unlovely, self-absorbed, and in many ways irresponsible isolationism. And it is equally improbable that America will resurrect its discredited role as global policeman—even under the new euphemism "*Pax Americana*"—for which it now certainly lacks both the will and the resources. A new vision is required to enable our leadership to forge a consensus for a new foreign policy, to craft an international role that the American populace deems worthy and appropriate, on the one hand, and at a cost they are willing and able to afford, on the other.

We have been in this position before. It is, after all, the third time in this century that the United States has emerged victorious from a prolonged global struggle with an expansionist, anti-democratic adversary. It has been our great good fortune to have realized our political objectives while preventing the Cold War of the last 40 years from resulting in a cataclysmic hot war that civilization could not have survived. In large measure American will, strength, sacrifice and, above all, leadership have produced this great strategic victory.

Once again, therefore, we are at a major crossroads in our history. We must avoid repeating the mistake made in the wake of our triumphs after both World Wars I and II and never again pay the bitter price paid in 1941 and in 1950 for an incautious optimism. The blood and treasure that containment of the Soviet Union within its own extended borders required should not yield merely a short-term peace dividend. We must not forget that since the end of World War II, 22 million people have lost their lives in "small wars"—8 million more than the number killed in World War I. While it may not be dominated by ideological conflict, the post-cold war era in world history could become even more violent than its predecessor.

FORGING A GLOBAL CONCERT OF DEMOCRATIC STATES

We face not only a dilemma, but also stand on an historic threshold beyond which lies great opportunity. If we act with prudence and foresight, we can bequeath to our children and their children, a world of peace not conflict, one of stability not chaos. But to do this, the United States will have to forge the necessary global concert of democratic states which bids fair in the long-term to maintain the peace we have paid for with tens of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars. We cannot do this on our own, but we can take the lead in creating a peaceful world because of our unmatched military power. That power, buttressed by our will and the support of our allies, can go a long way toward deterring aggression, thereby saving both ourselves and them from the necessity of a costly and, quite possibly, deadly renewal of the arms race. But this opportunity will slip from our grasp if, having won this long struggle, we now either retreat into isolationism or attempt to go it alone.

To reap the benefits of our victory, we need not maintain the considerable defense budgets that our competition with the Soviets required. We have already begun cutting our defense spending on an appropriate scale. The preservation of peace need not require that we pay more than our fair share of the common defense to ensure the promotion of the interests of the world's democracies, and those who now aspire to join our ranks. We should not—we cannot—shoulder a disproportionate amount of the burden; but our contribution can be unique, as we shall see.

In the long run, the most significant threat which the United States and its

allies could face would be the emergence of a hostile, peer competitor. Such an adversary, while as difficult to envisage now as it must have been in the 1920's and again in the immediate afterglow of World War II, is hardly unthinkable over the span of the next generation. Such a country or, more likely, coalition of countries would constitute a "peer" in the sense that they would have both the technological and doctrinal sophistication, if not to defeat us on the field of battle, then at least to present us with a constraining global challenge such as we knew throughout the Cold War.

As we look toward the long-term future, therefore, we should strive to preserve a global concert of major, like-minded, democratic powers which supports our common interests in what is certain to become a more politically complex world where military power may be much more widely distributed than it is at the moment. The effect of the diffusion will be all the more significant, proceed more rapidly, and have greater effect in a world in which the United States not only reduces the size of its military forces, but also relinquishes its substantial lead in advanced military technologies. Thus, our national strategy for the post-Cold War era may wish to improve the quality while it reduces the size of American armed forces.

THE ASIAN ARC

While Europe will continue to be an important center of power, present trends indicate a strong possibility that the global fulcrum will shift increasingly toward the great Asian arc that reaches from Petropovlosk to the Persian Gulf and includes the Indian subcontinent. This area already includes over half the planet's population and enjoys its highest economic growth rates. In the early decades of the twenty-first century, it may well emerge as the world's economic and technological center of power. Japan, Russia, and China could all theoretically contend for hegemonical ascendancy in this region, while India, Indonesia, a united Korea, and perhaps even Iran at the head of a radical Islamic bloc, already are or could become serious military powers in their own rights. Any power or coalition that dominated this crucial region could, in a matter of time, amass the potential to extend its power globally. In effect, the Asian arc may assume the geostrategic importance in the twenty-first century that the great Eurasian land mass enjoyed in the nineteenth and twentieth.

A prudent policy, embarked upon now, can minimize the possibility that a rival center of power will emerge and that we shall be confronted by a hostile peer competitor in the future. A challenge from the Asian arc, or from any other quarter for that matter, can be forestalled and prevented provided that we persuade today's allies and friends that they do not need to translate their economic and technological prowess into global military might. By demonstrating that we remain committed to safeguarding our common interests, we can help deflect the rise of alternative

military superpowers among today's friends. All but one of our potential competitors, the People's Republic of China, enjoy or aspire to democratic governments. We can deprive chauvinistic elements within those states of the arguments they would need to persuade their nations to increase spending on defense beyond what is necessary for legitimate burden-sharing and for their own security requirements. This will require a continuing, though of necessity diminished U.S. commitment that makes nonsense of the argument that these challengers require new and greatly expanded military roles to fill the vacuum created by American retrenchment and to rearm in order to free themselves from dependence on an uncertain ally. This will require nurturing and transforming our alliance structure—and in some instances creating new alliances—both in Europe and in Asia, to meet the conditions of a changing international security environment so that current allies maintain complementary rather than competitive and comprehensive force structures.

TECHNOLOGY, STABILITY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The dissolution of the Soviet threat to Western Europe is only one, albeit the most important change that will characterize the international environment in the course of the next generation and beyond. There may be other changes—and challenges—as Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait has shown. Our victory in the Gulf War will have the benefit of deterring other would-be aggressors from acting out their expansionist ambitions, at least for a while. Nor will such regional bullies threaten us, our allies, and our interests on anything like the scale of the Soviet threat under which most of us have lived all our lives. Smaller threats, however, do not simply require smaller arsenals. The military issue most occupying Washington minds at the moment is the proper size of the base force, that is, the extent to which the American force structure can be prudently reduced. Here, I should like to address not the issue of size, but rather of the kinds of forces that will be required, given the likely nature of the military missions that our and our allies' armed forces may be called upon to execute in the decades to come.

The peaceful democracies of the world must now begin the gradual transformation of the structures of their armed forces so that they can meet the challenges and successfully accomplish the missions that the future may have in store for us. Most of those challenges, at least for the foreseeable future, are likely to be mounted at the regional rather than global level.

The military missions of the post-cold war era will grow out of a different international environment from the one we have known over the past forty years. Therefore, they will be different from what we have equipped and trained our armed forces to perform. Some of the peripheral actions that our armies and navies were, of necessity and often unexpectedly, called upon to perform in the decades since the

end of World War II may now become central. Those missions may arise from the conflictual chaos that will almost certainly continue to characterize large segments of the so-called second and third worlds; chaos caused by population pressures, economic stagnation, possible ecological catastrophes and, above all, the political instability built into great parts of the old Soviet empire and sections of the developing world—especially where they intersect in central and southwest Asia—because of ethnic diversity and questions of legitimacy.

The majority of the developing world will probably suffer from ever-greater threats to their well-being. Weakened from birth by a lack of cohesive national identity, the negative legacies of colonialism, and great inequities in the distribution of wealth, authoritarian governments that enjoy little legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects also face a the threat of explosive population growth. As it has for the last two centuries, the population of the world is increasing at a higher rate with every passing year. But in contrast to the eighteenth, nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, this growth now is confined to the world's poorer countries. At present, the population of the developing countries is doubling every 25 years. In contrast, Europe's population will remain virtually constant for the next thirty-five years, that of the United States will grow only because of immigration, while that of Japan will actually decline.

There are a few signs that the leaders of the developing countries will be able to cope with this explosive problem. Most of the elite of the developing world have recently come to reject socialism as the bogus solution to economic problems that it is, and have witnessed the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism in the land of its birth. Encouraged by the examples of South Korea, Taiwan and the recently-freed nations of Eastern Europe, many developing countries have moved toward market-based economies and liberal political systems. It remains to be seen, however, if such trends will continue. The political interests of the leadership of many developing nations and long-standing cultural factors argue against success in many cases.

If the outcome of these struggles is negative, then competition over increasingly scarce resources will weaken much of the developing world. Governments that are already hard-pressed will be extremely fortunate to prevent the further deterioration of the current dismal state of affairs. As a result, by the second quarter of the 21st century, the developing world will likely be even more conflict ridden, fractious and poverty stricken than today. Many countries will have ceased to develop and certain of them will be falling into a black pit of despair.

For the most part, the resulting violence in the developing world should be internal to those countries. Coups, revolutions and insurgencies will be far more prevalent than aggression across national borders. However, some leaders of developing states may attempt to offset their problems at home with a bellicose foreign policy. Others may seek to take advantage of instability or chaos in

neighboring countries by supporting one side in civil wars or domestic unrest. But whether such conflict is national or international, the resources devoted to the pursuit of such struggles will further reduce what is available to deal with starvation, disease and natural disasters. As a result, a dramatic increase in human misery throughout much of the developing world can be expected over the next generation.

On occasion, the United States and some of its allies will wish to become involved because common interests will be at stake, or because a conflict may be threatening to escalate, either geographically or vertically to unacceptable levels of violence, or because the national consciousness being what it is, we shall wish to intervene for humanitarian reasons. The assumption is not that the United States will decide to shoulder the burden of the world's policeman, but only that we may, decide selectively that military intervention is necessary.

Military missions may continue to be generated in reaction to the activities of the next generation of expansionist autocrats who seek to capitalize on the weakness or the problems of their neighbors, and countries who will use expansionist policies to divert attention from their internal failings. This is especially likely to occur if we and the other members of the democratic world have dilapidated our military forces to the extent that they can no longer present a convincing deterrent. But the quality and the nature of our forces will be more crucial than their size. The proliferation of advanced technologies will mean that the next generation of Saddam Husseins will possess capabilities equivalent or superior to some—I do not say the full panoply—of those employed in DESERT STORM. Accordingly, if we cease being vigilant, we risk facing the danger that some future aggressor will successfully use Saddam's failed strategy of attempting to raise the cost of an intervention beyond what the world's free and democratic nations involved may consider legitimate to pay.

CHANGED MISSIONS FOR A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT

The kinds of missions that such crises will generate will not be entirely new but they will be different from those designed for containing an expansionist Soviet Union. What is especially important to remember, however, is that such missions could be greatly facilitated by new military technologies which appear to be just over the horizon and whose progenitors have already made their inaugural debut in OPERATION DESERT STORM. We should, first, expect the battlefield of the future to become increasingly transparent because of improvements in satellite and sensor technologies. Second, we may be fairly confident that increasingly accurate precision guided munitions will mean that whatever can be seen can be struck and destroyed. And finally, targeting and destroying enemy battlefield units will be accomplished at levels of efficiency previously unimaginable, thanks to upgrades in communications capabilities and software integration which will be able to assimilate and process enormous amounts of information with inconceivable rapidity.

Accordingly, let us look at some of the kinds of military missions that may be generated by conditions in the post-cold war period and see how those missions might be greatly facilitated by the military capabilities that the new technologies will confer, capabilities that will greatly favor the defending forces and provide additional avenues for deterring and defeating aggression.

Heading the list of future security missions will be the time honored role of establishing and preserving core security. This will almost certainly continue the shift it has already begun away from deterrence and towards the defense of our territories against weapons of mass destruction. In future decades an increasing number of nations are likely to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the long range (eventually intercontinental) missiles to deliver them. Control of the upper atmosphere and space will be essential for dealing with this since it will allow us to buttress core security by enhancing our ability to perform strategic surveillance and target illumination.

We may also decide that we wish to affect the outcome of a regional conflict without placing large numbers of our service men and women in harm's way. We should therefore envisage preserving or creating a wide range of options designed to help protect our friends from their enemies: providing them with intelligence and arms; performing the twin missions of establishing command of the sea and control of the air on their behalf; missions we should easily be able to perform for the foreseeable future. Finally, we may wish to be able to place a tactical or strategic umbrella over a friendly nation to protect it from enemy missiles. Some of the new information technologies will also help us to influence the outcome of a regional conflict.

We shall also, on occasion, wish to contain a conflict and prevent it from spreading geographically without becoming directly involved in it, as the United States did in OPERATION EARNEST WILL during the Iran/Iraq war with our naval forces. Such missions will entail using military forces to create a fire lane through, or serve as a fire break around a conflict to prevent it from interfering with vital supplies to us and our allies. Some of the new, micro-sensor technologies will eventually enable us to establish a *cordon sanitaire* around a battle zone, rendering the area impenetrable to all without safe-passage codes. The ability to deter regional aggression, a conspicuous failure over the past generation, will thereby be greatly facilitated when future Saddam Husseins understand that crossing their victim's border places all their equipment in harm's way, since they will be completely, immediately and instantly targetable.

We may also wish to prevent a regional conflict in which we are not directly involved from escalating vertically to unacceptable levels of violence through the use of deadly chemical, biological or nuclear technologies. Information technologies may eventually offer a surgical approach to make it difficult for belligerents to

communicate certain kinds of messages. A non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse or microwave burst could prevent rivals from using their own communication systems to order nuclear strikes. Other techniques might flood communications channels to their capacity with useless information to the same end.

Another mission involves measures to dissuade a potential aggressor or to punish an actual trouble-maker. The mission might be called "punitive intrusion" and its essence would be brevity (of duration), accuracy (of targeting) and lethality (in the discrete and awesome amount of damage inflicted). This mission covers a broad range of operations, perhaps best exemplified in strike operations against Libya in 1986. As more countries develop increasingly sophisticated infrastructures, the vulnerability of rogue countries to such strikes will increase. This mission will require the ability to counter enemy C⁴I while securing our own, to gather intelligence, and to identify targets and destroy them accurately. Most important will be our ability to penetrate air defense systems.

More than ever before, the United States armed forces will have to assume responsibility for a number of non-traditional support roles. Armies have many capabilities beyond direct military intervention. Furthermore, in an era of fiscal austerity, comparable capabilities are unlikely to be created for new or old agencies. As a result, the military is likely to be called upon to perform a broad range of missions such as refugee protection, disaster relief, population evacuation, border control, drug interdiction, infrastructural assistance, and environmental protection. For such non-combat missions, the military generally will be able to respond with existing assets rather than requiring new platforms or systems. Requirements for such missions will include intelligence gathering, surveillance, and monitoring capabilities; training and education cadres to assist in national development programs; and crisis emergency teams with adequate lift, personnel, and equipment.

These roles will also be affected by the new technologies. Consider the task of evacuating civilian populations under fire. Such a task takes on importance now that we understand that the defense of a city's people—the source of skills and knowledge—is more important than defense of inanimate territory or buildings. A skilled and literate population might reconstitute its capabilities were it transported to Western Australia or British Columbia. Sensors, satellites, miniprojectiles, and lasers could provide a *cordon sanitaire* for weeks, behind which larger successors to the 747 or the C-5, working around the clock, could evacuate a hundred thousand people or more a day.

A derivative version of the *cordon sanitaire* can also enhance core security. Countries not willing to confront the world's democracies directly might attempt to introduce nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons into our cities covertly. To counter them, we might employ myriad sensors to track all incoming ships, aircraft, and trucks. Small sensors, perhaps not much larger than bottle tops, could be made mobile by installing them in microbots which could search through containers and

detect the presence of such illicit materials (including drugs) before ever they reach our shores.

Finally, information technology could make many other forms of supporting humanitarian roles possible. Tomorrow's denser data grids will make it easier for our armed services to undertake disaster relief. For example, we should be able to assess damage more quickly and begin to coordinate relief efforts more effectively. Where expert medical or engineering assistance would be needed, such knowledge could be made available almost instantaneously through a combination of deployable expert systems, and live remote video hook-ups.

R & D, ACQUISITIONS AND RECONSTITUTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

With the end of the Cold War, the United States can look forward to ten or twenty years in which it can maintain leadership in defense technology with only modest effort. As a consequence, we should stress long-term technology over short- and medium term. A core R&D strategy should concentrate on five areas:

1. Electronics (sensors, emitters and microprocessors);
2. Nanotechnologies (microscopic mechanical and chemical devices);
3. Energy (photovoltaic, compact storage and beam delivery);
4. Software (with an emphasis on systems integration);
5. Manufacturing technology (so that we can mass produce components efficiently).

However, with nothing but hypothetical threats and procurement budgets severely constrained, what kind of procurement strategy should the United States adopt? The answer is a hedging strategy based first of all on how smart companies operate under conditions of uncertainty. It should have four main components: prototyping; concentrating on core competencies, cycle-time reduction, and reconstitution.

Prototypes have traditionally been undertaken by industry in this country in the expectation of a major procurement program at the end of them. This has limited the number of technologies that can be evaluated for their effectiveness. But when the technological and strategic uncertainties are great, it may be more sensible to design and finance many prototypes and purchase only small numbers of each. This broadens the range of capabilities that we can usefully explore if we are not sure exactly what kind of weapon systems we need. It also means we shall have to provide new incentives for the industries which elect to compete for such contracts.

Concentrating on core competence—the specialties that make any organization

competitive—is natural because we stand alone in our mastery of defense technology. In the not-too-distant future, every major weapons system on the battlefield may either be of our own design or a copy. We excel at software and systems integration—precisely the sort of competence needed to manage large groups of very small objects. A core competence strategy would therefore concentrate our energies on what we do best. The military requirements for this will be found in maintaining our research efforts in the R&D of sensor systems; in improving our ability to use space for intelligence gathering and target illumination; in increasing our lift capacities by developing light-weight fuels, compact power units, and lighter ordnance. While we are doing this, we shall wish to ensure that the overall U.S. force structure is not considered threatening, thus prompting the very arms race it is attempting to render unnecessary and obsolete. This will be best achieved by developing and demonstrating capabilities without actually deploying the weapon systems, so that our allies understand our effort for what it is—keeping warm the capability to meet an unforeseen threatening contingency in the future.

Cycle-time reduction aims to shorten the time it takes to field new systems, and ensure that what is fielded has incorporated the latest technology. We need to work more closely with defense producers in developing technology and administrative procedures which can cut cycle times across the board. Using more self-contained modular components—each able to fit into a standard socket, for example—will help to reduce this time.

Finally, we know from experience that it is important for us to be able to reconstitute personnel, equipment, and the industrial base upon which our arms production depends, in a timely manner. We are only beginning, however, to grasp the interplay between reconstitution and technology. Normally, we think of reconstitution as something we plan for by ensuring that current production lines have enough capacity to accommodate a production surge in a crisis. A prototyping strategy, however, will not leave many active and correctly sized production lines to work with. Instead, we shall be relying on commercial industry in an unforeseen crisis. This means planning to get at least the components of tomorrow's defense systems from the same production lines that support commercial systems. For this to happen, tomorrow's weapons have to be designed with such parts to begin with.

CONCLUSIONS

It is our vital interest, and in the interests of all peaceful nations, to prevent a renewal of a costly and deadly arms competition. This means working together with our natural, democratic allies to ensure that at some time in the future the world does not, as it has in the past, reconfigure itself into two opposing centers of military power. In forging this global coalition of like-minded democratic states, the United States may take the lead by virtue of its military might and demonstrably

peaceful intentions. The overarching aims will be to dissuade other countries or coalitions from constituting themselves into rival centers of military power, and to deal with those that are not deterred. In order to do this, a balancing alliance structure is essential so that the twenty-first century will be more a kin to the hundred years which followed the Congress of Vienna than it is to the decades which intervened between the Treaty of Versailles and the outbreak of World War II. To keep friends assured of our continued willingness to share the burden of the defense of our common interests, and to dissuade rivals from turning their economic capabilities to competitive military ends, the United States' role in this global concert will be to continue to do what it does best—develop defensive technologies to dissuade those who might otherwise see advantage in taking with force what they cannot attain by peaceful means.

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

by

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WHAT NEW GLOBAL ORDER?

There has been considerable discussion in the United States of an emerging era of cooperative diplomacy, of a national strategy based on "what we are for," as opposed to containment, which was a strategy of "what we were against."¹ The administration, still groping for a national security strategy in a world where the term has become increasingly irrelevant, has produced a very uneven series of think-pieces and projections. None seems to ring true; none appears to capture the complexity of our present and emerging world.

However, those of us with a professional interest in South Asia have a significant advantage as we attempt to understand the emerging global system. The inequalities of power, status, and wealth that have always dominated South Asian regional and domestic politics are more clearly seen now as the real material of international politics, not the exception. I have, for ten years, been arguing that much of the world will come to resemble the strategic structure of South Asia (minus the Afghanistan conflict): a shifting balance of alignments and arrangements, hostilities and ambiguities, involving both significant regional powers and outside states that have the capacity to influence regional events. Further, the spread of advanced military technologies, the emergence of new environmental and ecological "security threats," and the search for cooperation on the regional level which have dominated regional calculations are now more broadly recognized as important.

South Asia was, for many years, a region where Cold War concerns were not central to the policies of any state (again, with the exception of American and Soviet actions in Afghanistan). Regional strategists thought that there was a "second Cold War," but they failed to understand that for many years both superpowers were behaving towards the region in quite non-superpower ways.² Now, with the removal of the scaffold of superpower confrontation, the realities of the global order are apparent for all to see.³

- The world is characterized by a series of regional conflict/cooperation systems, most with deep historical and local roots;

- The spread of advanced military technology from middle-level suppliers adds an inter-regional dimension to regional conflict.⁴ In some cases, the technology that is being transferred from one region to another has implications for third regions (e.g., the implications for India of the emplacement of Chinese missiles in Saudi Arabia);
- Because communism is no longer a plausible way of addressing injustice there has been a revival of old ideologies and beliefs, including militant Islam, sub-nationalism, and ethnic separatist movements. This trend is especially virulent in countries which never had a serious democratic movement or those who bungled democracy;
- The multi-ethnic state is in special difficulty because of the rise of separatist movements, the emergence of global human rights movements challenging the moral authority of the state vis a vis its own citizens, the spread of arms (fueled by neighbors, greed, and narcotics), and the spread of new technologies that undercut the state's control over information flowing to its citizens. South Asia has three such multi-ethnic states--India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka--thus, the problem of state coherence and integrity is not only an Indian problem, but a regional one. Indeed, it affects China as well, especially those parts that abut South Asia;
- New economic, environmental, and ecological concerns cut across traditional strategic divisions. All states are increasingly dependent on international investments, multi-nationals, and foreign technologies. At the same time, new concerns about environment and ecology have challenged the way they conduct their internal affairs. While that has made it somewhat easier for states to extract military technologies from the international marketplace, it has also placed new constraints on the use of force across borders except in the most unusual circumstances;
- New regions will emerge and the borders of old ones will shift. We will have to junk obsolete geo-psychological constructs (such as "Asia") and come to terms with new clusters of economic, strategic, and cultural interactions that will, loosely, be called regions. One region, Central Asia, has been reborn; it will have especially important ties to South Asia.⁵ New technologies can create regions, especially in the Indian Ocean area. And, as states like India acquire enhanced power projection capabilities and their economies expand beyond their immediate borders, they become multi-regional powers.

The new global order is going to be an era of region-by-region disorder, a period of extraordinarily complicated diplomacy, where the notion of vital national interests is replaced by a shifting series of alliances and arrangements patched together issue by issue. These alliances and arrangements will be stronger between states that

share something besides expediency. Indeed, we are entering an era where states have permanent friends, not permanent interests. Mutual personal, economic, cultural, and ideological entanglements will count for more than they have in the past.

What will be the building blocks of this new global order? I would invoke an example from the engineering community. A "supercomputer" is simply the most advanced current computer being manufactured. Among supercomputers, some are specialized machines and are configured to perform certain kinds of computations; others are more versatile, but cannot do anything best. In this new global order a whole range of countries will command the military and economic power possessed by the then-superpowers of twenty years ago. Two of these nations, the United States and Russia, retain significant military power, but are relatively weaker economically than they were twenty years ago. Japan and the European Community are economic giants, and Iran is an ideological superpower, at least in the Islamic world.

In this emerging world, India stands out, along with China and perhaps South Korea, Brazil, and some of the European states, for its *balanced* power. Like a versatile computer, India does nothing best but does many things reasonably well. And unlike Korea, any European state, Iraq, Brazil or China, it is dominant within its own geographical region. While the definition of that region is increasingly elastic (it may yet include parts of Central Asia as well as a portion of the Indian Ocean littoral) no serious challengers to Indian cultural, military, and economic predominance are likely to emerge.⁶

The regional systems that will constitute the international order will assume different forms. Some will be based on cooperation to resolve regional differences, some will be shaped by outside powers, others by regional hegemons; in some cases, regional balances of power will emerge.

In Southeast Asia, regional cooperation is likely to be the mechanism for resolving local differences, albeit with some lingering American presence to ensure that China or Japan do not play too great a role. In Northeast Asia, peace will have to be kept by an outside balancer, the United States. In the Persian Gulf, there will likely remain a regional balance of power among Iran, Iraq, and the conservative Gulf states, with each side drawing on external arms producers. To the west, Israel has attained the position of regional dominant power by virtue of its conventional and nuclear superiority. Europe has also entered an era of regional cooperation, accommodating and engulfing several major military powers (France, Germany, and hopefully, the Ukraine and Russia), perhaps without any significant American involvement.

South Asia follows its own path. India is preeminent vis-a-vis most of its smaller neighbors. It behaves towards them like a regional dominant power,

intervening politically, militarily and economically, and dominates their cultural life. India can also veto their relations with large external powers. But none of this applies to India's relations with Pakistan, which alone has the power to deter India, and even to challenge Delhi via small-scale military confrontation and low-intensity conflict. There is an imbalanced balance of power between India and Pakistan, and no matter how much Indians might wish it, Pakistan is unlikely to become a Bangladesh or Bhutan.

Finally, to again invoke the computer metaphor, some machines can be linked together for parallel processing of certain kinds of information. The UN will sometimes serve as a network that multiplies individual state power by channeling and coordinating the actions of several states. The containment of Iraq by a coalition patched together by Washington and sanctioned by the UN was a remarkable accomplishment. On the face of it, this was an implausible event. Having been done once, it might be attempted again, although I would be reluctant to speculate where and when. However, in some regional crises UN action will be blocked, and we are likely to see some regional dominant powers engaged in strategic cooperation, perhaps to be joined by one or more outside states. Again, I am loath to predict when and where, or even why, but the complexity and unpredictability of the future global order is exactly my central point. It may be foolish to plan for international cooperation to deal with a specific event, but it is equally unwise not to be ready for a whole range of contingencies. Striking a balance between preparedness and a self-fulfilling prophecy is going to be a major task confronting all would-be regional and global peacemakers in a world characterized by uncertainty.

INDIA'S REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ROLE(S)

In 1990 we circled the question of India's future regional and global role, looking at it from Indian, American, and regional perspectives.⁷ It was clear to me, at least, that both sides in this dialogue needed to be reminded of the different conclusions about Indian power that could be derived from different vantage points. There is no need to repeat this exercise. The remainder of this paper takes an unashamedly American approach to the question of India's role in the emerging global order.

It is important to disaggregate this global order. India, like China, is so vast and so complex that it constitutes a region all by itself. Thus, Indian domestic politics, and the great Indian experiment in democracy, have a security component of some importance. Second, we must consider India's likely role at the regional level (although the region is itself being transformed by events in Central Asia). Finally, there is India's global role—or more precisely, India's policies on issues which have global ramifications. At each of these levels—regional, inter-regional, and global—what are the reasonable American expectations concerning Indian policy? In

brief, what does the U.S. want from India?

INDIA: THE STATE AS A REGION

First and foremost, Americans should be concerned with the success of the process of state and nation building now underway in India. Many years ago, American strategists saw that a great experiment had been launched: whether a society that was, by any measure, one of the most unequal and unbalanced in the world could reduce these inequalities and achieve development by democratic means. It is not poverty (or more accurately, enormous disparities between the many poor, the many who have something, and the few who have a great deal) that is India's problem, but forging integrative institutions while simultaneously promoting economic growth under the conditions of political democracy. This is a feat that no other large state except the United States has attempted (and then, under much more favorable geopolitical and economic circumstances). It is a task of awe-inspiring magnitude. It is also the strongest basis for an Indian claim on American support, sympathy, and resources.

The United States still has every reason to support this goal, although there may be differences among Americans--and between Americans and Indians--as to the means of support, and whether support for India's domestic objectives must also translate into support for specific Indian foreign policies. The success of the Indian democratic approach to state and nation-building should be the central regional strategic goal of the United States. If India were to lapse into militarism, dictatorship, or split apart, the strategic consequences for the region and American interests would all be negative. It is hard to imagine what would be worse: a region dominated by an extremist Indian government, thrashing about, crushing its neighbors; or a region of five, ten, or twenty states, each in conflict with each other—and many within reach of a nuclear capability.

This is the strategic underpinning of the ritual rhetoric about "shared democratic values." The success of the Indian democratic experiment has these hard, practical implications, as well as being a matter of some ideological importance.

Interestingly, many American policies—carried out in good faith—are perceived by Indians as undercutting this process of state and nation-building. To an Indian strategist or policymaker, beset by problems of staggering magnitude, outside criticism can be seen as having deeper and more sinister motives. Comments on India's human rights record, its policies on Kashmir, its restrictive economic policies, and even intellectual property rights, are dismissed as "anti-Indian" (or when voiced by Indians, as anti-national).⁸ Americans should continue these comments and criticisms, but should not be surprised by hostile Indian reactions. But it is bizarre to conclude that such criticisms are directed against the Indian state itself.

THE REGION: WHAT STRUCTURE?

India's regional strategic objectives derive from three main sources. The first was the 1947 partition which left India and Pakistan as each other's major threat. The second was the residue of imperial concerns; i.e., protecting the subcontinent from outside penetration and advancing legitimate South Asian interests in adjacent regions, especially the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The third stems from the overlapping human, ecological, and economic problems that spill over regional boundaries, especially between India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, India and Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Burma, Bangladesh, and India.

Any American approach to South Asia must be constrained by two ironies. The first is that the consequences of partitioning the British empire (the enduring India—Pakistan conflict) undercuts any sustained attempt to pursue shared regional strategic interests that survived the departure of the British. The second is that the biggest of the successor states, India, is ambivalent about the existence of such empire-derived interests. During the freedom struggle, in opposing an empire, Indians also came to oppose the imperial idea, rejecting the relevance of the Raj even as they wield military power greater than that commanded by the British.⁹

Thus, while American policy towards South Asia has always supported the idea of India-Pakistan cooperation (most notably in 1947, then again after the 1962 China-India conflict), such cooperation remains an abstract idea rather than a live possibility. This is seen most clearly in the chronic trauma of Kashmir. Nearly ten years ago, at one of the very first India-Pakistan strategic conferences at Urbana, I urged both sides to address the main unfinished business of the Subcontinent—Kashmir. I was assured by Indians and Pakistanis alike that Kashmir was an "American obsession, not a South Asian one," and both told me that the problem was best left to another generation.¹⁰ Looking ahead, I see the Kashmir problem and related issues as getting worse, not easier. There is a failure of imagination in both Delhi and Islamabad concerning this mid-20th century issue. For that matter, there is not much imaginative thinking being shown on clearing up those 19th century disputes that still plague the Subcontinent (those that arose out of conflicts between the British empire and its neighbors—especially the India-China border *cum* territorial dispute). For a region which is about to be swamped by the conflicts of the 21st century, there still seems to be a psychological obsession with the problems of the past.

Failing any creative thought or bold diplomacy coming out of Delhi or Islamabad, America can only expect the present form of crisis-to-crisis relations to continue to dominate India-Pakistan relations. Recent conversations in both

countries indicate strong resistance to even restoring scholarly, journalistic, and other cultural ties to their pre-1965 level. While businessmen in both states profess an eagerness to gain access to a broader regional market, the politicians and bureaucrats (who have the strongest interest in maintaining the present state of sub-war tension) seem uninterested when they are not hostile.

These attitudes circumscribe any American or outside effort to support a South Asian regional strategic entity that would achieve serious regional cooperation. At best, there might be better management of the ethnic and environmental disputes that spill over regional borders, and for this the vehicle of SAARC is now available. America should continue to support SAARC and should expect India to do the same, but SAARC is no substitute for a thorough rethinking of regional strategic priorities.

This is a pity. Had India and Pakistan been able to cooperate after they achieved independence there is no doubt that the region would have been saved considerable grief. There would not have been a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese probably would not have dared appropriate Indian-claimed territory, the two states together could have emerged as the dominant power in the Gulf, and India-Pakistan cooperation would have dampened the impact of the Cold War competition on South Asia (in particular, by reducing the need for a wasteful and risky arms race which has now acquired a nuclear dimension). Realistically, Americans should not expect such cooperation to emerge, nor is it within our power to induce the two states to cooperate on vital security issues. Assistance at the margins—CBMs and other arms control techniques—however, might help avert a disaster that would engulf the entire region.

THE UNIVERSALISTIC COMPULSION

Indians have their own vision of a just international order. The global Indian agenda is quite different from that of the United States. For New Delhi, colonized and exploited for centuries, the central international issue has been (and for many Indians remains) the disparities between haves and have-nots. India has pursued three strategies to reduce these gross international disparities: it had minimal cooperation with the West—especially Western multi-national corporations (only enough to ensure a continuing flow of loans and necessary technology); it pursued a modified Soviet economic model;¹¹ and it associated itself with the Third World and non-aligned movement.

All three strategies are shattered, but Indian wariness of the dominant West remains. The United States can persuade and argue, but Indians themselves will have to reassess not the *goal* of a more just international order, but the means by which that order is to be achieved. For their part, Americans should reassess the depth of their commitment to their own professed international goals of justice among states and equality between them. Americans too often dismiss Indian

pronouncements concerning global disarmament or a new international economic or information order with a "let's get serious; let's get practical," or, more recently, "no one could seriously hold the views you advocate unless there was some sinister plan to sabotage American interests."

Take the NPT as an example. No one takes seriously the Indian argument that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is discriminatory. Everyone recognizes it discriminates between nuclear haves and have-nots. If India feels that nuclear weapons should be more widely spread, then it should act on that belief. If it believes that there is another "nondiscriminatory" way to control nuclear weapons, it should suggest it.¹² In the meantime, American policy should concentrate on extracting commitments from New Delhi with regard to non-proliferation (and other global issues) that advance our interests without infringing upon Indian principles.¹³

One way of doing this is to patch together a series of sub-agreements which, taken together, constitute a regional NPT (or at least cap or freeze regional nuclear programs). The NPT itself allows for regional agreements. This is the best that can be achieved over the next five years, and it would be counter-productive for the United States to seek more from New Delhi and Islamabad. While proliferation is important, it is not the most important component of the evolving strategic relationship between the United States and both South Asian powers. It is particularly foolish to lump India and Pakistan into the same category as such genuine rogue states as Iraq and North Korea (and China, for that matter, when it comes to *spreading technologies of mass destruction*). The following statement is particularly irresponsible:

Weapons proliferation is "a risky business," the ACDA director said, adding that more must be done to ensure that "weapons of mass destruction do not fall into irresponsible hands," especially in the Middle East, the Korean peninsula, and South Asia.¹⁴

On the proliferation question, we want stability, non-transferability, and partnership. We want stability in terms of steps that might be taken in the South Asian context. An India-Pakistan agreement, outside the NPT but compatible with NPT principles, is attainable. Such an agreement would have to include, tacitly or explicitly, pledges from existing nuclear weapons states, including China.

Transferability pledges are just as important. India could be a major source of nuclear technology, fissile material, and nuclear expertise. There has never been any suggestion that India would engage in such activity, but it has acquired material outside the context of the NPT, it is not an NPT signatory, and it is under no legal obligation not to transfer such materials or technology. The United States has been content with Indian assurances that it shares our non-proliferation objectives, but these might be put into treaty form without encroaching on India's refusal to sign the

NPT itself.

Finally, India could become a non-proliferation partner. To the degree that it is also threatened by proliferation by Pakistan, Iran, some of the Central Asian states, terrorist and separatist groups, or even some of its smaller neighbors, India and the United States might engage in private discussions about events around India. Here a degree of intelligence sharing could take place regardless of India's other proliferation policies.

For America, however, the question is about how badly we want these things from India. What kind of a price are we willing to pay for Indian adherence to the NPT or a regional NPT, for Indian cooperation on other proliferation matters, or in exchange for Indian actions that would stabilize the regional nuclear arms race? Would the U.S. be willing to sponsor India as a member of the Security Council on the same (non-nuclear weapons status) terms as it might sponsor Japan and Germany? How badly do we want non-proliferation? Badly enough to share some of the symbolic and real power associated with Security Council membership?

WHICH STRATEGY?

At the second Indo-U.S. Strategic symposium I outlined three possible U.S.-Indian relationships: a formal alliance, an implicit or informal agreement, and partial or limited consultation. My paper ended somewhat ambiguously and pessimistically, reflecting the uncertainties then evident in the U.S.-India relationship.

I believe that the intervening two years have removed some doubts on both sides. But no clear, strong, strategic ties are apparent despite the fleeting cooperation during the Gulf war. Indeed, the operations against Iraq reminded many Indians of their deepest fears of unchecked US power, and the end of the Cold War seemed to many to introduce an era of unrestrained American dominance. This view is fundamentally wrong and misestimates the powerful urge to isolationism now apparent in America, but it is widely held.

For its part, the United States can choose among five strategic alternatives in dealing with India. These are apathy, containment, appeasement, alliance, or cooption. Cooption will be more fully defined below, but it basically falls somewhat short of alliance, while it does not irrevocably close the door on containment--should worst cases come about. Cooption is cooperation with a tougher face.

For many years (approximately 1965 to 1971, and 1972 to 1984) American policy towards India was one of sheer *apathy* (or to give it more purposive labels, a policy of disengagement, benign neglect, or "letting the region reach its own natural

strategic balance"). When not motivated by the global strategic competition, American policy drifted. The guiding principle of American policy during those years was, "when all else fails, do nothing." Doing nothing was low-cost, but not cost-free. Doing nothing meant that the Soviets became a regional peacemaker, that a strong position in Afghanistan was given up, that leverage over the Pakistani nuclear program and Pakistani strategic ambitions was non-existent, and that India's non-alignment policy could become corrupted into a *de facto* alliance with the Soviet Union. Doing nothing also contributed to the view that Iran could be a regional stabilizer, even in South Asia, a view which was briefly (and oddly) shared by India. A policy of apathy was not the worst of all policies, but the regional record indicates that a degree of American engagement in South Asia is essential to preserve important regional and American strategic interests.

Still, apathy does have its attractions. If the United States were to forsake the opportunity to influence regional developments, its resources—human and material—could be spent elsewhere or not be spent at all. This has been an important theme in the current presidential primary campaign.¹⁵

There is also an informed Indian perspective which favors a policy of American disengagement from South Asia. Such a disengagement would force India and Pakistan to face up to regional realities without an American crutch. It would make both states more realistic about their own regional interests and their own relationship. They might also need time, in view of the intellectual trauma of the end of the Cold War, to come to an understanding of what might be a proper American role in the region. Finally, since the major task facing both India and Pakistan (as well as the United States) is internal economic and political reform, all three states need time to focus on these problems and should not rush prematurely into strategic cooperation.

I find this argument attractive but not compelling. Ideally, America would be instructed and guided in its regional policy by cooperating regional powers. They would set the conditions and terms for American military aid, cooperation, and mediation. Our role would be limited, but helpful to regional powers themselves. But the danger may be that America might lurch too far in the direction of disengagement. It would further reduce America's scanty regional expertise. If we were to reenter the region, would we do so on the basis of an understanding of regional realities, familiarity with regional strategists and officials, and a clear understanding of our own interests? The experience of the 1970s is cautionary. Our re-entry into South Asia in the Carter administration was highly destructive to our regional position because policy was driven by a single issue—non-proliferation. Indeed, the excesses of the Carter policy led to subsequent laxness in American non-proliferation policy. A policy of strategic disengagement runs the risk of becoming a policy of strategic irrelevance.

If a state pursues objectives in conflict with American interests, or if a region is threatening to the United States, then a policy of *containment* is obviously suggested. If we do not consider the region as threatening, then a policy of regional balance might be attempted. This was American policy in the Persian Gulf for the past decade, where neither Iraq nor Iran were perceived as friendly, and so a complete victory by either would be ruinous to American interests. But the disparity in size and the unlikelihood of both India and Pakistan turning hostile makes a balance of power strategy unlikely for South Asia.

America has followed a containment policy in the case of the former Soviet Union and a number of regional powers—Vietnam, Libya, Iran, and Cuba. Containment was also once the dominant policy in the case of Beijing. But India is not a revolutionary state, nor is it anti-democratic, or a close ally of any threatening power now that the Soviet Union is no more. Indeed, Americans often misestimated the Soviet-Indian relationship, which probably worked more to Delhi's benefit than Moscow's. America has never pursued a policy of containment towards India. While there may be conflicts of interest between our two countries, these are unlikely to be of great importance or long duration. The same considerations apply to Pakistan. On the other hand, things change—they did in Iran and Iraq. The failure of India's great domestic experiment in democratic change might produce a regime both angry and vengeful. So, one should not completely close the door on containment, as implausible as it might seem now.

A policy of *appeasement* is suggested when a state is known to have limited ambitions and when satisfying these ambitions will produce a status quo power. Recognizing India as the "regional dominant power" or "regional hegemon" and supporting Indian ambitions—or at least not opposing them strongly—would constitute a policy of appeasement. There are two problems with this policy. First, the U.S. does not know the directions of and limits on Indian ambitions. Second, Indians themselves do not know what their long-term goals should be. Should the United States grant India a free hand over much of what Indian hawks define as their intended sphere of influence? This includes part of Pakistan, parts of China, and much of the Indian Ocean.¹⁶ The United States has strategic interests (albeit not vital) in these countries and in the Indian Ocean. Since these interests do not threaten India, the U.S. is under no incentive to break off with such states, pull out of Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean, or subcontract to India a regional peacekeeping role. On the other hand, if Indian ambitions were known to be limited and did not conflict with American ties to other regional states, appeasement might be appropriate.

A policy of strategic *alliance* can only rest upon strong, enduring, and shared interests and friendships—a degree of trust and identity of goals between strategic elites that cuts across the spectrum in both states. The United States does have a shared interest with both Indian and Pakistani leaders in working towards orderly

change and a peaceful region, but we disagree with both on how to bring this about and over what policies to pursue vis-a-vis China. Slowly, our policies are again moving closer to those of Delhi, although from 1979 to 1989 we were in harmony with Islamabad's benign view of Beijing. We have also disagreed with elements of the Pakistani strategic community on our Gulf policies and relations with Iran. We do share important cultural and ideological premises with India and Pakistan, but these need not be framed by a military alliance.

There are other obstacles to a policy of alliance with Delhi. India has not been comfortable in the kind of alliances favored by the United States in the past.¹⁷ Outside of Europe, Washington is accustomed to alliances with dependent states. Both sides would have to find a model that fits their idiosyncratic styles, that would withstand the pressures of parliamentary democracy, and that would meet their respective strategic interests before the term "alliance" can be uttered between them. Even then, in a world of regions—a world that lacks a core strategic contest—there may not be any common permanent interests between members of different strategic regional groupings, only permanent friendships.

Finally, a policy of *cooption* combines elements of containment, appeasement, and alliance. Cooption is suggested when dealing with a state that has significant military or political resources, could use those resources in a way harmful to American interests—or in support of American interests, and is close enough or moderate enough to be influenceable. India fits this profile. Cooption is likely to be the most effective way to advance our India-related interests over the next few years. It recognizes that we have shared interests with India but acknowledges that a formal alliance may be excessive and containment actually destructive to the pursuit of those interests. Cooption was pioneered with Yugoslavia and later applied to once-hostile states such as Egypt and Indonesia. India is bigger than any of these states and, in the long run, more important.

The Reagan administration undertook a strategy of cooption, although the phrase then invoked in the corridors of the Seventh Floor was that the U.S. would "wean" India from the Soviet embrace, i.e. offer inducements that encouraged New Delhi to reduce its dependence upon Moscow. Of course, the Indians promptly used these inducements to extract better terms from the Soviets, but in the end American interests were advanced. This strategy enabled us to talk to India about a whole range of issues and led to a number of changes in Indian policy. It also led to changes in American policy as we learned more about Indian realities and ambitions.

STRUCTURES:

A strategy of cooption should create useful entanglements. The leaders of the coopted country must feel that they have a stake in good relations with the United

States. This stake will be in part personal, in part economic, in part ideological. Further, it must be evident that good relations are politically sustainable within each state.

To achieve this, there needs to be an increased number of formal and informal mechanisms that allow Americans to effectively present their case to Indian counterparts. A cooption strategy works slowly and indirectly by changing the terms of debate in the other country—this requires repeated and persistent contact. A few unofficial policy talks are now under way; these should receive continued high-level support. The two predecessor conferences to this were successively more effective and helpful. These meetings should be continued, but must be broadened in two directions:

- There must be equivalent State or NSC-sponsored counterparts, involving planning staffs and long-range thinkers—if they can be found. Private sector initiatives have also been helpful. Since both states are susceptible to democratic and populist pressures, enhanced contacts between journalists and politicians-- discussing strategic matters—is necessary to ensure that government-to-government discourse does not out-pace public opinion.
- Defense-related contacts should not focus entirely on military-to-military exchanges. In the Indian system, civilian officials are far more influential than their uniformed colleagues. It would be a grave error to treat India like a Korea, a Thailand, or even a Pakistan, and assume that men in uniform make all the important decisions.

GOALS:

A set of goals, or targets, for a strategy of cooption would be helpful. Since a cooption strategy is necessarily long-term, and would extend over more than one administration, it would be useful to be able to measure progress. What issues are most important to the United States, and where do we think we have the best chance of success? Clearly, the United States cannot remove the basic causes of conflict and hostility in South Asia, but it might:

- Convince the Indians to accept a limited, responsible American role in Pakistan, using that influence to encourage more normal Indo-Pakistan relations and even a settlement of key outstanding disputes;
- Encourage the Indians to continue their dialogue with China, but share with China our increasing concerns about China's disruptive role in Burma as an uninhibited arms seller and as a dictatorship;

- Persuade India to accept a modified regional non-proliferation agreement that would accommodate New Delhi's security concerns while advancing American non-proliferation interests;
- Come to a better understanding on issues that are important to one side but may be trivial to the other (relations with Cuba) as opposed to issues which are either bilateral (intellectual property rights and technology transfer) or which separately engage both countries, and which may cause conflict (relations with Russia, with Pakistan, or with China).

DIPLOMACY:

A long-term strategy of cooption will draw upon the resources of other states. In pursuing our India-related objectives we can work with Russia, several European allies, and, on economic and non-proliferation issues, Japan. Indeed, in some cases it will be other states that will be the more effective partner. Tokyo has a special interest in non-proliferation issues, it has significant investments in India and Pakistan, it is an Asian state, and it is vitally interested in the maintenance of sea lanes and a tranquil Indian Ocean/Southeast Asian region.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS:

A key assumption of a strategy of cooption is that India will not pose any significant threat to current or future American strategic interests. Except in the very unlikely cases of an American intervention in South Asia, or a hostile Indian intervention in a country important to the United States, it is unlikely that American and Indian forces will ever come into direct conflict. Therefore U.S.-Indian military relations should be keyed towards three objectives: avoiding misunderstanding between the two countries, laying the groundwork for possible future strategic collaboration, and providing warning time about possible changes in Indian policy.

CONCLUSION

Having a fire in your house is unlikely but not implausible. Having India turn into a hegemon or aggressor that confronts important American interests is unlikely and implausible. Having India turn inward, losing both its democratic direction and its coherence as a state is unlikely but plausible and this, rather than some fanciful rogue India, is the most significant threat to American regional interests.

A series of U.S. studies have apparently been searching for a new threat, a new cause for alarm. In this sense, the U.S. defense establishment is in the same position

as the Indian Navy: it is a capability looking for a justification. But in the case of South Asia, except for the proliferation problem (and that has been exaggerated, in my view), there are no direct threats to American interests. The chief threat is that the countries of the region, especially India, will fail in their effort to gain coherence as states and nations. This failure would be devastating to American ideological, economic, and even strategic interests, since it would have consequences for Central Asia, the Gulf, and Southeast Asia.

A strategy of cooption—a mixture of cooperation, pressure, and persuasion—recognizes the heavy non-military component of our regional security interests. Enhanced military-to-military ties are useful in avoiding misunderstanding, and might provide early warning of hostile changes in Indian policy, but their real value lies in showing the larger political communities in both states that the United States and India do not fear each other, and that they can cooperate on sensitive matters. If they can do this, they should be able to discuss coordination of their policies on a broad range of political, economic, and regional issues that lack the immediate photogenic attraction of maneuvers at sea, but are far more central to the security concerns of a fifth of the human race.

FOOTNOTES:

1. A recent quote from a member of the Policy Planning Staff; see also current work on "cooperative diplomacy" being done at a Harvard/Stanford/Brookings consortium, forthcoming.
2. For a full-scale study of how the Superpowers cooperated during the Cold War in various regional contexts see Roger Kanet and Edward Kolodziej, eds., *The Cold War as Cooperation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991).
3. The following is elaborated more fully in "The State is Dead: Long Live the Armed Ethnic Group!" *Chicago Tribune*, February 22, 1992; a revised and fuller version will appear in the July-August issue of *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.
4. For the finest brief survey see Kathleen Bailey, *Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991).
5. Indeed, if the Department of State is serious about the new Bureau of South Asian affairs, it will add Central Asia to South Asia and Iran, forming a coherent collection of sub-regions, and including four potential nuclear weapons states.
6. Predominance, not, as the *New York Times*, continuing its series of gaffes on South Asia would have it, paramountcy (editorial, March 22, 1992). Paramountcy was a term the British used to describe the ultimate dominance of British India over the princely states in matters of foreign affairs, defense, and even internal security. The doctrine of paramountcy enabled the British to intervene in the princely states and, when they felt it necessary, to absorb them into the Raj. To use this term to describe India's relations with its South Asian neighbors reveals a spectacular level of ignorance-compounded by numerous other errors in the same editorial.
7. See Stephen P. Cohen, "The Future Indian Security Role in the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean Region," in Jasjit Singh, ed., *Indo-US Relations in a Changing World: Proceedings of the Indo-US Strategic Symposium* (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1992).
8. See the acid remarks of an influential left-wing Indian intellectual, who has cautioned against being lured into the American embrace, especially by American statements about India as a "great" or "emerging" power. Nikhil Chakravartty points out that the same American government has attacked India in human rights fora, on grounds of intellectual property rights, and on non-proliferation and other issues. He detects a coordinated strategy of carrot and stick, praise and threat; I am out of the government now, but feel certain that such a clever strategy remains beyond the capacity of the U.S.

government. Chakravartty, "Dealing With America," *Mainstream*, March 21, 1992.

9. For a sustained polemic against the "Raj," especially the notion of an empire "essentially based on force" that had to be maintained, if necessary, "by brute force" see Suhash Chakravarty, *The Raj Syndrome: A Study in Imperial Perceptions* (rev. ed., New Delhi: Penguin, 1991), p. 19.
10. For an allusion to this interchange see my summary chapter in Stephen P. Cohen, ed., *The Security of South Asia: Asian and American Perspectives* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984).
11. A number of core Indian assumptions about the global order have been shattered by the end of the Soviet Union. The Soviet model was not only a socialist economic model and an ideological construct, it was (for most of its non-Western emulators) a way in which poor states could catch up with the west—it was a modernization model. It showed how the state could be a vehicle of social, economic, and ultimately, strategic change. Now, just as there is a former Soviet Union, there is a former Third World, a cluster of states, led by India, which are searching for other ways to reduce the gap between them and the West. In fact, although no one has noticed it, there is also a "former West," since the unity of the NATO powers and Japan vis a vis a central strategic threat has long since dissipated. The Russians have the options of becoming Europeans and joining the West—it remains to be seen whether this is an option open to India. If India wanted to become a "Western" state in its political, economic, and even cultural orientation, would it be welcomed into a Euro-Japanese club?
12. Actually, Rajiv did in 1988, and slightly modified India's earlier proposals for universal disarmament. The U.S. government missed an opportunity to engage Delhi in a useful dialogue that would smoke out Indian intentions and ideas (if any). The recent experience with the "five party talks," while frustrating to American diplomats, is one way of determining how serious is the Indian commitment to arms control.
13. For a full statement of this strategy see Stephen P. Cohen, "Policy Implications," in Cohen, ed., *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control* (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
14. Jacquelyn S. Porth, quoting Ronald Lehman, "All Tools Should be Used to Control Proliferation," recent USIS press release.
15. Contemporary American isolationism, as in the past, draws its supporters from the right and the left. The former believe that the world is evil, and that America should avoid its corrupting influence by having as little to do with it

as possible; the latter believe that the United States is an evil country, and that only a policy of isolationism can protect the world from its rampages. Both believe that distant and fractious regions, such as South Asia, do not deserve our attention.

16. To my knowledge, India still supports Mauritius' claim to Diego Garcia.
17. In Indian domestic politics, the dominant Congress party has not been accustomed to ruling in a coalition at the center, and did so in the states only grudgingly, until it could attain a parliamentary majority. Coalitions were unnecessary in the Nehru years, and during Indira and Rajiv's rule Congress' strategy typically was to swallow up one or more of its coalition partners, or divide the opposition to enable it to keep power. The present system, under Narasimha Rao, is unusual for its tranquility.

OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR INDO-U.S. COOPERATION ON ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES:

CHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA

by

Sujit Dutta

The people and states that inhabit the huge Asian landmass to India's north and east have been closely tied to India's history and civilization for over two millennia. China and Southeast Asia have been significantly influenced by political and cultural currents from India and myriad links that different Indian dynasties established with the states of the region. Much of modern Asian ethos, including that in the dynamic economies of the East, has been shaped not only by Confucianism or its neo-variants, but also by Buddhism and Hinduism with their not too distant roots in India. Colonialism disrupted many of the old relationships, but others survived and new ones were forged during the national movements that developed in Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

To the Indian nationalist leadership, the anti-colonial struggles in Southeast Asia and China were indivisible from their own goal of freedom. The Indonesian and Vietnamese national movements in particular were followed with great sympathy in India during the 1940s and given strong political support. Following independence, "There was a general belief among the nationalist elite in New Delhi that India's goal of preserving its autonomy of action in world affairs could be achieved only in the context of decolonization in the rest of Asia and in cooperation with genuinely independent governments in the continent's larger and more important states."¹

The interim Indian government organized an Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, five months before formal independence. It was attended by nationalist leaders from all over the continent, including China. India's first major act in international affairs after independence was the Conference on Indonesia attended by fifteen nations in January 1949. This spirit of common destiny made India the moving spirit behind the first Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 and the Nonaligned Movement in 1961.

This historical backdrop is important. To a world that has been carved up into small manageable regions and power structures, the wider civilizational, political, and geographical linkages shaped over centuries are a reminder of the universal and cooperative dynamics that tie humankind and the people of Asia together. India lies at the heart of Asia where East and West, and Central, South, and Southeast converge. A new, modern, secure, and prosperous Asia can hardly be constructed

without active participation by this large and ancient nation.

This paper deals with some of the dominant contemporary trends in the rapidly changing region covering China and Southeast Asia, as they impinge on India and its security. In sheer geopolitical terms, the security of the entire region is indivisible. China, Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia share land or sea borders with India while Malaysia, Singapore and the three Indo-Chinese states are tied to it through years of close political, economic, and other vital interactions-including those flowing from Indian investments and past immigration. Policies and developments in these neighboring states have a crucial bearing on India's own development and security. For nearly two decades in the 1960s and 1970s, India could not develop its relations with these states fully because of the conflicts with China and Pakistan, the convulsions of the Cold War in the region, and myriad domestic compulsions. Different perspectives over the Cambodian conflict were an additional obstacle in the 1980s. With a more confident India opening its doors and seeking to reengage itself actively with the region, a new chapter is beginning in Asian relations. The paper thereafter outlines possible ways in which India and the United States (the dominant Western and global power) can re-shape the existing reality for the benefit of all.

POST-COLD WAR REALITIES

The advent of the post-Cold War era in Asia has not been as explosive as that in Europe. Yet, a remarkable process of change is clearly underway. Countries that were at war or in the midst of tense relationships are forging new links. A general process of detente in the region is transforming the political, economic, and security environment. Some of the changes, it is true, were underway even before the Cold War drew to a close. But the end of the global conflict and competition between the politico-military-ideological blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union has brought about a realignment of forces unthinkable only a few years ago. It has forced virtually every state to reassess its domestic and external strategies and draw up a new agenda.

A series of fundamental changes have been unleashed in the socialist countries as a result of the changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies. Consider, for example, the sea change in China's relations with the former Soviet Union that has led to a rapid reduction of troops on their long and once tense border, and a settlement in the disputed eastern sector. The climate has changed to the degree that Russia has agreed to sell Su-27 and Mig-29 fighter aircraft to China and to forge wider defense- industrial-scientific collaboration. While new security complications and uncertainties over final settlement of the border problem have been created by the break up of the Soviet state and the collapse of state socialism in the Soviet Union, China's relations for the moment are developing with the successor Soviet states.

A similar process of rapid improvement is underway in Sino-Vietnamese, relations which have changed from conflict to cooperation in less than two years. Not only is border trade flourishing in what was until recently a war zone, the two countries have agreed to reopen road shipping, air, and postal communications, and to begin negotiations on ways to stabilize and settle their volatile dispute over the Paracels and Spratlys.

Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the end of outside intervention by China, Thailand, and other external actors supporting the Sihanouk-led and Khmer Rouge-dominated Cambodian coalition has opened the way for a United Nations peace plan for Cambodia. The plan has many problems regarding implementation and U.S. \$2 billion is needed to finance the 22,000 strong peace keeping group. Nonetheless, the end of external involvement in the Cambodian conflict which had vitiated Asian relations for two decades has had an immediate impact on improving relations between the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indo-Chinese states. Trade and investment between the two sides is growing and moves are on for Vietnam to join ASEAN. Meanwhile, the last of the remaining Soviet advisers in Cam Ranh are preparing to leave for home in May of 1992. This will mean a virtual Soviet withdrawal from the region and will pave the way for Hanoi to sign the 1976 Peace and Amity treaty among the ASEAN states.

After decades of strain, Japan's ties with resource-rich Vietnam are on the rise and it is expected that Indo-China will become a major focus of Japanese investment and trade in the coming years. Tokyo is also actively involved in the Cambodian peace process and is a major donor to the UN Peace Plan fund. A new Japanese role is gradually emerging in the region that will in the coming years shape its wider global role (which so far has been mainly economic). In a larger regional context, Japan and Russia are finally working to lay their World War II legacy of conflict to rest. Though a final settlement of the dispute over the four Russian held islands in the Kuriles-what the Japanese call the Northern Territories-will take more time and is complicated by rival nationalisms, problems of uprooting Russian inhabitants who have lived there for decades, and other strategic factors, a thaw has begun. The Japanese Defense Agency, reflecting the change in climate, has not mentioned a Soviet "threat" since its 1990 annual Defense White Paper. This has reduced tensions, with a positive impact on the entire region.

Another area of progress has been in India-China relations. Post-Mao negotiations on settling outstanding disputes-including territorial issues-and attempts to build confidence and trust between the two states—which progressed at a snail's pace during the Cold War despite the best intentions on both sides—gained a new lease on life with improvements in U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations and the end of foreign involvement in Afghanistan and Cambodia in the late 1980s. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 and the Chinese Premier

Li Peng's return trip to New Delhi in December 1991 were the first such high level political interactions in over three decades. They have paved the way for a multi-layered framework for cooperation which includes border negotiations, an exchange of military delegations, and discussions on global strategic issues. Improvement in Sino-Indian relations has a direct bearing on lessening tensions in South Asia and, in a more diffused manner, on the whole continent. Many issues remain to be settled between the two largest and militarily most significant Asian land powers, but a spirit of detente has set in with profound implications for an improved and radically changed security environment in the region.²

Dramatic improvements in India's relations with the United States and China are not only major bilateral achievements in themselves but carry wide implications for other relationships. One area where their impact is likely to be positively felt in coming years is Indo-Pak ties. Without the Cold War entanglements with the United States (which successive military and civilian regimes in Pakistan utilized to bolster its war machine against India) or the anti-Indian containment strategy that Beijing pursued in South Asia since the early 1960s (with the Sino-Pak strategic alliance as its major pillar), Islamabad could not have engaged in the 1965 and 1971 wars or blatantly granted sanctuary, armed support, and training for over a decade to Punjabi and Kashmiri terrorists. Pakistan could not have pursued its nuclear weapons and missile programs without significant Chinese support and less important, but nonetheless significant, tacit U.S. understanding.³

The Cold War strategies of the United States, Soviet Union and China spawned a series of repressive and authoritarian regimes in Asia, including the Yahya Khan and Khmer Rouge genocidal leaderships that were responsible for the slaughter of over three million people in former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and over a million people in Cambodia. Greater concern for democracy and the rights of people could possibly be one of the more tangible gains of the post Cold War era, though the preference for pursuing strategic gains in a situation where it conflicts with genuine democratic principles could remain in Asia for several more years.

It is in this context that the end of the Cold War "strategic consensus" between the United States and China based on anti-sovietism becomes important. Normalization and improvement of U.S.-China relations since 1971-72, and more particularly after the 1979 establishment of diplomatic relations, has had a wide strategic and security impact for the region—much of it beneficial. It ended China's isolation from the world system, opened up the country to radical reforms that improved the lives of millions, dealt a major blow to the ultra-left despotic forces, and enabled China to normalize relations with most Asian states. But the domination of the strategic factor had gravely negative consequences in Cambodia where China, the United States and ASEAN became the backers for the genocidal Khmer Rouge which dominated the Sihanouk-led coalition in their common campaign against Vietnam. Tacit U.S. backing for China also made possible the PLA's invasion of Vietnam in

1979, and its occupation of the Paracels in 1974 and some of the Spratly islands in 1988. The dangerous consequences of those undeterred acts continue to haunt the region. Finally, successive U.S. administrations, by their decision to subjugate human rights issues and concentrate on strategic gains in dealings with China, contributed to the tragedy of Tiananmen. The end of the cold war and Tiananmen has changed all that; a more mature U.S.-China relations, based on wide cooperation in development, as well as respect for a responsible and peaceful international behavior by all and opposition to repression and militarism-if attained-could be a major gain for Asia in the coming years.

Two other crucial developments-both having serious implications for security, stability, and development in the region if they do not work out-need to be noted. The first is the retreat of the old state socialist model in Asia. While the socialist states have not collapsed as in the more urbanized and industrialized Soviet Union and East Europe, many have rapidly changed their economic and even political course. China has for over a decade followed a reform policy that seeks to transform it into a market-based, outward-oriented, neo-authoritarian system that is closer to state capitalist models of East Asia than the earlier Stalinist or ultra-left Maoist system. Vietnam and Laos have adopted a similar strategy.

The totalitarian character of these states is giving way to a market-based, growth-oriented, yet still repressive system that at least in China did not hesitate to unleash the armed forces and tanks on nation-wide urban demonstrations for democratization, and against inflation and *official corruption*. What would Vietnam do faced with a similar situation and what would be the consequences of new, uncontrolled instability flowing from the structural crisis that has gripped China? These remain major concerns and challenges for the region in spite of the growth and prosperity that the reforms are bringing to the Asian socialist states of China and Vietnam.

The second dominant trend with far-reaching security and strategic implications is the outward looking policy reforms that are transforming the autarkic and import substitution policies that characterized the previous development process in most of Asia. Globalization of the industrialized world's industry and factory system, and the mobility of capital and finance across borders (facilitated by gigantic strides in telecommunications) are creating an entirely new world industrial and financial system with far reaching impact on notions of sovereignty, autonomy, and development. Trade and foreign investments are major engines of growth and employment in developing countries of East and South East Asia, linking and integrating the industrialized North with the developing South.

These changes in global industrial spacing and patterns are radically transforming the character of states and traditional development thinking. With strategic support and favorable markets, technology, and capital access from the

industrialized world, some developing countries seem to be succeeding in rapid industrialization. This is particularly true for governments that promote and protect key local industry through stress on internal market competition and export success and maintain high savings and investment in industry, infrastructure, and research and development. A stable and controlled domestic political climate and labor force—often by gross authoritarian measures—are important for such success, as is the stress on education, population control and fulfillment of basic needs for all.⁴ Korea and Taiwan, and now, increasingly, China and other South East Asian states are following the so called Japanese path to industrialization. There are of course many imponderables. Japan itself was never colonized, but instead gained from its colonization of east Asia. Japan, Korea, and Taiwan relied more on foreign loans than on foreign investments, unlike South East Asia and even Guangdong and Fujian in south China today. All three, moreover, had strong U.S. support and favorable international backing because of strategic factors linked to the Cold War. Whether Japan, North America and Europe, which are grappling with their own trade rivalries and problems, will provide a similar favorable ambience for the rest of Asia and especially the larger states remains to be seen.

The Asian environment therefore is perceptibly changing—mostly for the better. The United States is a key actor in this process of change. A major over-haul of U.S. strategy in Asia is underway. It is being shaped by the end of the Cold War; entirely new security and strategic challenges; America's own domestic problems over budget, trade, and growing sentiments of isolationism; and Washington's failure to reach a settlement on compensation with Manila and growing anti-base sentiments in the Philippines. The latter, combined with a natural calamity, has forced the United States to abandon its two largest naval and air defense facilities in the region, at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base.

Despite the impending closure of the large Philippines facilities and a planned reduction in US troop strength in Asia by 15,000 in the next few years, the United States remains the foremost military power in the region. The U.S. is actively involved in reworking many of the past politico-military ties and forging new ones. It is also engaged as a member of the UN Security Council and is a key global actor in the search for a solution to the regional conflicts in Cambodia, Korea, and the unification process of China. Secretary of State James Baker has been a major force behind the UN peace plan for Cambodia. U.S.-Vietnam relations, despite the problems over locating the U.S. soldiers missing in action (MIA) during the Vietnam War, are beginning to improve, albeit too slowly for the interests of the region.

Meanwhile, security arrangements with Japan and South Korea, and the American troops and bases integral to them—among the most important cold war pillars that dotted the region—remain in place. But the changed context is bringing even these old arrangements under pressure, prompting a search for new missions and content. Already, U.S. nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from South Korea

to facilitate an agreement with Pyongyang on nuclear issues. The moves underway towards a nuclear free and unified Korean peninsula are sure to lead to a lower profile U.S. Korean security relationship that is more concerned with ensuring a peaceful and stable transition to this end. It is more likely to evolve into a defensive mechanism against possible future threats from China and Japan than anything else.

It is also not at all certain that the U.S.-Japan security alliance will survive either the American domestic isolationist onslaught or the myriad tensions that have emerged in Washington's relations with Tokyo. Most states of the region clearly want to see the arrangement continuing, primarily as a check against a militarily powerful Japan. But how long both Washington and Tokyo will be able to remain committed to such a high profile alliance system and find it useful and financially viable is uncertain.⁵

New security thinking and arrangements that stress peaceful solution of all bilateral disputes, common security, balanced and lower levels of conventional military distribution of power among the major actors in the region, and a ban on all weapons of mass destruction, among others, will therefore be necessary to cope with the challenges of the post-Cold War era.

NEW PROBLEMS, NEW CHALLENGES

An Asia swept by change and growing detente, and free from the complications of the Cold War that aggravated many of the local problems, is not necessarily a peaceful and stable continent. Indeed, prospects for extensive turbulence and conflict exist. Internal developments in Cambodia, Burma, China and possibly Vietnam, as these states struggle with modernization, democratic pressures, critical transitions towards open and market-based systems, militarism or, as in Cambodia, collapsing state structures, remain a major cause of possible turmoil with regional and global implications.

Throughout the region there also exist a multitude of potential flashpoints. The Philippines still claims Malaysia's Sabah province. The Spratlys and Paracel islands that dot the South China Sea are claimed by Malaysia, China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. "Exclusive economic zones" that extend a nation's control over commercial activities hundreds of kilometers beyond its continental shelf have been declared by China, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam over the past two years, with overlapping jurisdictions that have not been sorted out. Relations between Thailand and Malaysia have been strained over fishing rights. Oil, if discovered offshore in the Gulf of Thailand, could become a serious issue between Cambodia and Vietnam. Both China and Taiwan claim the Japanese held Senkaku island (Diaoyutai) and problems have cropped up over Japanese attempts to construct a lighthouse on it, and the recent release of a Chinese map including it within its

territory. Serious ethnic problems exist in China, Burma, Malaysia, Cambodia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Tensions between authoritarian state structures and demands for democratization and full political rights exist in virtually all the states, with attendant potential for violence and regional tension. Drugs, gun running, severe ecological problems, tensions flowing from arms transfers, and security problems caused by arms build up and nuclear weapons exist and call for international action.

BURMA

Ever since Gen. Ne Win seized power from the elected civilian government in Rangoon in 1962 and launched the "Burmese road to socialism," this potentially rich country has been among the world's most isolated and economically poor areas. An authoritarian state run essentially by a military whose control did not go much beyond the confines of the capital kept the people poor and large parts of the country under tribal armed groups. The regime remained stretched to its limits in trying to subdue ethnic and Beijing backed left-wing insurgencies (especially in its border areas next to India, China and Thailand), doing little to industrialize and modernize the country. Virtually unadministered Burmese border areas provided sanctuaries for armed insurgents in India's northeast states of Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, and also provided passage to tribal insurgent and Maoist groups travelling to China for training and arms.

Following large scale popular demonstrations for democracy that swept Burma in 1988, a military junta headed by Lieutenant General (now General) Than Shwe—the deputy commander of the armed forces—seized power in September of that year and installed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The junta promised the United Nations that it would transfer power to a popularly elected government following national elections. It finally conducted the elections two years later, in May 1990, but refused to hand over power to the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Xyi, the daughter of Burma's independence leader, Aung San. Since then, the regime has arrested most civilian political leaders and any others seen as opposition, suppressed all political activities, and launched a military campaign in the border regions where the ethnic minorities have been waging a civil war for 40 years and where some of these leaders elected in 1990 took refuge and proclaimed a provisional government in order to continue the resistance to the military dictatorship. The campaign has now become a major source of destabilization in the entire region with some 150,000 Rohingya Muslims from the Arakan region having sought refuge in Bangladesh and another 100,000 in neighboring Thailand. Severe tensions have risen in Burma's relations with the two countries and although Rangoon and Dhaka were reported to have reached an agreement on the Rohingyas earlier this month, the reasons that led to the exodus will not go away even if many of the refugees return.

China remains the principal ally of the regime and has supplied it with an estimated U.S. \$1.4 billion worth of arms, including a squadron of F-7 fighters and four Hainan class naval patrol boats, under an agreement reached during Lt Gen Than Shwe's 24-man military team's visit to Beijing in October 1989. Sino-Burmese border trade flourishes and there are reports that drugs have become a major source of income for both sides. Chinese military advisers are in Burma and there are growing ties between the Chinese PLA and the Burmese military, including training and strategy development. Pakistan—which has been among the supplier of arms to the regime—and the ASEAN states, especially Thailand, were among the other partners of the regime till the crackdown on the Rohingya Muslims and the Karen refugees soured ties. Malaysia has now demanded strong steps against the regime and Thai troops have been placed on alert at the border. Thailand, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea also have significant economic involvement in the country, as do some U.S. and Australian companies.⁶

India and the United States have been the major international opponents of the regime and have repeatedly insisted that power be handed over to the NLD. As a result of their work, along with the West European and now Bangladesh and ASEAN states, the United Nations has agreed to dispatch a mission to Burma to address the causes of the vast refugee tide. However, far greater international pressures are necessary if democracy is to be restored and the legitimate elected civilian parties given power. International sanctions beginning with a cut-off of all military and diplomatic contacts are a must. A democratic, nonaligned, federal Burma is vital for the people of the country, for ending the ethnic crisis that is at the root of the refugee exodus, and for the security of India and Southeast Asia. Only such a government will be able to end years of insurgency, authoritarianism, misrule, and international isolation that has been the bane of Burma. It will also lead to the closure of the sanctuaries that insurgent groups in India—the latest being the United Liberation Front of Assam—utilize. China's growing military entanglement with Burma not only strengthens the repressive order, but also seriously erodes its nonaligned, neutral status. India has already raised the issue with China, but the problem is unlikely to go away without far greater international action in favor of Burmese democracy.

CAMBODIA

The second major source of instability and conflict flows from continued problems in Cambodia. It was hoped that the United Nations peace plan would bring the civil war to a close and initiate the process of nation-building and development in this war ravaged land. But it is clear that stupendous obstacles to peace lie before the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Yakushi Akashi, the former UN Under Secretary for Disarmament from Japan, who heads the 22,000 strong force—the largest ever deployed by the organization—has been given a monumental

task: ending a 22-year war, disarming the combatants, aiding the return of 350,000 refugees, professionalizing the police, running the government, holding national elections, and creating a democracy. As if these were not enough, he now faces problems regarding the U.S. \$2 billion needed initially for the mission. The U.S. Congress is refusing to sanction funds, citing budgetary constraints. Since Washington is among the key source of funds for the operation, it seems clearly doomed. Japan is the other major donor but it wants an active role in decisionmaking for paying more than its share of UN assessment. European contributions, too, are falling short.

Meanwhile, the state has virtually collapsed with the needless weakening of the Hun Sen government under the UN sponsored coalition plan. Fighting between government troops and the Khmer Rouge continues in several places. Indeed, the inclusion in the interim government of the Khmer Rouge-which killed over a million people, destroyed its economy, and unleashed the civil war-at the insistence of its main backer, China, and the failure of the peace plan to prosecute those responsible for the genocide remain the major causes for perpetuating the conflict. Under the proportional representation system to be adopted, the armed Khmer Rouge will remain a force in the country's politics and possibly be able to thwart government attempts to prosecute Pol Pot and other criminals.

The problems of disarming and demobilizing 70 per cent of the nearly 220,000 government and rebel troops, of keeping the rest in duty but disarmed and under UNTAC vigil, and of rehabilitating and finding jobs for 150,000 demobilized soldiers and perhaps as many irregular militias are mind boggling. Moreover, 350,000 refugees in UN-run camps in Thailand are to be resettled on two hectares of land per family, but less than a quarter of the sites have been reserved so far. Whether the refugees are prepared to return to farming again after thirteen or more years of camp life remains uncertain. Finally, can the UNTAC hold free and democratic elections in the war-torn nation where so many of the rivals still retain arms?

UNTAC remains the only hope for the country now, but the prospects for peace do not look bright. Yet peace is vital for the region. The return of the Khmer Rouge and their deep antipathy towards the Vietnamese settlers and Vietnam has the potential for a new conflict. Clearly, far more is needed from the international community to prevent a return to the killing fields.⁷

THE SPRATLY DISPUTE

Claims over the Spratly group of islands and, further north, the Paracels in the South China Sea are likely to be a major source of contention unless a peaceful settlement under international auspices can be quickly found. China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines and Brunei all have claims on either the whole or

parts of the chain. In 1988, China used force to occupy some of the islands held by Vietnam and has recently released maps that show the entire group as its territory.

Why are these nations engaged in this contention that has already led to the militarization of Spratly and the South China Sea? Suspected large deposits of oil and gas and prospects of enlarged exclusive economic zones are among the main reasons for the struggle. Under the 1982 Law of the Sea, possession of even the smallest offshore island can entitle a coastal state to an exclusive economic zone of 200 km beyond it. In the Spratlys, extremely large gains are at stake. For China, such a territorial gain would also boost its naval reach into Southeast Asia, close to the maritime artery of the region.

Some efforts to resolve the problem are on. Indonesia, as a non-involved party, has sought to bring the others to a conference and negotiate a solution. China and Vietnam, in the changed climate of their relationship, have also decided to begin negotiations. Beijing earlier offered joint development with the ASEAN states. A peaceful settlement is in the interest of all countries in the region. India and the United States also have security interests at stake. Until a solution is found to the problem, and to other such territorial disputes in the area, a key task will be to maintain the status quo. This requires a commitment by all not to use force and concerted international efforts, perhaps under UN Security Council auspices, for a settlement.

THE CHINA FACTOR

The future of China and the course of its reforms is clearly among the most crucial security issues of this decade. China's efforts to reform its command administrative system without the ruling Communist Party (CPC) losing its monopoly over power and without large scale economic dislocation and instability as seen in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are not simple or easy. The steep inflation of the late 1980s, the huge student demonstrations of 1986-87, and the nationwide urban upheaval for change leading to the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 reveal the potential for explosion.

Ever since the reformists launched the urban and industrial reforms in 1984, the CPC has struggled to find a way to bring about a relatively smooth transition to a market economy and resolve the structural crisis that grips the country. The failure of the reformist forces led by Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Hu Yaobang to control political and economic turmoil not only forced the CPC to fall back on the PLA to preserve the Party-State, but also brought a backlash from the left-wing. In the process, the CPC sacked two General Secretaries and killed and jailed hundreds to maintain stability. After three years, the problems remain unresolved. The reformists, therefore, are making a comeback with new resolve to implement the

agenda Zhao Ziyang had drawn up but could not carry through.

Even as parts of China boom and investments flow into the coastal belt, the crisis refuses to go away. The state sector-which employs millions and is the backbone of the economy-is in the red, with budgetary deficits and subsidies rising every year. Many of the provinces are at loggerheads and regional imbalances are growing.⁸ These in turn are aggravating all the other political problems of a totalitarian system, especially the nationality crisis in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Large scale turmoil in China leading to a possible collapse of the Party-State has grave implications not only for the Chinese people but also for all neighboring countries. Stability on the other hand could mean rising levels of repression by the PLA and internal security forces. Moreover, the creeping growth of capitalism and integration with the world economy (especially with Hong Kong and Taiwan) are weakening the power base of the CPC. Serious uncertainties exist over a smooth leadership transition in the post Deng and Chen Yun phase. Pressures for democratization are growing both within and outside the country. Thousands of Chinese students and intellectuals remain in the West and the people of Hong Kong and Taiwan seek a democratic system in China to protect their interests after unification.

An unstable China could send millions of refugees into neighboring states and unleash a series of internal and external conflicts. Serious problems regarding control over nuclear weapons and the military could ensue. The region can only hope, therefore, that the reformists somehow succeed to carry through the reforms.

However, even a neo-authoritarian reformist China is not necessarily a very stable factor. The military is a major component of the power structure and its involvement in foreign policy and arms transfers has serious implications. China's missile and nuclear technology transfers to Pakistan and arms transfers to Burma are the two most potent causes of insecurity in the region. Its propensity to follow unilateral means and to use force in establishing territorial claims such as those in the South China Sea are factors of concern. China, moreover, is a nuclear weapon state and the most important military power of Asia. All this adds up to a potent mix.

The success of reforms, a smooth leadership succession, steady democratization, the withdrawal of the military from politics, and measures that promote detente and a peaceful Chinese foreign policy are all important for Asia and the United States. These are the goals for which these countries should work along with Chinese reformers and the overseas Chinese communities.

AREAS OF INDO-U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION

India's interest lies in a peaceful and stable Asia that is conducive to democracy and development. It seeks complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction from the globe and a firm commitment by all states to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement of outstanding disputes, including those over territory. Given the complexities of the Asian states and their multi-ethnic composition in most cases, India seeks the protection of the rights of the people and the minorities within a democratic, federal and secular state system-not the steady break up of states that create far more volatile problems, as in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. A peaceful, democratic and prosperous China and Southeast Asia are in the interest of India's security. India also favors a zone of nonalignment and peace in Southeast Asia and an early end to the GATT negotiations which, unless settled, will complicate development issues in this trade dependent region.

In most of these areas the United States and India should be able to cooperate. As the two largest democracies, and with multi-ethnic societies, the two countries are singularly well-placed to pursue these goals. They must also cooperate in the struggle against, drugs, and gun running that is particularly severe in the Golden Triangle and India's neighborhood.

Cooperation in development should be the other major area. The high population density, poverty, and unemployment nexus that pervades many parts of the region promotes unrest, separatist tendencies, terrorism, population migration and conflict. Millions of refugees have over the years entered India from neighboring countries and complicated ethnic tensions and developmental problems in bordering states, especially in east and northeastern India. Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka, Chakmas and others from Bangladesh, refugees from Burma, and Tibetan refugees from China are in India because they face either persecution or poverty in their homelands. Vietnamese, Cambodian, Chinese, and Burmese refugees have posed major problems for the region in the past years. There is a need to promote rapid development. The United States, Japan and other developed countries have a major responsibility in this regard. Continued U.S. sanctions against Vietnam are not conducive to peace. Closer cooperation in Southeast Asia for development and security is also necessary. Over the past two decades of the Cold War, close ties with Japan and China were the twin pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the region; in the changing post-Cold War era, Washington needs to place far greater stress on a balanced foreign policy and cooperation with India and all the Southeast Asian states, including Cambodia and Vietnam. Greater cooperation for peace and development between India, the United States, Japan, Russia, and the Southeast Asian states will have to be promoted in order to promote security and overcome a regional arms race.

The United States and India both agree on the need to promote the cause of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

However, they disagree on scope and methods. The United States seeks to maintain the nuclear monopoly of the five powers and insists that it needs nuclear deterrence for security. India's own security is deeply affected by the nuclear weapons of China and other powers and the asymmetry of power that it causes in the region. China's signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty will not change the situation as it will continue to retain nuclear weapons.⁹

U.S. strategy in the region is undergoing change both because of domestic factors and the new challenges that are emerging. In the new situation, the United States, India, and Japan, as well as China, must be forces of peace and stability in the region. Policies that promote cooperation, balanced force levels, non-use of force, arms control, and confidence building, are the need of the time.

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PROLIFERATION ON THE SUBCONTINENT: POSSIBILITIES FOR U.S.-INDIAN COOPERATION¹

by

Geoffrey Kemp

INTRODUCTION

The breakup of the Soviet Union has had a double impact on U.S.-Indian security relations. First, it ended the close, intense military relationship between New Delhi and Moscow, thereby removing a major bone of contention between India and the United States. Second, both India and the U.S. are concerned about the emergence of new Muslim republics in Central Asia armed with nuclear weapons. This latter development means India is now bordered by or near three nuclear or potential nuclear powers. For these reasons, it is not surprising that Indian officials have begun to reassess their policy on proliferation and defense cooperation with the United States.

Concerning proliferation, the possibility for a more cooperative relationship with the United States is certainly worth exploring, given the complementary interests of the two parties on at least two issues. First, both countries share a desire to limit proliferation in the former Soviet Union. Second, both wish to prevent further proliferation in the Middle East.

Before exploring these possibilities, it is useful to provide some background on the current status of proliferation on the subcontinent and to discuss some of the strategic imperatives that influence Indian thinking regarding the regional arms balance, including the role of China and Western concepts of arms control.

BACKGROUND

THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT

The Indo-Pakistani conflict dates from the creation of India and Pakistan as independent states in 1947. It has its antecedents in centuries of Hindu-Muslim rivalry on the Indian subcontinent.

The communal violence that accompanied the partition of formerly British India and the war that followed left hundreds of thousands dead, while deepening the mistrust and suspicion between India and Pakistan. Religious differences continue

to plague the Indo-Pakistani relationship as a result of partition along religious lines. While Pakistan was created as a haven for British India's Muslim population, there are more Muslims in India, which is five times Pakistan's size, than in Pakistan. The reason for Pakistan's creation being specifically to be *not India*, Pakistan's foreign policy is understandably Indo-centric. There is a good deal of suspicion in Pakistan that modern India harbors designs on its former western provinces, particularly after New Delhi's key role in the creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan's former eastern province in 1971.

Meanwhile, India, which prides itself on being a secular democracy, officially rejects the communalism on which Pakistan's creation is based. As one of the world's largest states in geographic size, population, economic potential, and military capability, India also rejects a strictly subcontinental foreign policy. Rather, India aspires to be regarded at the global level on a par with its eastern neighbor China. For example, China achieved great power status—including a permanent seat and veto power in the U.N. Security Council—by acquiring nuclear weapons prior to the cut-off date inscribed in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India, which has not tested or deployed nuclear weapons since its 1974 test, has received no such status. This adds weight to the notion in India that only by acquiring the currency of global power, nuclear weapons, will it be taken seriously as a great power in its own right. For India's nuclear capability to be equated with that of Pakistan, and for India to be subject to the same superpower reprimands as Pakistan for its high technology achievements, only adds insult to the injury of not being taken seriously.

The different Pakistani and Indian approaches to foreign relations have been reflected in their relations with the superpowers. Pakistan, concerned primarily with the perceived Indian threat and suffering from an extreme disadvantage in size and capabilities, has traditionally turned to the West, and particularly to the United States, for assistance. India, on the other hand, has wanted to be considered a great power in its own right and has been loathe to accept the bipolar nature of the international system. Finding the old Soviet Union much more amenable to providing assistance with few strings attached, India signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1971. Since 1981, Pakistan has received the bulk of its arms imports from the United States, while Indian arms imports were primarily from the Soviet Union. India also has an extensive defense industry of its own, although it is still dependent on imported Western technology for most high technology systems. India never saw its relationship with the Soviet Union as that of client and patron and resented any attempt to pair India with Pakistan's relationship with the United States.

The primary point of conflict between the two countries has historically been the status of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, itself partitioned between India and Pakistan by the 1947-48 war. The issue was left unresolved and was the basis for the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965. The third, and most recent, war

between India and Pakistan in 1971 saw the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh out of the former Pakistani province of East Pakistan.

Since the 1971 war, India and Pakistan have been at peace, albeit an armed, mistrustful, and fragile peace. India achieved its primary goals in the 1971 war: the wrenching of East Pakistan from Pakistani control; continued control over its portion of Jammu and Kashmir state; and Pakistan's signature on the Simla agreement, stipulating that future disputes between them would be resolved bilaterally. Pakistan, however, was defeated on virtually every front. The Simla Agreement represented capitulation to New Delhi as it guaranteed that India could dictate terms to Pakistan without the latter being able to appeal for outside assistance against its stronger neighbor.

The conflict in Afghanistan also complicated Indo-Pakistani relations and continues to pose a threat to Pakistan's security. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought the U.S. into the region firmly on the side of the anti-Soviet Afghan rebels and their benefactor, Pakistan. The subsequent flow of arms and aid from the U.S. to Pakistan became a cause for alarm in India. In addition to greatly increasing Pakistan's military capabilities against India, the U.S. assistance program inadvertently provided Pakistan with an umbrella under which it could safely complete its program to acquire a nuclear weapons option against India.²

The Indian subcontinent was also rocked by the war against Iraq in the neighboring Persian Gulf. Pakistan sent troops to join the coalition forces against Iraq, while at the same time, the head of the Pakistani military publicly praised Saddam Hussein. There was a great deal of appeal for the Pakistani people in Saddam's Islamic rhetoric. Similarly in India, there were a number of public pro-Saddam, anti-U.S. demonstrations among India's Muslims, despite the government's attempt to remain as neutral as possible. Even the small gesture of allowing U.S. military aircraft to refuel in India caused an uproar.

As elsewhere in the region, religious fundamentalism, separatism, and economic stagnation are increasingly at the heart of each country's internal problems. Pakistan continues to wrestle with its Islamic roots, ethnic violence, and economic corruption, while Indian democracy faces a Hindu fundamentalist threat to its secular status even as it contemplates a future without a leader from the Nehru/Gandhi political dynasty, and a contentious bureaucratic infrastructure.³ In the past, periods of internal instability in India and Pakistan have resulted in inter-state conflict. Any such conflict will now include a nuclear dimension that could, in turn, spill over into the even more volatile Middle East.

China shares a 3380 km border with India. In 1962, they fought a war over disputed territory. China also shares a border with Pakistan along the boundaries

of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, and maintains a strong security relationship with Islamabad. As long as China has unresolved territorial disputes with India, it is bound to continue to regard Pakistan as an important ally. Thus, while Chinese arms sales to the countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf can best be explained in terms of economic motives, Chinese military cooperation with Pakistan has political overtones motivated by the two states' common perception of geostrategic threats.

WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS

Nuclear Weapons and SSMs:

On the Indian subcontinent, a nuclear rivalry exists between India and Pakistan. India is believed to have enough plutonium for 50 to 75 nuclear weapons.⁴ In testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in May 1989, former CIA Director William H. Webster asserted that the evidence suggested India was building a hydrogen bomb.⁵

Pakistan is believed to have enough nuclear material to produce ten to fifteen nuclear weapons.⁶ Pakistan has, until recently, been highly dependent on the United States for economic and military assistance. It has, in turn, seen its nuclear program come under close congressional scrutiny in the U.S. and has been the subject of numerous legislative attempts in Washington to curb its growth.⁷ American aid to Pakistan was, in fact, suspended in October 1990 when the President was unable to certify, as required by Congress, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device.⁸

On February 7, 1992, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan declared that Pakistan possessed components for the core of at least one nuclear weapon. According to Khan, Pakistan has "permanently frozen" its production of such components and of weapons grade nuclear material. He added that Pakistan has thus far refrained from constructing such a weapon in the interest of adhering to the NPT, expressed a willingness to get rid of its nuclear raw materials if India reciprocated, and pledged not to explode a nuclear device or export the technology to other developing nations. His comments were made after meetings with U.S. State Department officials at the UN in New York. Subsequent Pakistani statements have been more ambiguous.⁹

According to Indian Minister of External Affairs Madhavsingh Solanki, India was not surprised by Khan's disclosure. He said on February 8, 1992, that India is prepared to meet the Pakistani nuclear threat and is monitoring the situation closely. India, he added, does not have a nuclear bomb nor the intention of producing one.¹⁰ Some other Indians feared that the U.S. would use this event to push India to sign

the NPT and/or attend five power talks.¹¹

The Bush administration saw the disclosure as a Pakistani attempt to put its cards on the table and begin the process of removing sanctions. They also see the move renewing pressure on India. The US does not want to alienate Pakistan, as has been demonstrated by the permissive American policy on spare parts for Pakistan's F-16 aircraft.¹²

Both India and Pakistan are now categorized by the U.S. administration as probably possessing chemical weapons.¹³

India has developed its own SSM capability with the short-range Prithvi, and the Agni, an intermediate-range missile. The Agni, a two stage, 14-ton, 19 meter long rocket, was successfully tested on May 22, 1989, to a range of approximately 960 km, although it is believed to have a potential range of over 2500 km, and a payload capacity of 1000 kg.¹⁴ India claims that the Agni is the result of indigenous engineering efforts. However, technology transfers in the fields of satellite launching vehicles and guidance systems from West Germany, France, and the U.S., are partly responsible for the success of the Agni program.¹⁵

India's Prithvi is a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile with a range of 250 km and a payload of 1000 kg. The Prithvi was test-fired in February 1988, in September 1989, and again in February 1991. It is slated to begin production in the middle of 1992.¹⁶ Other tactical missiles developed by India are the Trishul and Akash SAM systems, and the Nag anti-tank missile system.

Pakistan has also continued to develop its missile program. In April 1988, Pakistan test-fired a nuclear-capable missile, reportedly developed with Chinese assistance.¹⁷ In February 1989, then chief of staff of the Pakistan Army, General Mirza Aslam Beg, announced that Pakistan had recently tested two indigenously developed surface-to-surface missiles, named Hatf-I and Hatf-II, with ranges of 80 and 300 km respectively. According to Beg, the missiles have a payload capacity of 500 kg.¹⁸ In April 1990, U.S. intelligence sources believed that China was preparing to sell Pakistan M-9 missiles with a range of 600 km.¹⁹ There has been no evidence that such a sale took place. In early 1991, however, Pakistan apparently received parts of the Chinese M-11 missile system with a range of 290 km and a payload of over 450 kg.²⁰

Combat Aircraft:

India's air force includes a variety of Soviet combat aircraft—the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, and MiG-29—the British Jaguar, the French Mirage 2000, and a

number of new Sea Harriers.²¹ In the past, India purchased the majority of its aircraft from the Soviet Union, but has now begun development of its own Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).

Pakistan purchased 40 F-16 aircraft from the United States during the early 1980s, and in June 1989, the United States agreed to sell 60 additional F-16 fighters to Pakistan.²² Pakistan also purchased 75 modern F-7 fighters from China in March 1989.²³ Most recently, Pakistan contracted with Australia in April 1990 to purchase 50 used Mirages.²⁴ The U.S. decision in October 1990 to cut military aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear program has put a permanent "hold" on the planned sale of the 60 F-16s agreed to in 1989.

India possesses a sophisticated indigenous defense production capability.²⁵ This fact sets India apart as one of the few nations in the Third World capable of acquiring, licensing, and developing state-of-the-art weapons systems. A new pro-export policy was announced in February, 1989²⁶ when the Indian government decided to increase exports of its domestically produced weapons to finance imports of high technology weapons and upgrades.

Pakistan can be expected to continue its conventional arms buildup through imports as well as local and licensed production of weaponry. Pakistan's defense industry has fourteen branches and is self-sufficient in tank ammunition and artillery. China, in addition to being one of its principal suppliers, is involved in assisting Pakistan's defense industry through joint development projects.²⁷

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE

That India and Pakistan did not go to war over the crisis in Kashmir in the spring of 1990 may be attributable in part to their undeclared nuclear weapons. Some Indians have argued that it would be easier for India and China to compromise on territorial disputes once India has an open nuclear weapons program and can negotiate from a position of equality. They argue that as long as China has a nuclear monopoly, no Indian politician will dare compromise on territorial issues. Similarly, Pakistan argues that India will not take it seriously until it can match New Delhi's nuclear capability.

It has also been suggested that to further stabilize their deterrence relationship, both states should be more explicit about their possession of nuclear weapons and proceed to integrate them into their armed forces inventories. They should establish well-tested command, control, and communications procedures. One of the most frightening prospects in a future conflict is the possibility that both sides might deploy bombs literally 'out of the basement' for the first time during a crisis or war. If nuclear weapons are to be part of the Indo-Pakistani military balance in

the future, it could be argued that it is better to get them out of the basement and establish secure methods for their deployment.²⁸

A second, contradictory view is that precisely because nuclear weapons remained in the basement during the 1990 Kashmir crisis, they should stay in the basement and not be acknowledged as part of each side's inventory. According to this argument, the knowledge of their potential existence served as a deterrent to escalation by either side. However, by remaining undeclared, neither side was forced to react as they would have had to if explicit mention of nuclear capabilities had been made. Nor was the international community forced to intervene because of the danger of overt nuclear threats.

It is possible to argue that Pakistan's nuclear capability was of greater utility in the Kashmir crisis than was India's. India could hardly threaten a nuclear strike in response to local insurrection. Yet, Pakistan's nuclear capability may have deterred India from using its conventional superiority to put down the revolt more forcefully. If this is the case, arguments for proportional nuclear deterrence in Pakistan may be strengthened.

If this concept gains credence in the region, the most predictable result will be a strengthening of India's resolve to acquire all the military attributes of great power status, including thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and significant regional power projection capabilities. While immediate attention has been focused on the prospects for a new Indo-Pakistani war, India's other rival, China—acknowledged as a great power in part because of its nuclear weapons—remains the key to understanding Indian concerns and aspirations in the high technology weapons arena.

From an Indian perspective, the silence in Western circles concerning the Chinese nuclear weapons program and its impact on regional and international security is politically motivated. In 1971, when the United States decided that a rapprochement with China would be a strategic benefit, much of the rhetoric decrying the dangers of Chinese nuclear weapons disappeared. The Defense Department, which had routinely used the Chinese nuclear program as a benchmark for sizing U.S. nuclear forces, ceased to emphasize the dangers of the Chinese threat. Yet during this period of Sino-American rapprochement, China systematically improved its intercontinental capabilities and poses a far greater threat now than at any time in the past. Indeed, in view of the alarm sounded in the U.S. Congress in 1989 when India first tested the Agni missile, an objective observer might well have thought that India, rather than China, posed the greater threat to the United States.

As long as China remains an accepted nuclear power and the border disputes between them remain unresolved, India will not give up its nuclear ambitions. The

Pakistani bomb may provide the political fuel for pressures on the Indian government to continue the program. Fundamentally, however, India regards itself as a competitor with China, not with Pakistan. Pakistan is a dangerous irritant, but China is a regional superpower.

Since China exploded a nuclear device in 1964, India has refused to participate in discussions on nuclear non-proliferation on the grounds that nuclear disarmament must be comprehensive, not selective by region or state. India will not allow itself to be put into the category of a Third World state while China receives honorary superpower status based on its weapons technology. India's preoccupation with Chinese nuclear capabilities goes far beyond the weapons' physical characteristics. Until the political dimensions of the proliferation problem are taken into account, regional arms control will remain elusive.

ARMS CONTROL: MISSILE AND NUCLEAR REGIMES

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

A group of seven states—the United States, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Britain, and West Germany—formed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1987, to deal with the growing threat posed by the spread of ballistic missile technology. The MTCR focuses narrowly on those missiles considered nuclear-capable, defined as having a range of at least 300 km and a payload capability of at least 500 kg. The MTCR consists of a set of parallel export controls to slow the development of Third World SSM programs. The agreement prohibits the transfer of conventional SSMs, space-launch vehicles, key subsystems for SSMs, and facilities and equipment to produce SSMs. Other items to be limited are on-board computers, inertial navigation systems, liquid and solid rocket fuel, testing equipment, flight control equipment, materials for rocket body parts and engine parts, and technology and know-how for the above items. Any of these items sold must be accompanied by assurances that they will not be diverted to rockets.

Since its inception, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Australia, Austria, Finland, Denmark, and Norway have joined the regime. Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, and most importantly, states of the former Soviet Union have agreed to abide by the MTCR export guidelines. China, despite various statements and discussions with American officials, has not agreed to abide by MTCR guidelines and appears to be continuing its policy of missile sales to the Third World, repeated pressure from the U.S. administration to halt such sales notwithstanding.

One of the principal faults of the MTCR is its definition of nuclear-capable missiles. The range and payload guidelines that it sets are not necessarily relevant

limits for Third World conflicts. In the Middle East, for example, adversarial states are quite close together geographically, making shorter-range missiles strategically significant. Similarly, the 'nuclear-capable' designation leaves open the possibility that suppliers may sell missiles that fall within the MTCR's scope if the supplier is assured that they will not carry nuclear weapons. In addition, Third World states subject to the export restrictions complain that the regime is inherently discriminatory while being unverifiable and unenforceable.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 divided the world into the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots' with the purpose of halting the spread of nuclear weapons technology in exchange for promoting the spread of peaceful nuclear energy technology. The NPT obliges its nuclear weapon state parties to refrain from providing nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, and to assist in the development of peaceful nuclear energy in non-nuclear states. It further obliges the nuclear weapon states to work toward global nuclear disarmament. The NPT obliges its non-nuclear state members to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons and to open all of their nuclear-related facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance. With 147 member states, including three nuclear weapon states—the U.S., Russia, and Britain—the NPT is the most sweeping, comprehensive, and probably most successful technology control regime in existence. Both France and South Africa have announced their intention to join the NPT—France as a nuclear weapon state, and South Africa as a non-nuclear state.²⁹ China announced in August 1991 its decision "in principle" to sign the NPT.³⁰

To supplement the prohibition on military nuclear trade in the NPT, the Zangger Committee and later the London Club of nuclear suppliers developed a common trigger list of export items that would require an IAEA inspection agreement before they would be sold.³¹ The London Suppliers Club thus resembles both the Australia Group and the MTCR. However, supplier export controls on nuclear material supplement a rigid global treaty, whereas there are currently no such treaties for chemical weapons or ballistic missiles.

Despite its success in formalizing the non-nuclear status of most of the countries of the world, the NPT has not succeeded in halting the spread of nuclear weapons altogether, nor has it been entirely successful even among its own member states. Israel, India, Pakistan, Brazil, and Argentina all remain non-members with significant nuclear programs, though Brazil and Argentina signed a similar agreement with the IAEA in December, 1991. Iraq is a party to the NPT but was nevertheless engaged in a sophisticated clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons, causing deep concern over the effectiveness of IAEA inspection procedures.³² The discriminatory nature of the NPT has come under criticism in the Third World,

particularly from India, which accuses the nuclear weapon states of trying to prevent the developing world from gaining access to sophisticated technology. The NPT has also been criticized for not taking into account the regional security motivations of nuclear weapons acquisition in some states, such as Israel. The Treaty comes up for formal renewal in 1995.

ARMS CONTROL ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Over the past three years, India and Pakistan have agreed to confidence-building measures in order to decrease the possibility of military confrontation. The decision to implement these measures was viewed as necessary in the face of growing tension in their relations over Kashmir and the Punjab.³³

In January 1991, India and Pakistan ratified an agreement to refrain from attacking one another's nuclear facilities. The agreement was initially reached in 1985 by the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the late Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq, and signed on December 31, 1988, by Gandhi and then Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Under the terms of the agreement, both countries provide one another with a list of nuclear facilities, including nuclear power and research facilities, as well as uranium enrichment plants and other related facilities. These lists are to be updated annually.³⁴ The agreement specifically states that the countries will "refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating indirectly or directly in any action aimed at causing the destruction or damage to any such installations or facilities in the other country."³⁵ On January 1, 1992, India and Pakistan exchanged lists of facilities.³⁶

During talks in December 1990, the two countries also agreed to resume high-level weekly contacts between their respective militaries and to finalize an agreement for advanced notification of military exercises.³⁷

U.S.-INDIAN COOPERATION ON PROLIFERATION

INDIA AND THE MTCR

The case of Israel is interesting in the context of the U.S.-India relationship. In order to persuade Israel to adhere to the MTCR, an agreement was worked out between the United States and Israel concerning Israel's close ties with South Africa on the development of ballistic missiles. The U.S. agreed to waive any possible sanctions against Israel for violating U.S. laws in cooperating with South Africa.

Could a similar deal be reached between the United States and India? This

is not to imply that India is currently selling missile technology to foreign governments, but might not India agree to restrict its missile technology transfers in exchange for the same type of access to U.S. technology that Israel has? Ideally, this is what India would aim for. However, in the near term, it is extremely unlikely that any American administration would commit to such close ties. The U.S.-Israeli relationship is unique and derives from Israel's very special circumstances. The decision of successive administrations to preserve Israel's "qualitative edge" is based on the assumption that, absent high-technology, Israel will not be able to compete in the military arena with its more numerous and geographically more protected Arab neighbors. India, on the other hand, does not face a qualitative problem in its military relations with Pakistan or, over the long run, with China. It is capable of matching both countries in both quantity and quality.

If the United States will not provide India with missile technology, are there other items the Indians wish for that could be seen as a substitute? There probably are. U.S. cooperation with India on aircraft development and production and a whole array of dual capable technologies that do not fall under the purview of the MTCR might be considered. This tradeoff would be different to that reached with Israel but possibly one both India and the United States should consider.

Perhaps the most important question for the United States is the extent to which we should be concerned about India's missile development program, as distinct from its potential role as a missile exporter. Since it is unlikely any Indian missile will be targeted against the United States or, for that matter, its close allies, it is difficult to make the argument that the U.S. is threatened by the Agni or any follow-on programs. On the other hand, the Western non-proliferation community would argue that a successful Indian development and deployment of long-range missiles would encourage similar developments in Pakistan and would, generally, set another precedent for greater Asian proliferation.

While there is certainly some truth in this argument, U.S. interests will best be served by restricting Indian exports of missile technology rather than taking the punitive step of trying to stop the Indian missile program outright. By far the best way to slow down, or even stop, the Indian long-range missile program is for the Indians themselves to reach the decision not to proceed, either for economic reasons or because the strategic environment has changed.

Trying to coerce India into taking arms control steps it does not perceive to be in its security interests will be counterproductive. This, unfortunately, has been the tone of much of the American rhetoric aimed against the Agni and other programs.³⁸ Such rhetoric makes sense in the case of countries like Iraq, and there were very strong strategic reasons why it was not in the United States interest to see the Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor program succeed. But in a practical sense, the more the United States and the other Western powers emphasize the negatives of Indian

weapons programs, the greater the political incentives for India to continue with them. There is nothing unique about this reaction. The same lessons can be learned from the European experience in the 1960s when the United States tried to squash nuclear development in Britain and France—the result was the reverse—and the efforts by President Kennedy in the 1960s to stop Egypt's missile program. (By sending a U.S. emissary to Egypt to urge Nasser not to proceed with his missiles, Nasser realized how important they were and continued with them for a period.)

The best way to get Indian cooperation is to work out a deal where India gets U.S. non-missile high technology in exchange for compliance with MTCR guidelines. Getting India to agree on rigid controls of its own exports and cooperation with other countries would be in the U.S. interest, particularly since it would provide strong leverage to use the same guidelines and approach for dealing with Pakistan and China.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

How can the United States and India cooperate on nuclear weapons proliferation? Leaving aside the more contentious issue of persuading India to join the NPT or setting up a two-tier system whereby India, Israel and Pakistan join the NPT as existing nuclear states, the most profitable avenue is similar to that suggested for the missile field. This means reaching agreement on the need to restrict all exports of nuclear weapons-related technology from the subcontinent to neighbors. There can be a no more dangerous issue for the Middle East and, therefore, for United States interests than nuclear proliferation within the context of the Iran-Iraq and Arab-Israeli conflicts. The possibility of an unchecked Iraqi or Iranian nuclear weapons program is sufficiently disturbing to precipitate international, if not unilateral, military action as a preventive measure. Could it ever be in India's or Pakistan's interest, to see a nuclear Iraq or Iran? There are reasons why under certain circumstances, people in the West might be suspicious of Pakistani and, possibly, Indian cooperation with the Middle East countries on nuclear weapons development.

First, consider the case of Pakistan. Pakistan is currently under a U.S. embargo due to the invocation of the Pressler Amendment—the President not being satisfied that Pakistan is not building a nuclear device. Under these circumstances, both United States and Pakistan are trying as hard as they can to maintain favorable relationships and not permit the distrust and anger over this issue to lead to a further deterioration. However, this bland situation might not last. It is conceivable that a more nationalistic or xenophobic regime in Pakistan would side more openly with radical movements in the Muslim world and see its nuclear capability as an important bargaining chip in getting access to Middle East resources. It is possible to imagine future cooperation between Pakistan and either Iraq or Iran both as a

political and economic device designed to strengthen each country vis-a-vis the West. In short, in thinking about proliferation nightmares for the 1990s, this must rank high on everyone's list. Hence, it must be a high priority to try to reach an agreement with Pakistan not to engage in nuclear multilateralism.

While it is more difficult to imagine scenarios under which India would be tempted to engage in the same types of deals, it can not be ruled out. Just what the scenario would be that could impel India to share nuclear technology with its neighbors is a matter of speculation. But one sure way to make this more likely would be insensitive or overweening actions by the West, particularly the United States, that further alienate India and give weight to the belief that the United States is intent on global hegemony now that the Soviet Union has been destroyed.

PREFERRED U.S. POLICIES

Key to understanding U.S.-Indian cooperation is the mindset of both parties. Indians are consistently sensitive to the impression that Americans either wish to ignore them or attach unfair restrictions to their legitimate defense needs.³⁹ Americans, on the other hand, consistently complain about Indian behavior in international arenas which, if not deliberately anti-American, certainly does little to further American interests. Indian attitudes and behavior at the U.N. are perhaps the best example of this.

A great deal of this confusion, misunderstanding, and suspicion derives from the fact that both countries support large bureaucracies, each of which has different agendas. There is no doubt that cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense is now in both bureaucracies' interest and could, barring any other constraints, be pursued very vigorously. In early 1992, cooperation of this sort has increased.⁴⁰ It is not at all clear if the Indian parliament or the U.S. Congress presently share these views. Positioned in between are other government agencies who have more ambivalent and antagonistic attitudes towards the relationship.

For all these reasons—and in the case of proliferation, the single-minded philosophy of the U.S. non-proliferation community and the antagonisms that this arouses in India—it would be unwise to expect too much from formal cooperation on proliferation. Far preferable would be limited agreements of the kind sketched above, together with efforts by the United States to work closely with India informally to explore an array of cooperative ventures ranging from a five power conference on the nuclear limited zone to specific proposals to deal with the bilateral India-Pakistan nuclear relationship. United States arms control objectives will be better served if we work closely with those in India who see arms control not as a threat to legitimate defense needs, but as a tool that can be used to assist India's security rather than

undermine it.

The United States should not lecture India on the high cost of its nuclear and missile programs. It is preferable that Indians themselves raise objections, if they are merited, as to the economic drain of such programs. To the extent that the United States can help stimulate a serious debate about the merits of arms control within the Indian decision-making process, it will serve its own interests. Sensible arms control advanced and approved by the Indian body politique can only work in America's interests. Thus, the confidence building measures between India and Pakistan that have begun to evolve over the past few years are very much in line with American thinking on the subject.

The United States can best help India reformulate its nuclear policy in the post-Soviet world by adopting a low-key but constructive approach that encourages arms control, while at the same time not undermining India's security prerogatives. The United States must accept that Indians themselves are the best suited to think through the dilemmas of proceeding with multi-billion dollar nuclear and missile programs at a time when economic productivity in an increasingly competitive world has assumed critical importance, and the defense budgets of the Western and the former Soviet Union republics are falling.

1. Some of the background material in this paper draws upon Geoffrey Kemp (with the assistance of Shelley Stahl), *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991).
2. For a full account of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, the latter's nuclear weapons program, and its effects on Indo-Pakistani relations, see *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988).
3. For greater detail on the state of Pakistani politics, see Mahnaz Ispahani, *Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity*, Adelphi Paper #246 (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990).
4. Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Threshold* (working title) (Boulder, Colorado: 1992 forthcoming).
5. See David B. Ottaway, "Signs Found India Building An H-Bomb," *Washington Post*, May 19, 1989.
6. Spector and Smith, *Nuclear Threshold*.
7. For a summary of nuclear proliferation-related restrictions against aid to Pakistan in U.S. legislation, see Appendix G, "Non- Proliferation Restrictions on Aid to Pakistan," in Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 474-480.
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12. Edward A. Gargan, "The Chastened Pakistanis: Peace with U.S. is Aim," *New York Times*, February 19, 1992; see also "Pakistan to Maintain Relations with U.S. Despite Aid Cuts," UPI, March 18, 1992.
13. See Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, March 7, 1991.
14. See Barbara Crossette, "India Reports Successful Test of Mid- Range Missile," *New York Times*, May 23, 1989; Richard M. Weintraub, "India Tests Mid-Range 'Agni' Missile," *Washington Post*, May 23, 1989; and "Advanced Surface-to-Surface Missile Tests Planned," Hong Kong, Agence France Presse, 1550 GMT, 26 May 1989, in *FBIS-NES*, May 30, 1989, p. 60.
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THE EMERGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: AN INDIAN VIEW OF THE AMERICAN ROLE

by

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An era in international relations has drawn to a close with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The events of 1989-91 can be seen as the end of the "Seventy Years Crisis" in international relations which began in 1919. The collapse of the Congress of Vienna system had generated utter turbulence in the international relations of Europe. This resulted in two world wars, dissolution of empires, and a prolonged Cold War. The comprehensive defeat of fascism in 1945 and communism in 1991 have together given the West a major victory.

But much of the initial triumph and celebration is giving way to new anxieties and apprehensions. Despite talk of a new world order, there is no worldwide consensus on the new world in the making. Nor is there a widespread agreement on the ends that the international community should be striving for, let alone the means—that should be employed. The hopes raised by the stunning American victory in the Gulf War—that there could be a smooth transition towards an era of harmonious international relations and a cooperative global order—have quickly begun to dissipate.

This paper focuses on a few key elements of the current global transformation and the challenges they pose. It seeks to delineate the likely role the United States could fashion for itself in the emerging global environment, a task complicated by the transitional nature of current international relations and the uncertain course of the domestic debate in the United States on the reconfiguration of America's role in the post-Cold War world.

John Lewis Gaddis has argued that the central faultline in the emerging world is the tension between the forces of integration and fragmentation.¹ The communications revolution, global economic and ecological interdependence, the search for collective and cooperative security, and the spread of liberal democracy all mark the growing strength of the forces of integration. At the same time, forces of fragmentation such as nationalism, protectionism, unilateralism, ethnic hatred, and religious conflicts have shown surprising new strength. The management of the tension between the forces of integration and fragmentation could be the major challenge in the new world order.

INTEGRATION VERSUS FRAGMENTATION

At the level of ideology, the Seventy Years Crisis was marked by intense rivalry between Marxism and liberal democracy. That ideological rivalry is now buried with the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the model of social organization it represented. However, a range of ideologies, anti-liberal in their orientation, are fighting to fill the ideological vacuum.² The surge of anti-liberalism is not limited to East Europe and the developing world, but is visible in the West as well.

The many sided civil war in Yugoslavia and the tragedy of Nagorno-Karabakh being enacted by Armenians and Azerbaizanis are only symbolic of widespread nationalist tension emerging out of the ravages of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the developing world, these tendencies, already visible in the 1980s, have now acquired a new intensity. At the very moment of the triumph of liberalism, we have begun to see unprecedented brutalization and violence in many parts of the world.

The celebration of the triumph of liberal ideas has also been marred by the knowledge that most of the new democracies in Europe and elsewhere rest on a very fragile institutional basis and are being threatened by forces of authoritarianism and revanchism. The new democrats have not found it easy to resist the temptations of ruling by decree and other authoritarian means.

In parts of the developing world we have seen the surprising resurgence of Islamic parties and movements, even as they are being marginalized elsewhere. Earlier in the Gulf war, we witnessed the almost irrational support for Saddam Hussein among masses of muslim people in many parts of the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union came as a shock to the intelligentsia in many developing nations. For a generation of radicals, nationalists and anti-imperialists, many of them essentially liberal in orientation, it has been a hopeless slide into the attractions of simple anti-Westernism as they struggle to cope with the new world. The blind rage against the perceived domination of the United States and or the West is widespread and cannot be ignored.

In the western world itself, we have seen the welling up of racist, anti-immigrant, and national chauvinist feelings. The surprising showing of these forces in the recent French and German elections, the charges of racism and antisemitism against the Republican candidate Patrick Buchanan, the popularity of Japan-bashing in the United States, and the crass statements in Japan about the American work ethic all reflect the enduring strength of the forces of fragmentation. The demands of electoral politics are forcing mainstream parties and politicians to

accommodate rather than confront the forces of fragmentation. The growing economic anxieties in much of the western world are also fueling the centrifugal forces.

The Soviet collapse has also meant that the world, for the first time since 1917, is fully capitalist. The disappearance of the Soviet model has made it clear that the world no longer has two radically different ways of running an economy. Recent developments in China and Vietnam, the major communist holdouts in Asia, indicate that despite the professions of unflinching faith in socialism they are committed to building capitalism under the leadership of the Communist Part—the so-called Red capitalism.

It is obvious that capitalist integration and the globalization of markets and production have gained unprecedented strength. But the world-wide transition to the market and capitalism need not necessarily be smooth. The old order remains strong in China and, despite the apparent upper hand of Deng Xiaoping, resistance from the old guard cannot be completely ruled out. In the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the enormous social pain resulting from the lunge towards the market has raised fears of the return of the old communists in alliance with national chauvinists.

Although it is evident that market forces have created unprecedented political conditions for spreading capitalism worldwide, it is not entirely clear that the developed capitalist world is ready to cope with the problems of rapid conversion of a large number of countries. The German preoccupation with Eastern lands, the current slowdown of the Japanese economy, the lack of near term prospects for a radical restructuring of the American economy, and the shortage of global capital do not make the prospects of a smooth transition to market economies very bright. The undue hesitation of the United States to come to the aid of Russian economic reconstruction and persistent doubts about the utility of external aid in Russian renewal are indicative of the complexity of the problem. Similarly, the scale of international fiscal effort required to facilitate economic reform and renewal in much of the developing world does not appear to be politically feasible.

Disintegrative tendencies seem to be gaining strength among the advanced industrial nations. The Cold War saw unprecedented economic cooperation and integration among the world's leading capitalist countries. Not everyone is agreed today that this cooperation can survive. There are many who argue that economic competition may become the modern equivalent of the old- politico-military struggle for supremacy. Economics, some say, must now be seen as an extension of warfare by other means.

The continuing deadlock in the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations and the increasing economic tensions among the United States, the European Community and Japan, fueled by nationalist/protectionist rhetoric at home, have given rise to fears that the world economic system may disintegrate into three competing trade blocs.

Already, Cold War language is being used to describe the new tensions. Kicking off his current election campaign, George Bush declared that the EC would not be allowed to hide behind the "iron curtain of protectionism", and that American agriculture will not "disarm unilaterally".

The unprecedented economic prosperity and cooperation achieved in the West during the Cold War have been possible largely due to the dynamism of the American economy and its global economic leadership. But given the structural problems afflicting the American economy, changes in the relative economic weights of the main Western powers and the absence of a common political enemy have begun to cloud the prospects for future economic cooperation. The key to continuing international economic cooperation remains in the hands of the United States. But the inability of the American political class to confront the domestic economic challenge, the refusal of the American people to pay the price of restructuring in terms of higher taxes, the rising tide of protectionism, and growing support for "fair trade"—an euphemism for managed trade—do not herald deeper and wider international economic cooperation.

Even within the European Community where substantial economic integration has taken place, there are tendencies toward fragmentation. Germany's waning enthusiasm for economic integration after unification and its recent unilateral action on interest rates suggest that there is a long way to go before the benefits of European integration can be realized. Furthermore, the opening up of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has intensified the tension between the notions of deepening and broadening in the European Community.

"UNIPOLAR" CHALLENGES

Like all decisive wars, the Cold War profoundly altered the distribution of power among the great powers of the international system. There are widespread fears in Europe and the third world that the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the stunning American victory in the Gulf war have brought about a unipolar world. In the United States itself, there is some enthusiasm for the "unipolar moment"³ to define and enforce an American agenda on the rest of the world.

There are many in the United States who challenge the notion of the United States being the sole superpower enforcing Pax Americana. They question the claim that Washington is in a position to impose global order entirely on its own. They read the Gulf War as having demonstrated the fact that the United States needed cooperation, or at least acquiescence of the other great powers, as well as military and economic support from the key global and regional players.

The United States is indeed in a unique position in the current international

situation; among the great powers, it pre-eminent. The emerging great powers, Germany and Japan, are economic giants but are in no position to undertake global political responsibilities. Barring some unexpected reversals in Russia, Moscow's international profile may continue to shrink. At the same time, the nature and character of America's role in the international system has been significantly transformed due to the relative economic decline of the United States, the imperative of bringing its international strategic commitments in line with fiscal resources, and the changed political environment in Europe and Asia. The American role is likely to be transformed from being the unchallenged leader of the Western alliance system in Europe and Asia into a critical balancer within the new security structures that are beginning to emerge in both regions. At the global level, the United States is the natural leader, but it can only lead with the full cooperation of the other great powers.

An indication of American self-perception in the new international order can be partly inferred from the recently leaked draft of the Defense Policy Guidance. The strategic objectives the United States sets for itself are remarkably simple: one is to prevent the emergence of any rival superpower or a combination of great powers that can threaten American interests globally; the other is to prevent "potential competitors from even aspiring for a regional role."⁴

From the standpoint of realism, it is not surprising that the United States seeks to freeze the current international balance in its favor. It is not difficult to understand the Pentagon argument that the United States must "sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order."⁵ This, however, may be easier said than done.

The central problem appears to be the reality that the Soviet threat, which acted as the glue that bound the West together, is no longer there. Western allies deferred to Washington in economic and political matters in return for the American security cover. In the new international context, there is little reason for continued uncritical allied deference to the United States on all issues. On the trade and economic front we have already noted tension; on the security front, we have seen the enormous energies the Bush Administration had to devote in rounding up the reluctant allies in the Gulf war, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein had given little space for the allies to distance themselves from the American position. Securing the cooperation of the allies could increasingly depend upon the merit of the issue and the calculation of individual national interest rather than an automatic obeisance to American leadership. Further, accounting for allies' interest assumes an American readiness to bargain and compromise with its allies on critical issues.

But the greater challenge to sustained American global leadership comes from domestic factors in the United States. The ongoing U.S. election campaign has

revealed deep and abiding differences over defining America's role in the new international order. While traditional internationalism dominates the discourse of both George Bush and Bill Clinton, the slogan of "America First", and the sense that America should look after its own before taking care of the rest of the world have touched a deep chord. As David Gergen notes:

"the tangle of domestic problems is so thick and enduring that economic growth may be disappointing and will exercise a restraining hand on the foreign policy activism of earlier days. While it remains rich, the country will think and act as if it is poor, choosing not to accept as idealistic and expensive a role as it has played in. Absent a direct challenge to its national interest Washington will be more reluctant to assert its leadership in quelling dangerous conflicts....In its economic relationships, especially with Asia, the country will be tougher and more demanding. The standard by which policies will be judged will be much less of 'What's in it for the world?' than 'what's in it for us?'"⁶

Although there is no reason to assume that America will become isolationist and turn inward, the influence of isolationists and nationalists on foreign policy formulation and implementation may continue to grow in Washington. The growing resistance to foreign aid, continuing reluctance to fund even a friendly United Nations, and congressional resistance to funding UN peace-keeping operations and the International Monetary Fund are indicative of the new mood.⁷

Paradoxically, the "sole superpower" may find its freedom of action in the changed world being constrained by a number of factors:

- The United States has emerged from the Cold War with a bruised economy and a growing sense that it must put its own house in order.
- "America-first" nationalism and protectionism have gained strong support.
- America's allies seek greater autonomy and, like the United States, are under domestic pressure to assert more nationalistic positions.
- In the past, anti-communism silenced much foreign policy dissent, but the Gulf crisis unleashed an intense political debate over external engagement.
- The extraordinary powers gathered by the U.S. presidency in the execution of foreign and defense policy during the Cold War may come under challenge from the Congress.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY VERSUS BALANCE OF POWER

Assuming that the United States will remain globally engaged, it is possible to discuss the American approach to the world in terms of a tension between the notions of collective security and balance of power. Although the notion of collective security was popularized by President Woodrow Wilson, it attracts few in the American establishment. However, given the Bush Administration's decision to involve the United Nations in the Gulf war and the talk of a new central role for the United Nations in the management of international security, there is renewed interest in the notion of collective security. In his major foreign policy address in April, Bill Clinton called for reinvention of the concept of collective security.

But realists argue that the historical record of the concept of collective security is dismal. Collective security arrangements have rarely worked. "When there was security, it was not collective, and when there was a collective there was no security"⁸ Referring to talk about collective security in Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, Henry Kissinger asked, "If everybody is allied with everybody, will anyone have a special obligation to anyone?"⁹

The realists are not wrong when they dismiss the notion that the Gulf War represented a victory for collective security. The Gulf War was prosecuted by an ad hoc coalition, harnessed and led by the United States, which bore the overwhelming military burden of the fighting. The realists insist that collective security is a mirage and that it is a fallacy to believe that all countries perceive threats in the same way and therefore will take equal risks to meet those threats. Only the United States can organize and back international action against threats to peace and security.

The Defense Policy Guidance draft has been widely criticized in the United States as a rejection of collective internationalism. Critics insist that given the growing internal and external constraints on the unilateral use of American power, it is absolutely necessary that the United States steadily move towards institutionalization of collective security under the aegis of the United Nations. The Pentagon document is said to be conspicuously devoid of references to collective action through the United Nations. According to the draft, coalitions "hold considerable promise for promoting collective action", as in the Persian Gulf war. But it considers "future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and, in many cases, carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished." The most important thing according to the Guidance draft is "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and that Washington should be fully prepared to act independently "when collective action cannot be orchestrated."

The ability of the United States to remain the sole conductor of the strategic

ensemble to be set up in response to major crises remains moot. Secretary of State James Baker referred to a coalition approach in calling for an international conference to coordinate aid for the Soviet Union.¹⁰ The conference itself saw grumbling from countries like Germany, unhappy at American attempts at taking over leadership of the Soviet aid effort without contributing much in terms of resources. When George Bush finally announced an aid package to the former Soviet Union, Japan was not happy; Tokyo had been arguing against aid without a settlement of its territorial dispute with Russia.

The central thrust of American policy towards both Europe and Asia has been predicated on the balance of power approach with the United States remaining the linchpin of the new security arrangements emerging after the Soviet collapse. On the one hand, there are persisting doubts about the longevity of the American commitment to the security of Europe and Asia and the scale of forward presence the United States could sustain in the coming years. On the other hand, emerging internal contradictions in the Eurasian landmass after the Soviet collapse may have already increased the need for a critical American presence in the region.

As the Cold War began to wind down in Europe in the late 1980s, there was growing interest in favor of a strong collective security framework in Europe. The signing of the Paris Charter at the end of 1990 and the new enthusiasm for the CSCE seemed to inaugurate such a process. But the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the tragic civil war and breakup of Yugoslavia have thrown the European security order into disarray. Despite the rhetoric about a new security architecture, all Europe has today is an alphabet soup: CSCE, NATO, EC, and WEU. As these institutions compete to fill the vacuum left by the end of bipolar confrontation, European security evolution has entered a difficult phase.

Meanwhile, the United States believes NATO is the only vehicle through which it can preserve a central role in European affairs. The Bush Administration has warned strongly against the creation of independent security arrangements outside of NATO in Europe, but France continues to press for independent European defense arrangements. Further, the twelve nations of Western Europe are committed at least notionally to common foreign and defense policies.

The lack of clarity over the new institutional framework for European security has been compounded by new strategic factors. The collapse of the Soviet Union has made the eastern half of Europe volatile and unstable. Despite its weak economic status, Russia remains the most populous state of Europe, armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. And its internal evolution remains unpredictable. The unification of Germany has enormously increased the strategic weight of Bonn, particularly after the Soviet collapse. The existing European institutions, according to Henry Kissinger, cannot by themselves establish a balance either between Germany and its partners in the West or between Germany and Russia in the East.¹¹ This naturally

leaves the United States as the only force capable of balancing the different forces in the new Europe. But given the pressures at home for disengagement, and tensions with the Europeans over economic issues, it is not clear how the United States can successfully reduce its forward presence, redefine the purpose and character of NATO, and rework the European balance.

Unlike Europe, the Asia-Pacific region had to adapt to conditions of multipolarity even at the peak of the Cold War. Besides the presence of a number of great powers—the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, China and India—there have been a number of other regional players wedded to an independent policy.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union has also dramatically intensified the fluidity and complexity of Asian international relations. It certainly has profound implications for the future internal and external evolution of Chinese policies. Deng Xiaoping is gamely attempting to get China out of the awkward ideological corner it has been caught in. The bow to capitalism and ideological jugglery are unlikely to resolve the basic contradictions inherent within the Chinese economic structure or between the economic and political structures.

At a more basic level, the disintegration of the Soviet Union could have a major impact on the territorial consolidation of the Chinese state. It is not obvious whether China is absorbing Hong Kong or the city is taking over southern China. The reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland seems as difficult as before. There is greater assertiveness by the Dalai Lama on Tibet and increasing ethnic restiveness in Sinxiang and Inner Mongolia.

Despite a number of difficulties, China has successfully utilized its leverage as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. China enjoys a solid working relationship with Japan and has had some recent impressive diplomatic gains, most notably in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. Much of this is thanks to the determination of the Bush Administration to keep Beijing engaged, perhaps driven by larger balance of power considerations in Asia. But it is also evident that China is no longer needed to contain the Soviet Union and that the bipartisan consensus behind U.S. China policy has dissipated. Given the uncertain nature of the internal evolution of China, Beijing's relations with the United States and the West will remain clouded. It also means that China will remain a major problem for Asian security.

The strategic uncertainty in Asia is driven by Japan's evolution as well. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have opened up new political space for Japan. Although residual pacifism at home and memories of its imperial past restrain overt strategic assertion by Tokyo in the region, Japan's political weight must be expected to increase. While Japan may have gained significantly, the tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance may have dangerous

consequences for Asian security. With rising nationalism in both the United States and Japan, conflict over trade and economics could easily spill over into the security front, undermining the most stable element of Asian relations since the end of the Second World War.

Well before the Soviet collapse, the United States was engaged in a comprehensive review of its Asia-Pacific policy. It has already announced a small cut in its forward military presence and recently announced its decision to withdraw from the bases in the Philippines. There must be some redefinition of strategic objectives as well as the means to achieve them in the Asia-Pacific region. Preservation of stability, encouraging peaceful change, and maintaining preparedness to defend against undefined aggressors, are the new American objectives in the region as opposed to the past emphasis on containing the Soviet threat. The United States has consistently rejected proposals for collective security in Asia such as that, by Mikhail Gorbachev in the past and more recently, by Australia and Canada. Instead the United States hopes to manage the Asian environment through a balance of power approach.

Cooperative vigilance is a new name for the American regional balance of power strategy. Expected to operate with fewer resources, the United States hopes to prevent the dominance of Asia by any state or combination of states. Although American forward presence would decline, its effectiveness will be maintained through access to various military facilities in the region as well as by regular exercises and military cooperation with a number of key regional military actors. Most nations in the region, afraid of possible Japanese or Chinese domination, would not like to see a precipitous decline in American military presence and are keen to cooperate with the United States to preserve stability.

The American strategy of cooperative vigilance has opened up unprecedented opportunities for strategic cooperation between India and the United States in maintaining the Asian balance of power. But significantly, the very commitment to the balance of power game may constrain Indo-U.S. cooperation, or at least create needless hurdles.

It may be logical from the balance of power viewpoint to argue, as the draft Defense Guidance did, that India itself must be prevented from exercising dominance in the region. This view created widespread apprehensions in India about American intentions and the durability of Indo-U.S. defense cooperation. There clearly are two sets of problems, one conceptual and the other practical.

If balance of power is an end in without any reference to common values and objectives, Indo-U.S. cooperation will degenerate into expediency and remain fragile. At the practical level it is understandable, given the preliminary nature of Indo-U.S. strategic interaction, that there is not enough appreciation in the United States of

India's legitimate interests and aspirations. Uncritical acceptance of the mythology of Indian "hegemonic designs" by motivated sections in India's neighborhood appear to hold sway in Washington. A correction of this can only come through wider and more intensive consultations between Indian and American intelligentsia as well as the two foreign policy elites. Another major problem is the continuing sense in Washington of dealing with India purely in a South Asian context. The conceptual limitation of India to the confines of the subcontinent, naturally strengthens the logic of balancing India with appropriate support to India's neighbors, particularly Pakistan.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have liberated India from the limiting influence of its relationship with Moscow as well as its restrictive domestic economic policies. India today is rapidly moving towards global integration and is casting its foreign policy net very wide. It is seeking to redefine its relationships with important nations in Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Gulf, and the Middle East, as well as the great powers of the world. In this context it is in the interest of the United States to define its relationship with India in the larger terms of Asian and global security. Particularly in the management of the balance of power in both the Eastern and Western parts of Asia, Indo-U.S. cooperation could emerge as a vital element.

It is obviously necessary that both India and the United States take care to ensure that India's neighbors are not frightened by emerging Indo-U.S. cooperation. To prevent such fear it is absolutely necessary for India and the United States to articulate their strategic cooperation, not just in balance of power terms, but also in terms of shared liberal democratic values. Such higher political content is necessary to sustain public support for strategic cooperation in both countries. This would also help spread democratization in the entire region, and prevent vested interests in India's neighborhood from projecting Indo-U.S. cooperation as hegemonic. The question is not whether India should have a veto over American policy in South Asia; no one in India is really asking for that. The question is whether India and the United States can structure their relationship in terms of widely acceptable principles and pursue them in an open and transparent manner. And the more basic issue is whether India and the United States stand for anything other than stability and balance of power?

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

The much maligned draft Defense Guidance of the Pentagon has suggested that a major American objective "is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems." These are objectives few in India would quarrel with.

Although the emphasis on international law and democracy are refreshing, the Defense Guidance cautions us against excessive expectations: "While the U.S. cannot become the world's 'policeman,' by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."¹²

The last few years have seen the dramatic assertion of democratic sensibilities world-wide. There have been many successful transitions towards democracy. There have also been spectacular failures, as in Burma, and China. There have been reversals too, in Thailand, Haiti, Algeria and Peru. The end of the Cold War and communism are bound to encourage democratization in most parts of the world; superpower rivalry in the third world had earlier shielded many a dictator. In addition, as long as communism sustained its challenge to liberal democracy, it opened up political space for authoritarian governments. The existence of the Soviet superpower made centralized state control, one-party dictatorship, and personalized autocracy legitimate forms of governance in many parts of the world. With the collapse of the Soviet model the political space for authoritarianism has narrowed sharply.

Many in the United States have demanded that support for global democratization be a key element in the new world order. They insist that support for democracy must be the new organizing principle of American foreign policy.¹³ From a realistic point of view, there obviously are limits to what the United States can do in spreading democracy, or consistently supporting democratic forces worldwide. As the Defense Guidance points out, selectivity, consideration of other foreign policy interests, and lack of strategic interest constrain American desire.

The different standards used by the Bush Administration in relation to democratization in the Soviet Union and China are not difficult to see. In relation to Burma the United States has been critical of the junta and did impose some sanctions, but beyond that Washington has not been keen to force the issue. There may be no over-riding strategic interest for the United States in making Burmese democracy an issue. No other power in the region is willing to take the initiative. The Japanese have rarely demonstrated any political vision and the ASEAN states have little interest in democracy.

But for India, democratization of Burma is far more important. For India, it is not just a question of democracy, it is also an issue of the unhindered supply of repression by China and the steady expansion of Beijing's influence. Disinterest in supporting genuine struggles for democracy would thus have important consequences for the overall balance of power in many areas. The issue here may not be the utter consistency in American support to democratization. It is the readiness of the United States to support its partners who have a stake in the success of the democratic

process in areas of marginal interest to the United States.

In many parts of Eurasia, demands for self-determination have gained a new strength in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. If redoing the map is seen as legitimate in Europe, the pressures for fragmentation are bound to increase in Asia as well. Unlike Europe, where demands for self-determination have now come into focus, the developing world has been witness to a large number of conflicts and civil wars centered around national self-determination and autonomy.

In Yugoslavia, the United States took a principled position in favor of the unity of Yugoslavia while encouraging support for peaceful change and warning against the dangers of violent disintegration. The U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, outlined a code emphasizing both integrity of the nation-state as well as full protection of minorities. As the events in Yugoslavia demonstrate, however, it is impossible to keep people together if they do not want to do so. As a result, the United States had to retract its position. India's own effort in Sri Lanka was premised on the same considerations, preserving Sri Lankan unity as well as gaining federal rights for the Tamil minority. Notwithstanding the failure of the U.S. policy in Yugoslavia, one hopes the emphasis on the basic principles underlying the Yugoslav policy will be retained in Washington as it copes with the challenge of self-determination. The creation of universal norms on rights of minorities, cultural pluralism, regional autonomy, and federal politics may not be achievable overnight, but steady progress on this front may be critical for security and stability in most parts of the Eurasian landmass.

There is already pressure on the United States from Congress and human rights groups to act or intervene against nations violating these norms. In the developing world, even in democratic parts, there is strong resentment against the imposition of political norms from outside. One argument that comes in particular from China and Southeast Asia is that democracy could be a major impediment to the creation of viable state structures and a functioning market economy; that it is unfair to demand of the latecomers in the international system norms that have been only progressively attained in the advanced industrial states. For many in the developing world, posing a choice between democracy and development is unacceptable. No amount of theory or empirical evidence is likely to convince those struggling to gain democratic rights that democracy and development are mutually exclusive goals.

What is worrisome is not American support for human rights, but the inability to distinguish between different contexts in which human rights problems arise. There is a tendency to lump together the rights of those struggling to break free from totalitarian and unitary political systems and those disrupting democratic and federal frameworks that already exist. There are many different groups seeking human rights: some use peaceful, non-violent means; and others are committed to terrorism,

religious fundamentalism, national chauvinism, and other illiberal ideas. While condemnation of human rights abuses by states is absolutely necessary, there is little attention devoted to the violent and anti-democratic character of groups fighting legitimate states. One expects that American human rights policy would show sufficient sensitivity to those democratic states struggling to cope with the forces of violence and disintegration.

CONCLUSIONS

Summing up, what should be the American role in the emerging global environment from the viewpoint of India? An isolationist and inward-looking America is not in India's interest. Without an active American engagement in Europe and Asia, the security context could rapidly degenerate. Nor is an aggressive America, unilaterally enforcing Pax Americana, in India's interest. An America acting in concert with other great powers, leading the world towards a more cooperative order and expanding the legal and normative framework is consistent with the internationalist vision of India's own founding fathers. In this global task, Washington should find India a natural partner.

The imperative of global interdependence and the current power realities in the international system places the responsibility for leading the world towards genuine multilateralism on the shoulders of the United States. The United States should resist the temptation of siding with the forces of fragmentation and seek to strengthen the tendencies towards global integration. This is particularly urgent in the sphere of international economy and trade.

On the security front, the United States should not find it difficult to balance the imperative of power politics with the emerging need for collective internationalism. Collective security is clearly a long-term goal and is not achievable by a prior design. It will have to be built by trial and error. In the interim, the United Nations is bound to gain in significance. The United States should seek to make the UN a genuine instrument of international cooperation. Misuse of the United Nations to partisan ends or giving the impression that the world body is not consistent in the application of accepted principles could well destroy the political credibility of the UN. And the success of the United Nations demands democratization of decision-making and reconstitution of the Security Council to make it more representative.

At the regional level, it is necessary that the United States strike a balance between the notions of balance of power and collective security. Asia without America would be politically unstable and dangerous. Continued American forward military presence in the Indian Ocean and Asia/Pacific region is not inimical to India's interests. Prevention of the dominance of the region by any group of states

is not inconsistent with India's strategic interests. If America tempers its balance of power approach with a commitment towards democracy and international law, there are possibilities for enduring Indo-U.S. strategic cooperation.

On the sensitive issues of internal democratization in most parts of the world, there is no basic difference of principle between the United States and India. But there is need for a more intensive dialogue between the two on the practical approach to handling democratization, the absence of which is the source of much international insecurity. The United States should find India a willing partner in the democratization of international relations and its internal structures.

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**WHITHER CHINA:
BEIJING'S DOMESTIC, FOREIGN, AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
IN THE 1990s**

by

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INTRODUCTION

The rise of China's successor generation began in the early 1980s. Yet, today, nearly ten years and two "successors" later, Deng Xiaoping remains China's major political force. Moreover, the shape of the new system is not much clearer than it was in 1982. Even though recent events suggest a revitalized reform consensus is emerging, octogenarian leaders of different persuasions—and their younger surrogates in the Party Politburo—continue to articulate competing versions of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Significantly, competing factions have failed to unite despite the extreme pressures engendered by the Tiananmen Massacre of June 1989, which discredited the leadership at home and abroad; the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, which eroded China's global strategic advantage; and the emergence of a "New World Order" from which Beijing fears exclusion as a major power. On the contrary, defining the proper response to these challenges actually increased contention. As result, neither the peasant concerned about the durability of the "household responsibility system with remuneration linked to output" nor regional national security policy managers can be certain of the future.

THE ENVIRONMENT: PRESSURES, FORCES, AND TRENDS

Even if the dramatic events of the past decade have not forced a clear consensus, they and other related matters will influence the course of future developments. Decision makers face a variety of internal and external pressures that will define their options and shape their actions. Overall, these pressures will drive Beijing to expand the scope and quicken the pace of reform.

ECONOMIC PRESSURES

Most important will be internal pressures for continued increases in living standards. Ten years of reform produced considerable improvement in the peoples' livelihood, particularly in the rural sector. Although China's urban dwellers have fared less well, they too harbor legitimate expectations for the future. Irrespective of their approach to reform, China's leaders all define achieving ever higher standards as the key to maintaining political stability. A thriving economy will also safeguard the leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Leaders appear to agree that the only way to achieve the necessary economic progress is to move reform forward. The points of contention concern the areas to be emphasized and how far to proceed in each.

At this time, moving forward with reform means confronting at long last two problems that have bedeviled the leadership since the early 1980s: revitalizing the sagging state sector of the economy and implementing comprehensive price reform.

China's 11,540 state-owned industrial enterprises constitute 2.5 percent of the nation's total and produce 45.6 percent of China's overall industrial output value. The state sector also generates some 60 percent of the central government's revenues. And yet, it is estimated that more than one third of these enterprises and establishments are running in the red. Reform of the state enterprise system requires making individual units responsible for their own profits and losses, freeing them from the most onerous constraints of the state plan, allowing them to hire and fire staff, and a host of other marketing-and-management-related initiatives that need not be discussed here.

China's irrational, two tier price structure poses an equally challenging set of problems. For example, enterprise directors see incentives to buy materials at artificially low, state-determined prices and then resell them at the higher, non-regulated market price. In addition to complicating the conduct of business, the two-tier price structure is a major source of the corruption and graft pervading China's urban centers. Comprehensive price reform involves, again among other measures, allowing the prices of an increasingly large number of commodities to float until they stabilize at a level reflecting demand.

China's leaders correctly assess that such measures cannot be implemented without engendering significant unemployment, strong inflationary pressures, and possibly a temporary decline in living standards. Also, they cannot agree on how better to structure such efforts. As a result, they are reluctant to follow the path of Poland and other East European countries that are trying to replace state-administrative controls with market mechanisms and have opted instead to temporize. If continued economic growth is the key to preserving stability and Party preeminence, and enterprise and comprehensive price reform are essential to

continued economic development, then any successor leadership will find it necessary to tackle these problems despite the obvious risks. Inevitably, this will require additional reliance on market-centered regulatory mechanisms and further devolution of decision making authority to the individual enterprises. There is no other option.

PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

Pressure arising from an inchoate but widespread popular desire for more political pluralism will also cause Beijing to expand the reforms. After ten years of interaction with the developed world, urban dwellers have come to respect pluralist industrial societies and, as the Tiananmen demonstrations attest, it is clear that politically sophisticated Chinese desire more political freedom. At the same time, the urban population continues to hold the view that Chinese officialdom is corrupt and that nepotism and the "back door" remain the most effective means of getting things done. Indeed, a major thesis of the Tiananmen demonstrators was that the absence of political freedom--not to mention the lack of political accountability--was a reason for the spread of such abuses. Finally, this same sector of the population blames the current leadership, and especially Li Peng, for the bloodshed at Tiananmen Square.

These conditions have produced two major results. First, the prestige, effectiveness, and relevance of the Chinese Communist Party and its Marxist-Leninist ideology have eroded. Abundant, albeit anecdotal, evidence reveals that the CCP and its so-called Party Culture evoke popular images of corruption, selfishness, and incompetence. Party members are almost universally perceived to constitute a self-perpetuating elite concerned solely with promoting their own benefit.

A second result has been to encourage the growth of a more pluralist society. The reduced prestige of the CCP and its ideology and an increasingly cynical view of politics prompt both the urban and rural populations to look elsewhere for individual political reference points. Chinese and western observers alike agree that the Chinese are manifesting a greater interest in religion, consumerism, family matters, and career management than ever before. Moreover, this new focus has effectively displaced politics as a primary area of concern. In effect, the totalitarian but moribund Party culture is being replaced by a number of other discrete cultures which, taken together, hold potential for a new, more pluralist basis for social organization.

PRESSURES FOR DECENTRALIZATION

The desire of provincial and local leaders for a larger measure of local autonomy is also contributing to reform pressure. A decade of experience with the benefit of the relatively streamlined bureaucracies of the Special Economic Zones has

enabled the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian to far outpace China's other regions in material standards and in the quality of daily life. Now the leadership plans to replicate the southern experiment in other areas such as Shanghai and the Northeast.

But South China has also developed a distinct identity. The southern Special Economic Zone approach is producing its own unique, more accepting view of foreign influence and is measurably more tolerant of its untoward side effects (such as delinquency and prostitution) than is true in the more puritanical north. The southern approach also involves a dazzling array of free-wheeling modes of procedure and pliable rules that are justified by their demonstrably salutary impact on productivity and profit. Moreover, Guangdong is oriented on Hong Kong and, through the colony, towards Singapore, Southeast Asia, and Japan. Similarly, Fujian's window is Taiwan and not Beijing.

Southerners are keenly aware of their contribution to the national economy and provincial officials are increasingly able to use local economic success to justify asserting their relative independence from the central authorities in Beijing. As the decade unfolds, their desire for more autonomy will increasingly strain relations with the center. For its part, Beijing will find it necessary to evolve a new relationship with the provinces which, while involving the loss of some power, will enable it to preserve its authority.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

Changes in the international environment will form a third set of reform-directed pressures, at least in the short term. The Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War, coupled with the success of the UN-sponsored coalition against Iraq, have at least temporarily produced a global climate in which norms of stability, cooperation, and a concentration on trade and technological competition are major defining priorities. If China is to be successful in its quest for economic development and enhanced international status, the leadership will find it necessary to accept the constraints of mutuality and integrate the nation more thoroughly into the global order, irrespective of the perceived costs to national sovereignty. In fact, the pursuit of integration—albeit on its own terms—has been integral to Beijing's foreign policy strategy since 1981.

It can be argued that China's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its stated intention to abide by the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime are both intended to help repair the damage to Beijing's international position suffered in the wake of Tiananmen. These actions are also designed to reap the economic, technological, and national security benefits accruing from reintegration into the global order. The importance of this goal is signaled by the fact that the

effort has occurred during a period in which Beijing is not able to assert its own terms very effectively. This mode of international pressure is likely to increase and, as with the corresponding internal pressures, an effective responsive will require a reform-oriented approach.

THE SUCCESSION

China's leadership succession has been in progress since at least the early 1980s. Indeed, the process probably began with the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. At this time, the succession comprises four elements, each forming one aspect of a seamless whole. First, Beijing must develop and promulgate an ideology that will restore legitimacy to the Party-state. This will be extremely difficult since that legitimacy has been slowly eroding ever since the Great Leap Forward in 1959. The new ideology must both define and reflect the myriad historical, cultural, and ideological influences that comprise China's present social and cultural reality. Put simply, China and the Chinese require a realistic, universally-accepted definition of the meaning of the term "Socialism with Chinese characteristics."

Second, succession involves putting into place, and implementing in a way that leaves no doubt about leadership commitment, a set of policies that operationalize the principles of the new socialism. Obviously, the measures must, like the ideology, be broadly accepted.

This too will be difficult. The reforms of the early 1980s amounted to an effort to revive and extend the pragmatic policies that were partially implemented early in the 1950s, abandoned in 1958-59 with the advent of the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Great Leap Forward, reimplemented in the early 1960s, and then totally swept away in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1965-1975. Similar swings between pragmatism and ideological rigor have continued since 1979, most notably in 1988 when Li Peng's ascendancy to the Premiership signalled first a halt and then partial retreat from earlier reform policies. The doubt, frustration, and physical suffering produced, directly and indirectly, by recurring policy shifts are another source of the presently reduced status of the Party/state structure.

A third aspect of the succession involves the settling in of a new generation of younger leaders whose status is based upon demonstrated technical prowess and recent experience rather than historical association with the pre-1949 era. Notwithstanding Deng's claim to have been at the "core" of the "second generation," he and the other octogenarians are really members of the first, or "Long March," generation, united and defined by more than sixty years of revolutionary struggle. The current leadership represented officially by Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and the other members of the Party Politburo actually constitutes the second generation of Chinese Communist leaders. Although they do not share the same revolutionary experience

as their elders, the politburo members owe their high status to one or more members of the older generation and remain loyal to them. Because the differences and policy disagreements among the elders are reflected in the interplay of politics at the Politburo level, the influence of the first generation remains pervasive. The post-Deng Xiaoping succession will not be complete until that influence has atrophied and merit becomes a basis for leadership status, thus allowing political competition to develop according to a new and different set of priorities.

A fourth and final aspect of the succession involves creating new rules of procedure to help institutionalize China's highly personalized political process. Actually, establishing the rule of law has been a durable feature of Deng Xiaoping's thinking since the 1950s and the effort to curb the scope for personalism was an important component of the reform goals implemented after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. Arguably, in the 1980s, the leadership achieved some progress in this regard. However, even the small progress that had been achieved was destroyed when Deng bypassed Party/government channels to deal with the Tiananmen crisis. Since then, Chinese politics has been as personalized as at any time since 1949.

CHINA IN THE 1990s

Authoritative assessments of China's future leadership and their policies must await the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party scheduled to be convened in the fall of 1992. However, leadership activities since January and the record of the Fifth Plenum of the Seventh National Peoples' Congress (NPC), provide some suggestions of what the future might hold.

This year will mark another major turning point in China's political evolution. The wide support from all political sectors, especially the Politburo and the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), for Deng's Spring Festival proclamation that the policies of reform and opening to the outside "...should continue for one hundred years...." suggests that the influence of Chen Yun and other advocates of a slow, more ideologically correct approach to reform is waning. It also suggests that the stage is already fairly well prepared for the accession of the third generation of leaders who will have total responsibility for managing policy after the elders leave the scene. China today strongly resembles the reform-bent China that existed in 1986, but with one important difference: the potential for a conservative/hardline recrudescence such as occurred in 1988/1989 has diminished.

Future domestic policies will emphasize pragmatic pursuit of economic development with gradually diminishing regard for ideological precepts. External policies will support economic priorities. While zealously affirming a rather narrowly

defined nationalism, Beijing will rely on diplomatic means to avoid confrontation, defuse potential conflicts, and expand its access to markets and foreign technology.

In the national security policy sphere, Beijing will maintain and modernize its small nuclear deterrent force and continue to try to acquire the modern capabilities that will permit prosecution of what Chinese strategists refer to as local wars of limited duration. China's leaders will rely on their peaceful overall posture to offset inevitable regional apprehension about continuing modernization of Beijing's military forces.

PROJECTED LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENTS

Li Peng's Government Work Report delivered at the opening of the National Peoples' Congress Fifth Plenum, signaled the official close of the three year retrenchment period forced by the conservatives in 1989, reaffirmed "Dengist" priorities in politics and ideology, and clearly asserted the intention to return immediately to the bold reforms of the pre-Tiananmen era. Leadership change is the inevitable corollary of a return to economic reform. The tone of Li Peng's "Report" indicates that, once again, Deng Xiaoping has managed to tip the balance within the senior leadership group in his favor. The long-standing split within the senior level of China's two-tiered leadership has, at a minimum, been adjusted or, more likely, resolved. Within the circle of Party Elders, the center of political gravity has shifted towards reform. Whether Deng owes this latest victory to the logic of his arguments, the imperatives of China's domestic and external environment, the reported infirmities of his opponents, or some combination of the three, is not clear. However, barring the reoccurrence of events that could enable the remaining hardliners to renew their opposition, such as a new inflationary spiral or renewed demonstrations, the last obstacles impeding the accession of the third generation of leaders appear to have been surmounted.

The Fourteenth Party Congress scheduled for this fall will elect the new Party leaders. Corresponding changes in government personnel will be announced at the meeting of a newly constituted NPC which will occur in the spring of 1993. The remainder of that year, and probably most of 1994, will be a period of consolidation and fine tuning as relations within the new leadership constellation crystallize. By the end of the period, any remaining senior leaders will either have passed from the scene or truly be in retirement.

The new leaders will be very much in the mold of present Vice Premiers Zou Jiahua and Zhu Rongji: pragmatic problem solvers whose world views reflect a sophisticated acceptance of the relativism of politics. Insofar as they possess a common defining experience, it will comprise memories of the early years of the Peoples' Republic before the extreme politicization of Chinese society which began in 1959, the years between such political storms as the Great Leap Forward and the

Socialist Education Movement, and a keen appreciation of the negative aspects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, during which they and their families faced difficulties. For this generation, "Socialism" and "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" will mean economic strength, stability and internal national coherence, and international recognition of China's status as a great power.

It is not likely that Li Peng will retain his present role much beyond 1993. Although there are indications that his views may have evolved in the last year or so, Li remains a symbol of hardline repression both within China and abroad. He is a continuing liability whose removal, probably in a non-punitive, manner will enable the new leadership to limit the international complications of China's human rights policies.

Jiang Zemin will probably remain in office for a time. Having been identified by Deng Xiaoping as the "core" of the "Third Generation," his continued tenure will be an important symbol of continuity and commitment to orderly succession. However, limited evidence available suggests intellectual and political limitations that will lead to his eventual replacement by a true representative of the third generation. It is probable that he will become known positively as an important transitional leader.

It is also likely that the succession will produce a fairly long period of consensual decisionmaking during which modest progress towards developing institutionalized rules for decisionmaking will be achieved. Although the consensual process undoubtedly will produce one individual who functions as first among equals, it is not likely that we will see a successor who will successfully fill the role of "Paramount Leader" in the manner of Deng Xiaoping or Mao Zedong. Indeed, given the absence of the kind of dramatic events that produced both Mao and Deng, it is unlikely that leaders of such stature will emerge anytime soon. Rather, the remainder of the decade will see a continuation of the collective style of leadership that has directed China since 1989. The distinguishing difference will be that the new collective will be far more homogenous in its policy preferences than its predecessors and therefore hold far less potential for ruptures than the constellations of the past. Although the successor leadership will inevitably be divided, and even fractionalized on some important issues such as those involving demands for greater political pluralism, these differences will be resolved within a larger context of general agreement on basic assumptions and values.

IDEOLOGY, THE CCP, AND PARTY-STATE RELATIONS

If the Fourteenth Party Congress and the Eighth National People's Congress go down in Chinese Communist historiography as the events that produced China's most modern leadership, they will also mark a shift in the locus of China's political center away from the Chinese Communist Party and towards a number of other

centers such as family, work unit, and the state. That the Chinese Communist Party and Marxism have lost legitimacy is readily apparent. In fact, that the CCP endures at all is largely because, at this time, there exists no credible alternative and, more compelling, because of fear.

As the prestige of the Party declines, the test of worth for economic policy is also changing. Increasingly, appropriateness is judged according to how much particular economic policies contribute to increasing overall productive capacities and raising living standards. Then too, leaders are chosen and promoted on the basis of their expertise rather than according to their political manifestation. Finally, the visibility of the state is increasing as the functions of Party, government, and increasingly privatized enterprises are separated.

The end result of these changes is likely to be an escalation of the trends towards consumerism, anti-Party feeling, and pluralism that have been developing since early in the reform era and which resulted in the Democracy Movement of 1989. As the CCP ceases to provide the satisfactions that should earn for it the loyalty and support of the Chinese people, popular loyalty will be transferred elsewhere. Unless the Party is able to represent convincingly its leadership as the source of China's prosperity—a prospect which seems to be most unlikely—it will continue to be defined as irrelevant and tolerated only with great hostility.

SOCIAL POLITICAL STABILITY

All sectors of China's leadership agree on the need to maintain political continuity and a stable social order. It is the broad acceptance of this reality that accounts for the noteworthy moderation that has characterized public leadership statements throughout the 1980s. The leadership also recognizes that high levels of frustration, particularly within the urban sector of the population, raise the potential for a new round of demonstrations that will require forceful repression and risk a new cycle of retrenchment. Beijing wants to avoid this at all costs.

The reformist strategy for maintaining stability is apparent in the formulation "one center and two points." The Chinese are to take economic development as the most important task (one center) and simultaneously expand both the pace and scope of reform policies and foreign contacts (point one) while also upholding the Four Cardinal Principles or basic ideology (point two). The reform camp would use higher living standards to prevent the conflict inherent in the conflation of non-socialist, foreign influences and Chinese notions of Marxist orthodoxy from generating conflict.

It is doubtful that this gamble will succeed. It was the opposition of the inherently contradictory forces of Western influence and Chinese culture and socialism that helped to produce the Tiananmen Democracy Movement and its

eventual repression. Throughout the decade, the leadership will see an inexorable concentration of internal and external pressures, not just for reform, but for basic systemic change. In circumstances such as these, demonstrations and other challenges to the political establishment are inevitable.

However, it is not inevitable, or likely, that these pressures will lead to a coup, cause China to disintegrate into regionalism, or result in the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party. Unless the rate of economic progress slows dramatically, improving living standards will in fact do much to disarm widespread popular discontent. In that sense, the reformists are correct. Second, despite apparent tendencies towards pluralist politics, it is doubtful that popular leaders with the strong organizational bases necessary to mount an effective opposition will emerge. Third, although it is true that probably all provincial leaders will balk at reformist plans to have the richer areas underwrite the development of the poorer regions, this will not translate into separatist demands. Provincial leaders are well aware that their success depends upon continued access to foreign investment and technology and that this in turn requires that outsiders perceive China to be politically stable. Also, like their counterparts in Beijing, provincial leaders regard national unity as a value in itself and will take whatever steps are necessary, including compromise, to maintain it. Fourth, Beijing now has at its disposal an effective paramilitary force in the People's Armed Police (PAP). It is not likely that PLA loyalty will be tested once again by orders to deal with civilian demonstrators. Indeed, the army appears to be an integral component of the reform consensus.

The final, and most important reason for this fairly optimistic judgement lies in the nature of the third generation leadership itself. The new leaders are the beneficiaries of stability, all have had considerable access to outside influence, and all share a negative experience of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Demonstrably willing to compromise in order to achieve results, ready to embrace a least common denominator of socialism as whatever works so long as minimum distribution of benefit occurs, but also committed to maintaining progress, order, and stability, the third generation is more likely to deal with increasingly organized demands for change by accommodation rather than by confrontation.

Given their commitment to authoritarian modes, their efforts will almost certainly not preempt struggle or prevent bloodshed. During the decade, China will see major challenges to the social order. However, as the third generation consolidates its hold and as its direct linkages with the past, the elders, pass from the scene, political evolution will produce an authoritarian structure that legitimizes itself mainly on the basis of its ability to provide for popular welfare and by its aggressive pursuit of Chinese nationalism. Like the protective varnish on an old painting, Marxism will be formally present, but not very visible.

FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

During the 1990s, China's leaders will continue to affirm the goals they have been seeking since the late 1970s: building a world class economic base to support China's claim to great power status and gaining international acceptance of that claim. At the same time, pursuit of these goals will be influenced by a number of imperatives, all of which lie beyond Beijing's direct control.

First, for one of the few periods since 1949, foreign and national security policies will be determined almost entirely by domestic priorities--in this case, economic development. Analysts of Chinese international behavior may find their task considerably eased by the strong impact of the economic imperatives under which Beijing will operate. For example, it is clear that the leadership will aggressively implement an array of measures designed to increase China's access to overseas markets and to meet the need for imports on the best terms possible. Beijing will actively support APEC and other similar organizations and work hard to maximize their effectiveness. Also, the Chinese will singlemindedly continue to develop and expand overt and covert sources of the advanced technology the modernization program will require.

At the same time it is less clear, but quite arguable, that expanded trade and other contacts imply a need to maintain stability, avoid confrontation whenever possible, and rely on diplomatic means to resolve those disputes that cannot be avoided. These priorities, although probably not decisive, weighed heavily in China's decision to work actively to achieve a settlement in Cambodia; they will continue to define Beijing's regional policies in the future. In the absence of any incentive to shift course, trade, technology transfers, maintaining stability, and avoiding confrontation will comprise China's major foreign policy themes for the 1990s and beyond.

Although future prospects are bright, some potential events could cause Beijing to deviate from the path projected above. Even a cursory glance at the record of Beijing's foreign relations since 1949 will reveal the existence of a range of issues on which the Chinese adamantly refuse to compromise. As policy makers in Asia as well as those in Washington and Moscow can attest, these involve questions perceived to bear upon such core Chinese values as sovereignty and national independence.

More specifically, if any of the parties with competing territorial claims in the Spratlys were to assert their interests unilaterally, Beijing would probably respond with military force. If Taiwan were to declare its independence, develop a nuclear capability, or succumb to widespread instability, Beijing would fulfill its public promise to intervene militarily. Similarly, if any other nation were to openly encourage Taiwan to assert its independence or develop its military capabilities above a certain level, the result would almost certainly be a rupture of diplomatic and other

relations. More or less equally forceful responses would be forthcoming in the wake of a perceived effort to change the ground rules for Hong Kong retrocession, or alter the status quo in any of Beijing's other outstanding territorial disputes. Although a cost/benefit calculus might influence the modalities of Beijing's actions, in no case would the probability of losing trade and other advantages preclude a forceful response.

A second variable that will help to canalize China's foreign policy energies is the reality that, for the first time since 1949, Beijing acknowledges that it does not face an imminent or even a proximate military threat. The Chinese appear to have written off the possibility of Russian military adventurism and, although they are clearly concerned about the possible spill-over effect of separatist movements in the Central Asian republics, this is not defined as a military problem. Similarly, China's relations with its other Northeast Asian neighbors remain positive, despite Beijing's status as one of the last bastions of Marxism-Leninism. In South and Southeast Asia, although potential tensions exist, relations continue to expand in positive ways.

The absence of military threat means that China has gained a period of grace during which Beijing is free to pursue its strategies for economic growth without major external distraction. It also means that the PLA will be able to plan and implement its own modernization programs and procurement plans in a planned and reasonably predictable manner. Finally, because China faces no credible military challenge, Beijing's preference for policies supporting regional stability and its desire to avoid conflict will be reenforced.

A third factor concerns the impact on foreign policy of the deterioration of some supports for China's overall strategic position. This condition is likely to persist throughout the decade and into the next century.

The Soviet collapse, the end of the Cold War, and a fluid international environment have all combined to deprive Beijing of the leverage it enjoyed for many years as an independent nuclear power. Moreover, China's loss of leverage was compounded by the erosion of prestige Beijing suffered because of PLA actions at Tiananmen and because of continuing adherence to ideological prescriptions that seem at odds with major global currents and trends. Indeed, for a brief time, China was regarded as a pariah state throughout the world. Finally, notwithstanding the remarkable economic progress that is likely to continue for a time before it begins to level off, many years will pass before China even begins to take the economic measure of its neighbors.

For all these reasons, the partial marginalization of China that began with the Tiananmen repression and escalated with the Soviet collapse is likely to continue. Despite its obvious remaining strengths, China will continue to lack many of the instruments of leverage requisite to great power status. As a result, the 1990s are

likely to be a period of testing and adjustment for Chinese foreign policy as Beijing attempts to recover its strategic position and redefine the international environment to its advantage. In this process, the Chinese will attempt to compensate for their material deficiencies by emphasizing their putative moral strengths, by expanding their participation in international forums and conventions, and by raising international concern about the potential future undervaluing China in any contemporary global strategic assessment. This is likely to take several forms.

In Beijing's assessment, the bipolar world is evolving towards multipolarity. However, the evolutionary process is complicated by the existence of one remaining superpower, the United States. The world is characterized by "one superpower, many centers." Accordingly, in order to define its position as an important node in the international system, China will encourage the growth of multipolarity. For example, in North/South matters, Beijing will support and articulate the views of the South while in East/West disputes, the Chinese will continue to champion the position of the East. China will also maximize its role in the United Nations and other international forums such as GATT and APEC. In these organizations Beijing will posture itself as the great power that remains solicitous of the requirements of the less than great powers. For example, in the UN, sanctions will be publicly opposed or at least regarded with skepticism, on grounds that they are example of "great powers exercising hegemonism over weaker powers." Overall, in the Security Council, the Chinese will attempt to establish themselves informally as a voice of the bloc of less developed nations whose support will be essential to UN Action. Naturally, China will attempt to exact effort to deliver that support.

At the same time, arm sales will continue to be an integral component of Beijing's strategies, both as a means of encouraging multipolarity and of increasing China's political influence. In implementing this tactic, Beijing will transfer arms and dual use technologies to nations that have been denied such assets by other powers. However, as the Chinese approach the issue of proliferation, they will be increasingly constrained by the requirements and responsibilities of their membership in the forums in which they will participate so actively. In general, proliferation activities will be conducted with far greater caution than in the past.

FOREIGN POLICY, MILITARY STRATEGY, AND FORCE STRUCTURE

The future lines of China's military strategy fell into place in 1988 when Beijing effectively discarded its long standing commitment to Maoist notions of People's War in favor of a doctrine of preparing for "Local Wars of Limited Duration." This formulation will guide China and the PLA into the next century. Beijing reasons that the end of bipolarity and the emergence of a multipolar strategic environment raises the possibility that historical animosities, unsettled boundary disputes, and disagreements over access to resources are more likely to erupt into

conflict than in the days of bipolarity. If war occurs, it will remain localized, be of limited duration and fought for limited objectives, and won by whichever party is able to concentrate high technology weapons systems with greater effectiveness. Nuclear capabilities are important as a means of discouraging escalation and, of course, for strategic deterrence. Particularly worthy of notice is the apparent assumption that it might well be necessary to prosecute such conflicts at some distance from China's national borders. Successful implementation of Local War doctrine requires the existence of a force projection capability.

In fact, the PLA seems to be building such a capability. For example, the recently announced purchase of Su-27 aircraft from the former Soviet Union indicates that the air force has assumed a higher budgetary priority than in the past. Also, the PLA remains committed to acquiring an aerial refueling capability and an airborne command and control system that will serve the interests of both the air force and the navy. However, economic constraints will undoubtedly prevent any major increase in overall PLA capabilities until after the end of the decade, if then. Even with the announced restructuring of US forces, a major change in the regional balance of forces is not likely. Nonetheless, it is possible that outside observers will be challenged to separate the notions of capabilities and intentions when assessing Beijing's future behavior.

CHINA AND THE REGION

It is clear that, despite the occasional raised eyebrow, Beijing is generally satisfied that the Asian security environment will remain stable and fairly benign through the decade. Also, owing to a number of domestic and international constraints and imperatives, Beijing will actively implement policies designed to preserve peace and stability within the region.

Nonetheless, Beijing does manifest some concerns about the future. The most important of these relates to Japan's future role and any new military capabilities that might affect the regional balance, particularly in light of the announced restructuring of United States forces in Asia. Needful as it is of access to Japan's economic resources and advanced technology, Beijing is well aware that it has little or no direct leverage over Tokyo. Therefore, it will sedulously avoid allowing confrontational situations to develop. Rather, in managing relations with Japan, Chinese leaders will utilize instruments of indirect control. It is likely that the devices of raising Japan's feelings of guilt over past wrongs and of playing to regional fears of revived Japanese militarism that have formed the pattern of influencing Japanese behavior in the recent past will continue into the future.

China is also concerned about the future of the Korean Peninsula, the role that a united Korea might play in the region, and what the consequences of that role

might be for China's future. Although Beijing probably has little power to affect the overall outcome in dramatic ways, undoubtedly certain areas in which Chinese actions might make a crucial difference in determining actions by Pyongyang. The number of these areas will probably increase after the passing of Kim Il Song. In the meantime, the Chinese are likely to continue their practice of positioning themselves as well as they possibly can with both sides in order to obtain the best possible future advantage. This means constantly expanding relations with the Republic of Korea and continuing pressure on Pyongyang to follow China's example by expanding its range of foreign political contacts, reforming its economy, and participating responsibly in international forums while simultaneously upholding the principles of socialism. Overall, the Chinese probably judge that a reunified Korea, probably with at least a potential nuclear capability, will pose a security problem of major proportions, particularly in light of the projected reduced United States military presence. At the same time, the Chinese are probably also aware that there is little or nothing they can do to prevent reunification. Their future pattern of interaction with the peninsula will therefore emphasize acceptance and accommodation.

The contours of China's future relations with Southeast Asia were marked by the establishment of ties with Singapore and the restoration of normal relations with Indonesia and Vietnam. For the remainder of the decade at least, Beijing will not wish to alter the present status quo which implicitly acknowledges its special interests in the subregion and also meets its concerns about the presence of external powers there. The status quo also holds promise for expanded trade, improved relations with ASEAN, and a chance for Beijing to demonstrate its willingness to play a positive regional role. Actually, Beijing undoubtedly realizes that, even if it wished to do so, any effort to change the status quo by asserting its special interest would fail for want of physical capabilities and would, in any case, not be worth the candle. With the exception of Vietnam and Burma, the nations of the sub region are all benefiting from years of consistently high economic growth. Also, with the same exceptions, all exhibit a degree of national coherence, sense of purpose, and ability to marshal extraregional support sufficient to manage any intrusion.

MEETING THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE

China today poses a complex challenge for the international community. We are dealing with but one assessment of the most likely outlines of China's future development. Because it is not possible to know whether some, all, or no part of the vision presented here will evolve, it is also not possible to assess the contours of the regional security environment with precision. Especially in the case of the People's Republic, "What if..." must be actively retained as an analytical construct. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, in fashioning a policy and managing relations with China, it is essential to build into the calculus a means of preserving room to maneuver in case the untoward event actually occurs. Nonetheless, it does seem apparent that as

the Twenty-first Century approaches, Beijing's ability to influence, and, in some cases, to determine the course of regional events will grow. Today, much of China's influence stems from passive attributes such as its size, its location, its reserves of human and natural resources, and, by no means least, the ability of its leaders to manipulate the vision of a nation of great potential to excellent advantage.

However, in the future, economic development, political stability, policy continuity, and a force projection capability will provide Beijing's influence with more active roots. This is likely to be the case, although to a lesser degree, even if reform does not "last for one hundred years." However, there is no reason to assume that Beijing's positions will fail to evolve in positive ways. It is possible to imagine three different strategies for managing ties with China. For example, one might focus upon the competitive dimension of the problem and opt to implement a policy of isolation and containment. This might involve creating a structure including bilateral alliances, a regional security regime, and a series of ad hoc agreements that would constrain Beijing's efforts to secure an expanded regional role. Within the region there may well be a residue of suspicion about China's longer term goals sufficient to support such an approach.

Another alternative is seen in adopting a strategy of management by developing a close association with Beijing. Although the record suggests the Chinese are skeptical about alliances, it can be argued that the pattern of evolution in the international system is such that China's leaders could be persuaded of the benefit of such an arrangement. In any case, the goals of a close association strategy could be realized even if a formal alliance failed to develop. A third option might consist of dealing with an expanded Chinese role by integrating Beijing more closely into the global strategic system. Chinese actions with respect to participation in APEC and a pattern of wooing ASEAN suggest that the leadership is keenly aware of the benefits that accrue from such a course. Whether the Chinese desire for integration will extend to such measures and agreements as the Missile Technology Control Regime remains to be seen. However, the possibility of a meaningfully positive response to such an approach is clearly apparent.

This list of options is heuristic rather than prescriptive. Also, the different approaches noted are neither logically exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. Undoubtedly, any response that evolves will possess elements of each. In any case, the effectiveness of the policies of next century will depend upon accurate assessment and candid evaluation of contemporary forces and trends.

OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION ON ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES—CENTRAL AND WEST ASIA

by

Robert B. Oakley

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

Fundamental changes in strategic relations over the past two years confront both India and the United States with major policy choices as they look ahead at South, Central and West Asia. Already by the time of the previous symposium at Pune—which followed the unanimous Security Council decisions pressuring Iraq to withdraw and the buildup of the U.S.-led military coalition for use should Iraq fail to do so, all with Soviet support—the U.S. had seen enough of the new Soviet world view and its priority on cooperation with the U.S. to change its own global outlook. The U.S. no longer saw the Southwest and South Asia region primarily in terms of containing or (as in Afghanistan) pushing back the Soviet presence. This new view of the region had been foreshadowed when the USSR and U.S. took virtually identical policy decisions in sternly warning both Pakistan and India to back away from their building confrontation over Kashmir in the summer of 1990, a posture subsequently adopted by China as well. However, given the massive U.S. commitment to, and preoccupation with, Desert Shield and the imminent Desert Storm, and India's concern over what this might portend for its own future, there was really no opportunity at Pune to discuss the longer-term, broader, regional implications of these changes.

This year the top agenda item is just such a hard look at the future, at where U.S. interests lie and how India should position itself. Moreover, there are important new realities which have emerged since the time of the Pune symposium and must be taken into account:

- The end to the Cold War was suddenly followed by the internal collapse and breakup of the USSR and the emergence of independent states, including the Islamic states of Central Asia, with uncertain interrelationships and political orientations. This is a major development for India which had long been accustomed to a considerable degree of political, economic and military cooperation from the USSR, including its influence upon the region of Central Asia, Afghanistan, and other states. A related development has been the continuation of China's slow improvement in relations with its former rivals: Russia,

India, and Vietnam, and its slow drawing back from heavy Cold War involvements in friendly countries such as Pakistan and Cambodia.

- Recognition of the world-wide implications of both the increased politico-economic power of the European Community and the increased economic power of Japan, and the propensity of both toward more freedom of action vis-a-vis the United States in using their power. This comes at a time when almost all governments have recognized the need for greater emphasis on boosting and reforming their economies, and the immense socio-political perils of neglecting them.
- The irresistible demand by the U.S. public that a much higher priority in governmental attention and resources be given to the home front, to social and economic rather than national security issues. This element of uncertainty as to the future role of the U.S. abroad comes at a time when many governments are reassessing their interests and allegiances in light of the end of both the Cold War and the danger of catastrophic superpower conflict, and in light of the unravelling of not only the Warsaw Pact and its affiliated members, but also the end of the uncoded, amorphous, largely accidental yet tacitly accepted and influential system of international restraint which evolved from the interaction of the superpowers.
- The hesitant and uncertain, yet clearly visible focus upon increased international cooperation, formalized or ad hoc, to deal with actual and potential threats to world order and dangers to humanity. The crisis over Iraq has been the proximate cause of this new emphasis upon collective security, centered but not totally dependent upon the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council. It extends past UN operations in Iraq, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, to seek a variety of ways to cool regional or even local/internal tensions before they explode. It also includes much greater unilateral and multilateral efforts to control nuclear technology and prevent the acquisition or production of weapons of mass destruction.

In light of the old plus the newly visible developments on the world scene, it is important to review Central and West Asian security issues, discern the prospects for cooperation generally between India and the U.S., and consider how to deal with specific actual or potential problems in the region. In order to do this, it is necessary to look at what the regional problems are likely to be. Future trends in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, as well as in Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf take on much greater importance for India in these new circumstances. They also remain important for the U.S., even with our more domestic-minded political imperative.

However, the U.S. is not a single superpower sufficiently interested in and capable of directing the course of world events alone.

THE GULF AND SOUTHWEST ASIA

In the Gulf, the U.S. policy for a half-century of protecting the free flow of oil to the world and assisting its friends to protect themselves remains unchanged. There appears to be enough recognition of its importance on the part of the U.S. public and political opinion that this policy can be sustained. There is similar recognition by the European Community states, plus Russia, Japan, and even China that this part of the world is so important and potentially so dangerous that stability and non-aggression must be promoted energetically, including the seeking of counsel and assistance from external powers.

At present, the region enjoys a rough politico-military balance. Iraq has lost most of its superior military capacity, much of its economic power, and is experiencing internal political problems. Iran has not yet rebuilt its own military machine and is engaged in internal debate over new economic and political directions even while striving to make up for lost time with strenuous, costly new efforts in military and economic development. The GCC states have come out of Desert Storm stronger politically, at least temporarily; recovering rapidly from economic losses; and strengthened in security by the acquisition of new weapons, improved organization and training, and with a variety of formal arrangements with the U.S., UK, and France, and separately with Egypt and Syria, for long-term security support.

However, the tightly structured, formalized Gulf security arrangements, with the U.S. as the chief architect and builder, have not eventuated. Those who really know the Gulf understand why. Moreover, despite improvements in their indigenous military capabilities and cooperation, the GCC states remain essentially dependent upon outside protection against major external threats. This protection is available primarily from the augmented U.S. Navy sea, and air presence, reinforced by frequent visits of U.S. Air Force units, by ground or amphibious exercises with U.S. forces, and by prepositioning of weapons and equipment.

This favorable perspective could change over the next several years if Saddam Hussein were again to consolidate his power and the pressure of the international community were to ease, allowing Iraq to rebuild its powerful conventional military machine and its highly developed capability for special weapons of mass destruction (including the capability to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles). As CIA Director Robert Gates told Congress on March 27th,

... We believe Baghdad has been able to preserve significant elements of its special weapons programs. And once it's free to begin rebuilding them, its scientists will be able to hit the ground running.

The nuclear weapon development would need the most time to recover, because most of the—much of the infrastructure for the production of fissile material would need to be reconstructed. This judgement would be reinforced if equipment at certain, only recently identified nuclear research sites is destroyed as UN inspection teams have demanded. The time Iraq would need to rebuild its nuclear capability could be shortened dramatically if it could somehow procure fissile material from abroad.

Much of the chemical weapons production infrastructure would have to be rebuilt before the Iraqis could reestablish the pre-war level of production. However, we believe they could quickly resume limited production of such weapons using covert stocks of precursor chemicals, undeclared chemical process equipment, and unfilled munitions.

Because it doesn't take much equipment to make biological warfare agents, we estimate the Iraqis could resume production within weeks. They have retained microbiofermentation equipment and pathogen cultures. We remain convinced they also have a stockpile of biological weapons.

Finally, we judge the Iraqis could soon restore their capability to produce Scud-type missiles though they might need some help from abroad.

In this case, one must expect renewed, heavy Iraqi politico-military pressure upon the region, the likelihood of subversive actions, and military adventures to inflict revenge and impose Iraq's will upon the GCC so that it would be accepted as the dominant power in the Gulf. This could conceivably be accompanied by some form of understanding with Iran and/or Syria in order to secure Iraq's rear and thereby increase its power of intimidation. Iraq might also be able to extend a degree of threat into South and Central Asia, particularly if Islamist organizations supported it as they did during Desert Storm.

Such a challenge would face the GCC states, but also the U.S., EC, Japan and others—including India—with the same sort of tough decisions which were taken in the fall of 1991. Would the next international response be as rapid, clear-cut, and forceful as before? Given Iraq's pariah status, one can expect that the world powers would not allow it to reach this point; and that if by some chance it should, there would be another strong response. Yet this is not a foregone conclusion and the

degree of collective action which could be mobilized would play an important role in determining the response.

The other source of potentially powerful, destabilizing change in the Gulf is Iran. Should it succeed over time with its present intensive efforts (\$2 billion per year) to rebuild its armed forces to the same level of regional dominance the Shah had achieved by the late 1970s; and should the internal political struggle be decided in favor of those advocating a policy of neo-Khomeini, Islamic revolution; the Gulf, South, and Central Asia will all face a very serious threat. As CIA Director Gates told Congress on March 27th:

While Iran struggles to recover from the Gulf war, Iran is determined to regain its former stature as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf. Tehran's reformulated national security policy has three main goals: guarantee the survival of the regime, project power throughout the region, and offset U.S. influence in the Middle East.

To achieve these goals, Iran has undertaken diplomatic measures to end its international isolation, is purchasing weapons from a variety of foreign suppliers, and is developing a capability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Iran's capabilities already include medium-range missiles and chemical weapons. Should its drive for accelerated procurement and production of weapons of mass destruction continue, and especially should it lead to possession of chemical warheads for missiles and a nuclear capability, the threat would be multiplied and would be extended to other countries at a greater distance (e.g. Israel and Egypt). Such a powerful Iran could command greater responsiveness from the Islamist political movements it has been encouraging and which have achieved various degrees of political effectiveness in several Moslem countries, (e.g. Afghanistan, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, and Malaysia). One could also expect increased activity and effectiveness on the part of Islamist movements presently inactive or still in the formative stage (e.g. the Gulf and Central Asia).

During the decade until 1988, there was a network of subversive organizations, mostly Shia, operating on Iran's account in Kuwait (the Dawa) and elsewhere in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia where there was extra Iranian subversive activity at the time of the Haj. For the past three to four years, this network has been dormant as the result of new Iranian policies of improving relations with the GCC. However, it could be quickly reactivated. While most of these Islamist groups are Sunni and may not actually take their orders from Teheran, their activities parallel and reinforce those of Iran and are calculated to serve the interests of both in intimidating,

radicalizing, or destabilizing established regimes in a number of countries. Under circumstances where Iran appeared strong, there is also a network of potential state allies which might turn more toward its lead, notably Syria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Iran would thus be a more difficult threat to deal with than Iraq, should the leadership which emerges after this month's elections decide upon an aggressive course of action.

Obviously, what might happen to West and Central Asia under circumstances of a major threat from Iran or Iraq, with the real possibility of a spillover into Kashmir, would be of paramount concern to India. The United States would be primarily concerned about the Gulf, but not uninterested in South/Central Asia. There are obvious advantages in U.S.-Indian cooperation, together with other countries, first to ensure that such a situation does not occur, then if it should occur, to find ways to stop it. This could probably best be done in some international framework.

Even with these potential external threats to the GCC states, their principal dangers come from within. The first of these is the possible failure of individual regimes to move rapidly or decisively enough to accommodate strong Islamic-populist pressures for greater political representation and socio-economic justice, while at the same time maintaining a strong, stable regime which is able to govern. The political power of Islam would be one, but not the only or even the most important, factor in creating a situation which could escape the control of the existing regimes. The second danger comes from their possible reluctance to join together either to prevent or respond to a serious threat, be it external such as Iraq or Iran, or internal such as the challenge of a powerful Islamist movement (probably benefitting from some external support). This sort of failure from within the GCC would place the U.S., India, Pakistan, and the entire international community in a most difficult position, conceivably one where there would be no feasible means of providing effective assistance from outside.

The U.S. near-term objective is to help maintain the presently peaceful power balance among the GCC states, Iraq Iran. Key elements in so doing will be sustaining the international pressure upon Iraq, while encouraging Iran by international persuasion and pressure to opt for pragmatism and future cooperation rather than trying aggressively to export its ideology and regain a dominant regional position. This appetite for influence could extend past the Gulf to Iran's relations with states in South and Central Asia where it has significant potential assets, including Islamist movements.

India obviously has similar interests to those of the U.S., but so far as the Gulf is concerned there appears to be little it can do directly other than support and participate in international efforts at maintaining stability. Indirectly, the perception of India's behavior and intent toward its immediate neighbors and the Indian Ocean

region, and the course it pursues in developing its own military capability, especially in acquiring and/or producing missiles and nuclear weapons in a climate of increased international opposition to weapons of mass destruction, can influence Iran and Iraq--both by the behavioral example it sets for regional powers and by what might be seen in Teheran as a challenge by India to its own area of influence.

CENTRAL ASIA

Since the August 1991 coup and the breakup of the USSR, there have been numerous predictions that serious instability would strike some or all of the five states often referred to as post-Soviet Central Asia. These have been predicated upon the existence of several internal and external sources of potentially serious friction, as well as doubts about the durability of the regimes in power. The violent, fragmented situation in Afghanistan has also contributed to fears of instability in post-Soviet Central Asia, given that the conflict there persists despite Soviet withdrawal, cessation of U.S., USSR/CIS, and most other outside military support for combatants, and the intensive efforts by the UN for a political solution.

The fear inspired by events in Afghanistan comes not only from its geographic proximity and the danger of spillover, but because the potentially disruptive forces threatening Central Asia have certain similarities to those behind Afghanistan's troubles (e.g. ethnic/tribal differences, militantly political use of Islam, the potential for interference by and competition among outside powers, and severe economic problems). Another serious problem confronting the former Central Asian Republics is their economic, military, and political relationship with Russia and the continued presence of large numbers of Russians in the civilian and military structures of these states. Kazakhstan poses a unique problem given the presence there of over 100 nuclear strategic missiles and no clear agreement on transfer to Russia or local destruction. At present they are under the effective control of Russian officers of the CIS, but the future is not certain. An additional concern, particularly on the part of India, has been that the former Central Asian States could develop into a radical, politico-religious bloc which would in turn establish tight links with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Should this occur, Kazakhstan's nuclear potential would be even more alarming.

Over the past six months, the worst has not occurred and the political situation in the five post-Soviet Central Asian states has thus far been marked generally by continuity and stability. Former Communist regimes have validated their continued power by elections in four of them. Although elections in Kyrgyzstan produced a new leader, he is a former Communist and his lieutenants are from the former government. Ethnic/tribal differences have not erupted in or between these states, or with Afghanistan. Potentially dangerous friction between dominant local ethnic groups and Russians has also been kept under control. In addition, relations with

Moscow have remained reasonably stable, though not close. There has been no sign of the five quite different states coalescing into a single bloc. Those adjacent to Afghanistan have worked hard to avoid becoming entangled in the conflict there and have kept close watch on the borders to try to prevent any spillover or subversion. The economics are not good, but deterioration has been considerably less than expected, and less in relative terms than in Russia, Ukraine, or elsewhere.

The future course of political and economic development is more likely to evolve gradually, given the considerable power of the status quo in all five Central Asian states. However, the global drive for more politically representative and economically responsive government, and the potential political power of Islam are already making themselves felt. All five regimes are pledged to democracy and varying degrees of free political activity are emerging alongside continued power at the center. Islamic institutions are growing stronger, but are still subject to state-imposed political controls. New economic links, supplementing but not replacing the principal ones with Moscow, are being established with a number of foreign corporations and governments, from Western Europe through Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India to East Asia. The cultural activity of Turkey throughout the region, especially in the fields of TV, radio and education, and also of Iran, especially in Tajikistan, can be expected to have a substantial long-term impact.

Islam is in ferment throughout the region and many are those eager to tread out the wine. Nonetheless, the Islamic movement in the area still appears to be mainly homegrown. It has a significant presence only in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and the movements in those two republics have few links with each other. With the loss of influence by the mufti of Central Asia, the Islamic movements in the region remain "national" in their mode of organization if not in their ideology. Rivalries between external Islamic forces help check the development of a cohesive strong Islamist movement for Central Asia and complement measures taken by the regimes to minimize the radicalization and politicization of these movements. These measures also help preserve the separate "national" character of the individual state movements. Iran's politico-religious influence to date has been somewhat less than expected, hampered by linguistic and cultural problems (except in Tajikistan) and by the small number of Shia, as well as by Saudi competition. While there is definitely a religious revival—as there has also been in the European parts of the former USSR—fears that a fundamentalist wave supported by external powers would rapidly destabilize former Central Asia or that they would coalesce into a single Islamic bloc have been highly exaggerated. Naturally, this could change in the event of a severe crisis, mainly due to the economy and a breakup of the CIS.

The Central Asian regimes are too preoccupied with socio-political and economic problems, dangers, and opportunities at home—not to mention with handling the new-formed, complicated, and difficult task of building correct relationships with key foreign powers showing interest in the region (plus Russia and

the CIS), and with problems on their borders (e.g. Afghanistan)—to pay much attention to more remote issues such as Indo-Pak relations in general and Kashmir in particular. Historically, the rulers of these areas have had good relations with India. They see its democratic, multi-ethnic system as one they might in time find useful as an alternative to Islamic regimes such as Iran or Saudi Arabia. The regimes can be expected to discourage rather than encourage, much less join, any Islamist or other pan-national movement directed at Kashmir or any other aspect of India's problems with its Moslem minority. They are suspicious of Pakistani connections with militant Islamist organizations, including its own Jamaat Islami, as well as Afghan groups like Hekmatyar's, which have been active in former Central Asia as well as in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and which pose an ongoing threat to the present regime.

However, while unlikely to join or approve action to support separatist movements on the ground in Kashmir (or Azad Kashmir), these regimes do not support the status quo for Kashmir and would like to see the issue resolved, probably by some form of self-determination. This view stems from their recent unexpected but most welcome exercise of the right to self-determination and achievement of independence after being so long under Russian rule. Albeit rather simplistic, they see some similarities between their own and the Kashmir situation—including the control over a Moslem people by a more powerful, non-Moslem state. A resolution of the situation would also remove an uncomfortable, but not intolerable, issue which creates complications for these regimes, since they must deal with a certain amount of Islamist agitation amongst their own people as well as some pressures from Pakistan and other Moslem states to support the Kashmiri cause.

The economy of the region is at present the most serious arena of foreign competition. As elsewhere in the formerly socialist countries (actually they are still socialist, despite aspirations not to be), governments and nascent entrepreneurs are searching for new partners. The U.S. has emphasized the transition to a market economy in discussing possible aid, but the amount of aid forthcoming will not be very great. The World Bank and UNDP are also gearing up for efforts here as in Afghanistan. Turkey is a major contender, already having landed some major construction projects, and Israeli experts are working at helping both the Uzbekistan and Tajikistan governments convert from cotton monoculture. India is looking for markets for its substantial production of moderately priced consumer goods as well as for investment opportunities, and is hoping to use commerce to help build a political base. Iran does not have Turkey's or India's industry, but is striving to capitalize upon its geographic location, its ability to provide oil and petroleum products, and other economic assistance and trade, as well as its cultural links. The ROK is ahead in major investment. U.S. and European oil companies are very interested. Japan is pretty much waiting on the sidelines, but studying the possibilities. The elites of the area see themselves as poorer industrialized countries rather than poor Third World countries like Pakistan or, of all places, Afghanistan.

They would prefer to receive aid from Turkey, South Korea or the U.S. Nonetheless, they will take what they can get. Pakistan is staking its commercial future in the area on a Tashkent-Karachi transport link and the enterprise of its businessmen.

At present, however, despite all the excitement over these new developments, by far the most important economic link continues to be with Russia. Both the economy and the system of rule have depended upon cotton exports to the north, the profits of which funded the patron-client relations that enabled the rulers to maintain control over both urban and rural areas. The breakdown of this relationship, if the Russian economy crashes or if the polity dissolves further in internal conflicts, could lead to a breakdown of social control and political stability.

Speculation about foreign involvement and competition inevitably turns to the military when one thinks about developments in Afghanistan over the past 20 years. Only the Kazakhs among the Asian nationalities had any significant representation in the Soviet officer corps. The Uzbeks, although with few officers, have a relatively large number of troops. While none of the Central Asian Republics has claimed control over the troops of the former Turkestan Military District as the Ukraine has done with the Ukrainian Military District, the cement holding together the ties with Moscow is reportedly ready to loosen. As Russia moves to create its own army, and as many Russian officers in this region and in the other CIS states are being retired, there is beginning an exodus of officers back to Russia. Also, although all five regimes have thus far supported the maintenance of the former Soviet military under joint CIS command, Uzbekistan has expressed some reservations. The looming disintegration of the CIS will probably lead to the creation of five separate armies. In this case, the Russian Army would no longer be available as a backup for the insecure power of the smaller states and as a degree of deterrence against feared domination by Uzbekistan.

This would put the latter in a stronger position vis-a-vis the three weaker states and would induce it to play a more assertive role protecting Uzbek "rights" and ethnic minorities in these states and Afghanistan. The role of Kazakhstan would also be more important, assuming no internal split between the Kazakh and Russian populations and no loosening of presently tight ties with Moscow. In a situation of no institutional links between the armed forces of the five states, and with few remaining Russian officers in most of these forces, the danger of intra-state incidents would increase, as would the chances that one or more would start looking elsewhere than Russia for outside help to their military.

The greatest dangers for and from the former Central Asian states thus would come from faltering leadership in the face of intensive external pressures: particularly a worsening economic situation; a loosening of ties, especially military as well as economic, with Russia and the CIS; a negative change in relations amongst the five states or with key foreign governments, starting with Russia, but also notably Iran,

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Turkey (in which case, competition amongst the latter could become destructive to stability); and a collapse of the Kabul region and breakup of Afghanistan into separate fiefdoms, some with erstwhile powerful external patrons (e.g. Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia). This last scenario could cause some former Central Asian states to become actively involved in order to protect themselves or their fellow ethnics in Afghanistan and could also exacerbate divisive pressures inside and between individual states.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is in a dangerous state of transition. The Kabul regime, a number of Resistance leaders, and the principal external powers are pledged to work with the UN on a transition regime; substantial outside support for military operations has ceased. However, powerful but suppressed ethnic/tribal animosities are reemerging and pressures to split the country into regional/local ethno-military entities are growing. As the Kabul regime weakens, external powers could well be tempted to join with internal groups should prospects fade for an overall political settlement.

The political future of Afghanistan is uncertain and highly volatile. The UN is working with President Najibullah and other leaders of the current regime, as well as with some influential Resistance political and military leaders plus traditional tribal leaders to obtain agreement on an interim successor regime in Kabul. The objective would be for it to command a degree of support from, and provide a modicum of unification for, the emerging regional/ethnic power blocs (including regime, Resistance, and traditional elements) rather than have these blocs over time fight their way to autonomy, without any unifying institution, and very probably fight each other for Kabul.

However, not all of the several influential, separate politico-military elements which constitute either the region or the Resistance are behind the UN effort. Despite support from the U.S., Russia, and the former Central Asian states plus Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, there are suspicions that some of these latter governments are quietly seeking partisan advantage for the Afghan groups closest to them rather than applying maximum pressure for a peaceful solution within a unified Afghanistan. Should the UN efforts or some other accepted unifying solution prevail, current tensions and the potential for future instability in the surrounding states would fall substantially. If it does not, these problems are almost certain to be exacerbated. By far the most likely outcome would be a splintering of Afghanistan into a number of de facto, autonomous entities resting upon ethnic/tribal, military and religious bases, with several of them receiving support from outside.

In eastern Afghanistan, Pashtun tribal, military, and religious leaders would probably form a series of mini-states. These would have cautiously normal relations

amongst themselves and very close private and official relations with Pakistan which would provide them material support and work to minimize tensions between them and with itself. These entities would be heavily influenced by more radical Islamist tendencies, especially Jamaat Islami from Pakistan. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could be expected to have substantial although not dominant influence. The presence of hundreds of armed, radicalized Arabs, as well as thousands of Resistance fighters, in the border area is another threat. Islamabad has begun to deport them.

To the Northeast would be one or more mainly Tajik mini-states, with the strongest influence coming from Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud and his Supervisory Council of the North. There would probably be correct but not overly close relations with Pakistan. The same would likely be the case with Tajikistan at least for a few years while the latter cautiously tested Massoud's intent and capabilities either to maintain good relations without interference or to display interventionist tendencies. To the North and center and Northwest would be a collection of Uzbek and Ismaili enclaves, none of them very large or powerful. They would probably have closer relations with Uzbekistan which is more powerful and therefore less worried than Tajikistan about avoiding cross-border activities. At present, the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Ismailis are at peace with one another and are standing together against any return of Pashtun dominance. However, future relations might not be so peaceful.

In central Afghanistan, the most powerful entity would be dominated by the Shi'a Hazaras, some of them with strong support and probably a fair degree of control from Iran. Around Kandahar, the Durrani tribes could be expected to form one large loose group seeking good relations with both Pakistan and Iran. Iran's efforts to extend its influence into Afghanistan have increased over the past year, particularly since the breakup of the USSR. Its interest in expanding future influence out of the Hazara area, all the way to Kandahar in the south and north to the border of Tajikistan, has exacerbated Pakistani and Saudi suspicions, spurring them to counter Iran's influence as well as make greater efforts for a quick settlement.

If there is no overall settlement, Kabul would probably be the main (but not the only) point of conflict amongst the various indigenous forces, possibly dragging in their external supporters. How long this conflict might last and what the outcome might be are hard to predict. It would almost certainly be bloody and of long duration, given the very slim chance of any outside politico-military intervention strong enough to restore order. Other sporadic conflicts of lower intensity can be expected where the major groupings noted above come together, as well as with smaller and more localized enclaves or tribal leaders.

Under these circumstances, Afghanistan would be a tough problem with disruptive potential for all of its neighbors, adding to already existing tensions and problems within and between them. However, it would be in no position to project

meaningful influence systematically outside its borders or to collaborate effectively with any outside power. This situation would not be a serious threat to India, nor would it be expected to generate serious preventive or peacemaking activity by the U.S., Russia, or China. Whether the UN would take on a role under such circumstances would be highly problematical.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan's national security policies appear to be at a turning point as it tries to take stock of the long-term effects of the loss of military assistance and much of the political support it has long received from the U.S.; the reduced future support it can expect from China; the virtual disappearance of the threat from the USSR; the ambivalence of Iran's policies toward the Gulf, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, and how Iran relates to Pakistan's interests; the failure of its favorites to win the political or military struggle in Afghanistan; plus the new realities and future opportunities in former Central Asia and how they relate to the future of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. A certain amount of time and reflection, as well as the clarification or further evaluation of important external factors which are either unclear (e.g. future U.S.-Pakistan relations) or evolving (e.g. Iran's external orientation, the situation in Afghanistan), will be required before any Pakistani government can be expected to come up with a coherent new policy context in which to place them.

It will also need to weigh carefully the probable domestic repercussions of major policy changes, with particular attention to the strength of Jamaat Islami and that of the broader Islamist movement of which it is a part (including what happens in countries such as Algeria and Jordan where there are strong Islamist politico-religious challenges). At present, Nawaz Sharif's IJI party is not sure enough of its political base and strength to split completely with Jamaat or the other major components of his coalition, and therefore is moving ahead cautiously on programs already underway such as the major economic reform. This also causes IJI caution in moving too far or too fast with new initiatives such as closer relations with India on the one hand, or closer alignment with Iran on the other.

The view by Pakistan's civilian and military leaders as well as the public perception of India's policies and intentions toward Pakistan will continue to be the pivot around which the rest of its strategic thinking turns. If they believe India to be embarked upon a strategy of increasing its relative power and regional domination, thereby threatening Pakistan they can be expected to make strenuous efforts to seek more arms and stronger external support. On the other hand, there is a body of influential opinion with an interest in exploring cautiously any openings from India for better relations which it deems sincere, difficult as this would be to

sustain politically due to a half-century's accumulation of popular suspicion and hostility.

Concerning Afghanistan and Central Asia, Pakistan has already made a significant policy change, not only in the rhetoric of its pronouncements and the priority accorded the exploration and exploitation of economic opportunities in Central Asia, but also in sharply diminishing material support for Hekmatyar and other radical Islamist Resistance leaders. Pakistan's government recognizes the urgency and importance of this for productive relations with the Central Asian states as well as for reducing the serious problems caused by the presence on its territory or just adjacent to it of tens of thousands of armed Afghans, hundreds of fanatic Arabs, and between two and three million refugees for whom international help is diminishing. Some of the Arabs are already being expelled. However, more time will be required before one can tell how effective Pakistani pressure and controls will be on its former radical collaborators, and whether the UN efforts succeed in winning a political solution which maintains a modicum of unity and stability, further reducing the future utility for Pakistan of such Afghan groups and leaders as Hekmatyar.

Pakistan's military establishment has been particularly affected by developments of the past eighteen months, those mentioned above plus several others limited more to the military. The latter were centered on what came to be seen as the erratic, potentially dangerous behavior of Chief Of Army Staff Beg in engaging the military's influence on major political issues. These actions, unwisely ideologically, and done without developing a consensus among his senior commanders included: setting in train in early 1990, then further contributing to a series of interacting politico-military actions by India and Pakistan over Kashmir which almost touched off serious hostilities (and seem to have seared both countries); promoting a politico-military "strategic alliance" with Iran without approval of the President or the PM or a consensus amongst senior military commanders; first pressing hard for Pakistani participation in the U.S.-led coalition opposing Iraq and supporting Saudi Arabia, then opposing this commitment and showing extremely bad judgement regarding Iraq's capabilities vis-a-vis those of the coalition; and generally falling too much under Islamist influence on political and military issues. The reaction to these accumulated developments began in the spring of 1991 and led by the end of the year to a major change in not only senior officers but also the overall leadership style of the Pakistani military establishment. Most notable was a more consultative, consensus-forming attitude by the Chief of Army Staff and a military decision to play much more of a supportive than a leadership role on policy decisions, working much more closely with and accepting more guidance from the country's elected political leadership.

The Pakistani military is trying to maintain as much military capability as possible despite the loss from the U.S. of large grants and credits, new orders of

sophisticated weapons (e.g. some 70 F-16s), and essential spare parts. To this end it is seeking armor, aircraft, and other weapons from the former Soviet-bloc and European (e.g. French) sources at low cost or with long-term credits. China is still looked upon as the primary and most reliable source of military weaponry and technology, however, the Pakistani military has come to a more realistic view of China's limited capability and diminishing will to assist as a result of several developments over the past year. These include the embarrassing public revelation of Beg's totally failed Pakistani-PRC tank coproduction program, increased prices for what came to be seen as inferior equipment (especially in light of Desert Storm), and failure (under U.S. pressure) to complete delivery of the M-11 missile system.

After a period of coolness due to anger and misunderstanding over the sudden cessation of military assistance, Pakistan's military has become very keen on retaining as close a relationship as possible with the United States military whether or not this means more material support. Many obviously value the years of close professional cooperation, training, and dialogue (on both military and broader issues). This provides the United States with a continued opportunity for communication and a modest capability for influence with Pakistan's military leadership.

With respect to India, the Pakistani military seems to be making major efforts to avoid the danger of a serious clash, including greater use of the hot line and other confidence-building measures with the Indian military, and acting forcefully to stop mass marches toward the Kashmiri border by Kashmiri militants. However, it does not seem to have taken similarly effective action with respect to the covert passage of men and weapons across the LOC into Kashmir. It has openly endorsed and is acting to carry out the Government's new Afghan policy, reducing ISI help to radical resistance groups, and strongly supporting the United Nations political settlement effort. It has also supported the Government's decision to suspend weapons-grade enrichment of uranium and further production of components for nuclear devices. However it is keeping its powder dry as to what strategy will eventually be best for Pakistan when it comes to nuclear and other special weapons capabilities and it appears to have lost none of its inherent suspicion of India on this or other national security issues. There appears to be no inherent opposition to more and more systematic communication with India's military establishment, but there is a still-prevailing suspicion that this will probably not benefit Pakistan.

India's traditional response to fears of increased cooperation and actual or potential increase in politico-military power by Pakistan and other regional states, plus its paramount fear of China, has been to push ahead more rapidly to develop its own military machine, tighten existing ties with the USSR, seek new sources of support, and try to divide any new coalition so that it would not in fact acquire increased power to be used against Indian interests. This has been all the more true whenever there was a perceived increase in militant Islamic activity in Pakistan and other neighboring states. India has usually not seen fit to moderate the traditional

policy of asserting its role as dominant power in the Subcontinent and an important power in the Indian Ocean with appreciable potential influence extending down into Southwest Asia and up into Central Asia (including Afghanistan).

Some observers believe that India is preparing once again to assert this traditional response to what it fears might happen in the region: the development of a militant Islamic bloc in Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran which could be extremely dangerous for its long-term interests. Some of the indicators cited as revealing that India is about to assert such a defiantly defensive policy are: establishment of diplomatic relations and acceleration of substantive cooperation with Israel, probably including the sharing of intelligence and military technology; specific proposals for closer military cooperation with the United States, including sharing military technology and joint naval exercises; continuation with limited reductions of its defense budget but with continuation of its major military programs, including domestic production and foreign acquisition of weapons and technology, (with priority apparently going to missiles and other weapons of mass destruction); rejection both of the NPT or regional nuclear restraint agreements and of suggestions from several governments (including the U.S., UK, and Russia) that India agree to five-power talks on global/regional nuclear controls; and the more openly discussed international conviction that India's nuclear program has a significant military capability, paralleling that of Pakistan, with components for dozens of plutonium-fueled nuclear explosive devices already fabricated for rapid assembly.

Prime Minister Rao's speech at the United Nations Security Council Summit and his rejection of President Bush's personal proposal for five-power talks served to bolster the case of those who argue that India is determined to move down this traditional course as it responds to new world and regional developments. Selig Harrison's views of India's current strategy as set forth in his article for the March 1992 issue of *Current History*, also point in this direction:

In the years immediately ahead, India's internal political and economic problems are likely to slow down but not stop the development of its power-projection capabilities. American policy should be based on the premise that New Delhi will become an increasingly important military power with significant defense industries of its own in the public and private sector.

Indian great power ambitions are rooted in a self-image as one of the world's oldest and largest civilizations, entitled to global status second to none and to a regional sphere of influence centered in, but not necessarily restricted to, South Asia and the western Indian Ocean and its island states. The psychological

compulsion to demonstrate a military reach consistent with this self-image can be seen by the growth of Indian naval power....

...The most striking symbol of India's military muscle is the domestically produced Agni missile. Successfully test-fired on May 22, 1989, the Agni is a two-stage, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that uses a combination of solid and liquid fuel and carries its own guidance and on-board computer. While described as a technology demonstrator, it is likely to be produced for the armed forces in the near future....

...Making the next leaps to an intermediate-range ballistic (IRBM) and an ICBM involves complex technical problems of warhead miniaturization, heat shields for the nose cone, and gas velocity for thrust. However, New Delhi is making steady progress in this direction and plans to test a four-stage Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle this year with a payload comparable to that of an IRBM....

...Whether, when, and in what form India adopts an overt nuclear weapons posture in place of its present policy of calculated ambiguity is likely to depend on how far and how fast the drift to war continues. India is already capable of deploying air-delivered nuclear weapons and of putting nuclear warheads on its short-range, domestically produced Prithvi missile, which can reach targets throughout Pakistan. Pakistan's comparable Hatf missile is still in the early stages of development. Significant deliveries of the Prithvi to the armed forces will be under way by early 1993, and it is then that the danger of another war will become serious if the Kashmir issue has not been resolved.

CONCLUSION

Perceptions in Central and West Asia, as well as in the U.S., EC, and Japan, that India had actually decided to pursue such a policy at this sensitive regional juncture would prove to be costly in economic terms and counterproductive in politico-military terms. Unless the current situations to its west deteriorated sharply, India could not expect much outside political or economic support if much of the world concluded that it had adopted what might appear as an unjustifiably aggressive

policy, threatening to provoke dangerous repercussions in Central Asia and Southwest Asia (a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy). The very real danger of this perception taking hold, and the potential negative consequences, appears not to be adequately recognized by the government of India.

The appearance of Indian rigidity in holding to independent, outmoded Non-Aligned Movement leadership policies, rejecting international arms control regimes, and continuing to develop what are widely believed to be sophisticated missile and nuclear programs will be likely over time to produce a more serious, tangible, negative reaction from the U.S., Russia, the EC, Japan, and China. This is especially true since it comes in the face of growing world concern, examples of concerted world pressure upon Iraq and North Korea, and recent decisions by South Africa, France, China, Argentina and Brazil to change their adamant opposition to international or regional arms control regimens. As a result, India is feeling the pinch of tightening Western controls on technology exports. This is in part due to the perceived problems created by Indian obstinacy to the new, tougher international policy on weapons of mass destruction, and in part to the belief, justified or not, that India might be creating a situation that encourages a more aggressive politico-military posture by Pakistan and which could lead to non-conventional conflict with it and/or other regional states.

New Delhi appears not to understand or deliberately to ignore major changes in Pakistan—notably the cessation of U.S. military assistance which substantially reduce its military capabilities and political support for any attack upon India—as well as lesser but still meaningful changes in China which, under pressure from the U.S., has given ground on some specific issues potentially threatening to India. Failure to respond to these changes would be a mistake for India's relations with the region, as well as with the U.S. and other outside powers.

In reflecting upon this situation, India might wish to consider whether the new realities noted at the beginning of this paper, including the almost overwhelming need (shared by Pakistan) to devote greater economic and political resources to internal problems, warrant a new approach. It might wish to weigh the advantages of turning to the U.S. and other major powers as well as to regional governments with proposals to cooperate in a collective approach to lower regional tensions (including over Kashmir); seek agreement on new global and regional arms control measures (along the lines of President Bush's May 29, 1991, proposal for the Middle East, modified for South Asia); and accept the idea of five-power talks, perhaps expanded to include Kazakhstan (if Washington and Moscow agreed, which is doubtful), with the proviso that it include both global and regional issues and involve new measures by the U.S., Russia, and China as well as India and Pakistan. India could also propose to Pakistan (and the IMF/IBRD) that both governments make parallel reductions in military expenditures. There are no doubt other ideas which could achieve the same purpose, and which could be more acceptable in terms of India's domestic political situation.

As Rodney Jones writes in the Winter 1992 issue of *The Washington Quarterly*:

New realities combine uneasily with old quarrels in the region, bringing the risk of war and nuclear confrontation closer even while stimulating some new thinking about an attenuation of conflict and a piecemeal process of overcoming the sources of domestic and regional instability. The post-cold war agenda for the international community in southern Asia is formidable. The chief objectives must be to prevent a war over Kashmir, reduce the emerging risk of nuclear war, support the strengthening and implementation of the new economic and trade policy realism in Delhi and Islamabad, and help facilitate, to the extent possible from outside, political solutions of the causes of internal communal, ethnic, and terrorist violence. In the near term, preventing the outbreak of war over Kashmir will take precedence, but every opportunity to check the nuclear proliferation threats should be pursued. The economic development priorities need sustained emphasis and may be crucial in the long run to solving the deepest internal conflicts. The ability of Delhi and Islamabad and of interested members of the international community to address this agenda creatively and effectively will determine whether South Asia slides deeper into despair and nuclear conflagration or joins the more hopeful movement of history evident in so many other parts of the world.

The important thing for India is to show that it is taking a new look at new realities and seeking greater international cooperation in addressing regional problems. In this way, India could position itself to obtain greater external support rather than generating international concern, and perhaps even achieve a major breakthrough on the scale of Tashkent. Obviously this would require very careful planning and preparation at home (diplomatic, military and political) and considerable consultation with the regional states as well as the U.S. and other major powers.

OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR INDO-U.S. COOPERATION IN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES

by:

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BACKGROUND

The prospects of Indo-U.S. cooperation in defense technologies were briefly outlined from the Indian perspective in a paper at the first IDSA-NDU seminar held in November 1989.¹ The progress in 'mission area' cooperation in the Light Combat Aircraft has been quite satisfactory, although the LCA program itself is currently facing delays caused mainly by financial constraints. Two and a half years is a rather short period to look at the same topic. But, many historic and dramatic events have unfolded on the international strategic scene and in India's own industrial and economic policies. I would argue from a technological perspective that there is an awakening and a large potential for quickening in this new dawn that has been ushered in. Technology is indeed considered today as *the most important factor* in economic growth. This must be contrasted with the dated perception that land, labor, and capital were the key factors in industrialization. I am personally happy with this awakening—this "continuity with change"—and would hope that inputs from technology and technologists would have a greater role to play in India.

Werner von Braun said in 1973: A third-rate technological nation is a third-rate power, politically, economically and socially."² There are various ways of conveying the same thought, but to an American audience this quotation may strike a respondent chord. The technological underpinnings of political and economic independence have been clearly reiterated in the new policies of the Government of India. These will need to be effectively factored in bilateral and multilateral transactions having strong technological components.

But the truth about commercial and military technologies is well known:

- .. protect "crown jewels" to avoid losing the cutting edge;
- .. never part with contemporary technologies, sell an older version;
- .. share selectively, if unavoidable, with allies; and
- .. use the machinery of export administration to regulate technology flows; use technology control regimes to regulate international flows.

It is equally true that technology doesn't stay bottled up or static. This contemporary fact is felt in the daily lives of technologists, economists, and politicians in developed and developing countries.

The cost of being in the technology game is increasing steadily due to rises in the following units: research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE); manufacturing; and marketing in a competitive world. Add to these the insistence on technology transfer by developing countries, altered security "realities," shrinking defense budgets, the play of "free market forces" in grey areas, and the steady growth of the industrial infrastructure around the world. The result is the inevitable, if gradual, loosening of technology protectionism.

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1991

Briefly, the New Industrial Policy of 1991 is

"designed to unshackle Indian industry from the myriad administrative and legal controls which have become unnecessary in the changed national and global economic environment. [It] reiterates the objectives of employment generation, reduction of socio-economic disparities, removal of poverty and attainment of self-reliance."³

The major highlights are:

- ** licensing abolished, except for a short list of industries with strategic/security impact (e.g. arms and ammunition, defense equipment, aircraft, ships, atomic energy, aerospace, electronics);
- ** automatic clearance for import of capital goods for a project if FE availability is through equity or if CIF value is less than 25 percent of the total value of plant and equipment, up to a max of Rs 2 crores (about U.S. \$0.8 million);
- ** phased manufacturing programs not applicable to new projects;
- ** broad-banding to produce any article without additional investment; and
- ** DGTD registration abolished.

Foreign investments will be strongly encouraged through automatic approval for foreign technology agreements and 51 percent equity in high priority industries: metallurgy, prime movers, boilers and steam generation plants; electrical;

transportation; agricultural machinery; scientific instruments; chemicals; drugs; food processing; tourism. Also, through automatic permission for foreign technology agreements in the above high priority industries (max payment Rs 1 crore or about U.S. \$0.4 million, 5 percent royalty on domestic sales and 8 percent on exports). There is wide-spread acclaim in important economic circles for these dramatic and historic changes in the industrial policy of India.

THE NEW EXPORT-IMPORT POLICY

The new Export and Import Policy announced early in April 1992 says that:

"the fundamental feature is freedom. It substantially eliminates licensing, quantitative restrictions and other regulatory and discretionary controls. All goods may be freely imported and exported, save for two Negative Lists.... These Lists have been kept as small as possible in the present circumstances."⁴

This new policy is as historic and dramatic as the new Industrial Policy. From the technological perspective, I would highlight two aims of the new policy: first, to promote efficient and internationally competitive import substitution and self-reliance under a deregulated framework for foreign trade; second, to foster the country's research and development and technological capabilities.

Three Questions

The impact of these new policies on Indo-U.S. commercial relations is likely to be felt in the coming years. And, I believe, there is much optimism in the air. As far as their impact on Indo-U.S. strategic relations is concerned, I would pose three indicative questions. First, do these new measures provide a new opening for U.S. defense companies to sell new defense-related products more easily to India? Second, will the new policy be attractive for U.S. defense companies to invest in India for new items in preference to European sources? Third, does the new policy enable export of goods or services to the USA by MOD entities?

As regards question one, my personal view is that this will continue to depend on USG policies and regulations. Even if the necessary approvals are given in time, the prospect is circumscribed by the present budget constraints. As regards question two, even in the new policy, arms and ammunition and all defense systems continue to be reserved for the Government sector; liberalization is essentially in the commercial sector. So, I doubt whether the U.S. defense industrial complex will find the "climate change" attractive enough at present. Finally, in answer to question three, some exports by way of minor contract jobs for sub-systems, components, services are possible. The US, at any rate, has a number of linkages with its allies

and Indian bids will face stiff competition. I would also subscribe to the general theory that a buyer-seller relationship in defense equipment and systems between India and any developed country is not likely to be beneficial to both.

Critical Defense Technologies

As indicated, my personal views on the three questions are not rosy in the short run. At the risk of being unrealistic, I would make a little, bold peep into a technological future; a look at the sky above while temporarily mired in the mud below. This peep poses the following question: If Indian industry is to "plug into" the international system, to get "globalized," should not the Indian R&D system, including the defense segment, not be encouraged to plug into the international R&D system? My answer is "yes," provided superfluous barriers and regulations are lowered or removed. I would add that the field should be "critical defense technologies."

In 1989, the U.S. Department of Defense released a document entitled "Critical Technologies Plan." Table 1 lists the critical technologies identified in the document.

Table 1: U.S. DOD's LIST OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES

1. Microelectronic Circuits and their Applications
2. Preparation of Gallium Arsenide and other Compound Semiconductors
3. Software Producibility
4. Parallel Computer Architectures
5. Machine Intelligence/Robotics
6. Simulation and Modelling
7. Integrated Optics
8. Fibre Optics
9. Sensitive Radars
10. Passive Sonars
11. Automatic Target Recognition
12. Phased Arrays
13. Data Fusion
14. Signature Control
15. Computational Fluid Dynamics
16. Air Breathing Propulsion
17. High Power Microwaves
18. Pulsed Power
19. Hyper-velocity Projectiles
20. High-Temperature/High-Strength Light-Weight Composite Materials
21. Superconductivity
22. Biotechnology Materials and Processing

The document also lists countries other than Japan, the former USSR, or NATO/ Warsaw Pact partners, which have *significant R&D efforts* in these areas. I have edited the entries to bring them up-to-date with respect to Indian R&D efforts (Table 2), omitting biotechnology convenience.

TABLE 2: COUNTRIES WITH SIGNIFICANT R&D EFFORTS IN CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES

1.	Microelectronic Circuits and their applications	India, South Korea, Taiwan
2.	Preparation of Gallium Arsenide and other Compound Semiconductors	China (for MW applications), India (from 1993)
3.	Software Producibility	India, Israel, Brazil, Sweden
4.	Parallel Computer Architectures	India
5.	Machine Intelligence/Robotics	Switzerland, India
6.	Simulation and Modelling	India
7.	Integrated Optics	
8.	Fibre Optics	Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan
9.	Sensitive Radars	Israel, India, China
10.	Passive Sensors	Israel, India
11.	Automatic Target Recognition	Israel, India
12.	Phased Arrays	Israel, India
13.	Data Fusion	India
14.	Signature Control	China, Israel, India, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan
15.	Computational Fluid Dynamics	India, China, Taiwan
16.	Air Breathing Propulsion	China, India, Israel, Sweden, Taiwan
17.	High Power Microwaves	China, India
18.	Hyper-velocity Projectiles	China, Israel, India, Sweden
19.	Pulsed Power	China, Israel
20.	High-Temperature/High-Strength Light-Weight Composite Materials	Australia, Brazil, India, China, Israel, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan
21.	Superconductivity	China, India, Switzerland

Table # 2 mentions 10 countries: Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan. Without making any invidious comment, I would argue that factors like technology status, manpower, resources, political stability, liberalized economic conditions, technology protection experience, and restraint in the export of sensitive technologies would make India a cost-effective, attractive partner for R&D cooperation in these critical technologies.

I would like to provoke a discussion by making this proposition: If the USA is looking for off-shore R&D in critical technologies, consider the Indian infrastructure and resources. This could be on agreed terms, including security aspects. This could lead to products for markets in both countries and the world. Co-development leading to coproduction of market-leader products may be the only way out in a situation where budgets are cut and new competition is making inroads. To make a point, the Office of Naval Research appears to be quite interested in promoting joint R&D with India in materials research.

For this little bold peep into the technology future to be translated to ground reality, a number of fixations on both sides may have to be resolved. Further, the level of understanding in the US of India's technological capabilities and national interests will have to significantly improve. one of the aims of this Seminar would be served if we can look into the technology future as well.

1. K Santhanam, "Prospects of Indo-U.S. Cooperation in Defense Technologies," paper presented at the First NDU-IDSA Indo-U.S. Strategic Seminar, Washington DC, November 1989.
2. Quoted in "India's Quest for Technological Independence, Volume 1: Policy Foundation and Policy Change" by Baldev Raj Nayyar, Lancers Publishers, New Delhi 1983
3. "Export and Import Policy, 1 April 1992 - 31 March 1997," Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.
4. *New Industrial Policy and Procedures, 1992*, Nabhi Publications, New Delhi.

INDIA IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

by

Jasjit Singh

The international strategic environment has undergone rapid changes since the late 1980s. India has been sensitive to these changes which imply both opportunities and challenges, some old and others new. Indians inevitably perceive these changes in the context of what India has attempted both before and after attaining independence—the world's largest and most ambitious experiment in transforming a traditional, de-industrialized, pluralistic society into a modern nation state through a consultative approach to politics.¹

As regards its role in the international system, there is a disjunction between India's vision, the articulation of that vision, and the perceptions of the world about India.² India has always taken a wider view of security extending well beyond its military dimensions. However, there is a widespread tendency, particularly abroad, to view India in the regional context, with the "region" defined as South Asia. This, in itself, is in contradiction with the concept of increasing global politico-economic interdependence. It could hardly be a valid concept with India moving ahead rapidly with the "globalization" of its trade and economy.

Even the smallest state has to be involved in the interaction constantly taking place at the global level. All states are affected by international geo-political trends. There are a very large number of global issues which affect the security (military and non-military) environment of states, and these issues are increasing in number and importance. It is inevitable, therefore, that India will have to continue playing a global role. The question is, "what should be that role?" An assessment can only be made by examining the strategic environment and India's strategic objectives.

Strategic Vacuum

The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 created a strategic vacuum in the global system. The vacuum is all the more marked because of the perceived (and real) inability of the main successor, Russia, to re-organize itself as an effective power. The prolonged rule by the Communist Party and its elimination as an organized political force has created a situation where the republics of the former Soviet Union suffer from an absence of political culture. The economy and its management are in crisis. At the same time, the military system, though under severe socio-economic stress, still remains the world's second largest military power with the potential to destroy the globe. The full implications of this strategic vacuum have not yet been adequately understood and appreciated. However, since

the bipolar system represented the US and USSR leaning heavily against each other, the collapse of the USSR has not only created a strategic vacuum but an inevitable leaning forward of the US into that vacuum. This has created the perception of a unipolar world system. The question that needs to be asked is whether the United States is willing and/or capable of filling the vacuum.

At the same time, it must be recognized that in the terminal years of the bipolar system other centers of power had been emerging, though in asymmetric paradigms. In essence, they represented an emerging second tier, though coupled with the bipolar system, either inside or outside the alliance framework. Taking all the normal indices of national power into account, four such powers are identifiable: Japan, the European Community (especially Germany at its core), China, and India. The global strategic vacuum, thus, is likely to be filled over time by the six key players of the international system: USA, Japan, the EC (European community), China, India, and Russia. The emerging international order may thus be defined more accurately as **polycentric**.³

The USA is the more complete and hence the leading power, while the others have attributes in different areas at different levels of capability. The shifting balance of power has already led some analysts to identify a U.S. shift towards trilateralism based on the logic that "the declining hegemon (in this case, the USA) reaches out to the rising powers (identified as Germany and Japan) offering the hand of cooperation as a means of restraint."⁴ A similar paradigm could explain the USSR reaching out to China and India during the late 1980s.

The polycentric paradigm of international order would necessitate hexalateralism at the global and even the regional level. This would be in consonance with India's role at the global level in the past where it pursued the objective of an independent policy in a military-alliance dominated world and worked to uphold the UN Charter, preferably through peaceful means. A stable, cooperative strategic environment is more important to India now than ever before. India's role in the evolving scenario, therefore, should be to help ensure that the strategic vacuum is filled through a graduated, controlled transition into a hexalateral balance of power based on enlightened self interests. India seeks a cooperative framework with relationships that ensure stability and opportunities for socioeconomic development.

In the evolving scenario, India enjoys most of the advantages although it may take some time for the realization to sink into Indian consciousness. Ideological harmony with the dominant world trend places India in an advantageous position. As one of the most vibrant liberal democracies in the world, it can look forward to an era of converging interests with most of the world's leading powers. Economic reforms instituted last year hold out the promise of faster integration into the international economic system and sustained economic growth in the future. The transformation of the Soviet Union and its radically altered image in West also

removes the negative effect of Indo-Soviet friendship on perceptions of India. At the same time, India's relations with the United States and the West can now move forward more firmly and rapidly without necessarily having to forgo traditional relationships with the Soviet Union on one side and the developing countries on the other.

India's primary competition in the years ahead will be with China, but there are no objective reasons why this must be played out in conflictual terms. Both countries have a vested interest in a tension-free environment. Pragmatic national interests will structure Sino-Indian relations into the peaceful coexistence of cooperation and competition—as much as they would do in the polycentric world at large.

Strategic Objectives

In order to assess India's role in the emerging international environment, it is also necessary to identify India's strategic goals and objectives. At the most fundamental level, the primary (and overriding) strategic goal is the **socioeconomic development** of the people.

India has been termed as one of the world's three economic giants. But, in spite of remarkable progress during the past 44 years, a great deal remains to be done for India's 864 million people. Despite inheriting what was essentially a fragmented country under a unified alien rule, an essentially de-industrialized state, and the turbulence inherent in a developing country, India's democratic political system has demonstrated unprecedented resilience. Observers have talked of political instability in the context of "minority" elected governments, but this in itself reflects the underlying stability of the political system of a noisy democracy.

At the same time India is confronted with major tasks and challenges to its integrity, growth, and development. Transformation through peaceful evolution and its management at the scale in which issues in India operate are the greatest challenges. Note also that the information revolution has increased public awareness and aspirations. With over 60 percent of the population below the age of 30, there is an inevitable revolution of rising expectations in India. This has been further accentuated by the changes in policy implemented by the government since mid-1991.

Fulfillment of the strategic objective of socioeconomic development and growth should continue to guide India's role in global and regional affairs. It must seek and work for an environment of peace and security in which this objective can be pursued with greater chance of success. Past experience indicates that any deterioration in the security environment had an adverse impact on socioeconomic growth.⁵ A credible capability to ensure stability and security should continue to be high on the

priority list. Self-reliance and a degree of autonomy in political, economic, and military terms are natural corollaries. India needs to expand expeditiously its economic and trade activities so that growth rates can be maximized. A key element in this paradigm is energy resources in an otherwise energy deficient country.

At the same time, India accords great importance to moral values, especially equity, justice, and democratization. New issues of global importance confront the international community and, with nearly 15 percent of the world's population constituting a heterogeneous society living within its borders, India must be in the forefront of efforts to find equitable solutions to problems like that of environmental issues affecting development. Similarly, technology acquisition will be a high thrust area in coming years. While the country has acquired impressive industrial manufacturing and production credentials, it suffers from serious design and development weaknesses. Its gross R&D investments are still less than one percent of GDP and a substantial proportion of even this low level of investment does not translate into production. Greater investments in R&D (civil and military) need to be linked to technology acquisition processes.

The Developing World

A polycentric world order will undoubtedly make inter-state relations more complex. For example, both China and India are developing countries with large economies and resources, as is Russia at a different level. Although underdevelopment places constraints on the level of cooperation and competition that these countries can engage in, the shift in the international order towards a polycentric world where cooperation and competition may co-exist is also likely to influence India's role.

A significant element of the changing international environment concerns "North-South" relations, i.e. between the industrialized, developed countries of the North and developing countries of the South. The Cold War which dominated the international scene for more than four decades was really a confrontation among the North spawned by the Second World War. The Twentieth Century has witnessed significant tension and conflict between states and interests of the industrialized developed countries and the developing world. While the Cold War exacerbated many of these tensions and conflicts in the search for influence and control by the protagonists, in many instances it also generated the countervailing influence to restrain and limit conflict.

With the ending of the Cold War, three issues merit attention:

- Most of the fundamental North-South contradictions and sources of tensions are likely to persist well into the 21st century.

- The North-South gap in capabilities and "power," if anything, is likely to widen in the coming decade.
- Stability and socioeconomic development of the South is essential for international peace and security.

In the future, international and national security will depend to a significant degree on how the international community reacts to and deals with these issues. Three possible paradigms may be visualized:

- A united or cooperative North deals with a divided/fractional South. This, of course, will increase the potential for tensions and conflict with consequent tendencies towards instability in Southern countries struggling with the process of nation/state building.
- A united North deals with an equally united South. This appears highly unlikely in view of the indigenous sources of tension and conflict on both sides. However, the potential of this paradigm evolving into a confrontationist framework will be high, especially if some chauvinist state starts forming a clique of nations.
- A progressively cooperative relationship develops between the North and South. Although this will demand statesmanship of a high order, only a paradigm of this nature can provide for increasing stability.

The basic issues and problems facing developing countries remain unchanged; some, in fact, may intensify. At the same time, there is little possibility of increased maneuver room for the developing world, in spite of intra-North tensions. Potentially, this may result in irresponsible states resorting to a chauvinistic expansion of influence, especially through violent means. With the number of developing countries dramatically increasing and the global economy experiencing stagnation, frustrations could generate irredentist state behavior.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) needs to be seen in this context. While Western attitudes to the NAM are understandable, India's sobering and moderating role in NAM has, more often than not, been ignored or forgotten. Vectoring of the developing countries' energies and aspirations will enhance national security and stability, and continuation of the NAM is desirable at least from this angle. NAM will need to redefine its tasks and roles in view of the altered political architecture of the international system. India will need to play a more active moderating role, especially since other traditional leaders are not likely to make any positive contribution.

One of the most important factors influencing developments in this area is the

likely role of China. It has already applied for observer status in NAM and believes that in the process it has "saved" the NAM just at the time when "old faithfuls" were walking out at Harare. In recent years, China has been increasingly identifying itself with the developing countries. Chinese strategic thinkers are known to have postulated China as the "representative of the Third World" among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In the past, the USSR had projected itself in that role, and China seems to be trying to take its place. The Non-Aligned Movement, being in a state of flux, may well offer China additional advantages to increase its influence in the developing world, especially in Southeast Asia and West Asia. But given the traditional position of India in the Third World and the continued, if not increased, necessity for moderating influences—and hence the need for continued India's leadership role for—increasing competition and rivalry between China and India may emerge in the future. In fact, China may not seek a formal linkage with NAM beyond observer status in order to gain advantages both from the West and the South. Without a perceived compatibility of interests and strategies, an expansion of Chinese influence and security/defence relationships with the Third World in general and countries in southern Asia in particular can hardly be seen as benign to India's strategic and security interests. India will thus not only have to play a prominent leadership role in NAM and help in the evolution of new constructive leadership, but also avoid the potential for friction with China.

International Peace and Security

India has consistently strived for peace and security at the global, regional, and local level. It has taken a keen interest and played a prominent role in sustaining the UN Charter and the functioning of the UN. Three specific areas merit attention in relation to the future.

First, the UN structure that evolved in 1945 reflected the international order consequent to Yalta and Potsdam. The political architecture of that international order has undergone fundamental changes since then, with particularly dramatic changes in recent years. The relative power of nations has altered, so much so that the vanquished states of 1945 are among the leading powers of the world today. When the UN was established, countries like India were not even independent. Over a hundred states have acquired that status since then. In the emerging international order, the role of the UN needs to be strengthened. But the UN organization can hardly be effective unless it reflects the geopolitical realities of the international system. Reforms are essential, and India needs to work for these reforms in such a way as to strengthen the UN and its role in enhancing peace and security. These efforts should also reflect the renewed focus on democracy and democratization of the national and international systems.

Second, India has been strongly committed to general and complete disarmament, especially focusing its efforts on stopping the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction. India took the initiative at the UN in 1964, pressing for nuclear nonproliferation measures and obtaining a UN General Assembly resolution for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty in November 1965 which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of states (including the US, USSR, and UK).⁶ Unfortunately, the present NPT evolved outside the UN framework and in contravention of the principles accepted at the UN. India also tabled a comprehensive action plan at the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament in June 1988, but events have overtaken the main elements of the proposal. India will continue to play an active role in supporting disarmament and nonproliferation, however, it will not sign the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state and must resist any indirect process which results in a similar situation. India's security at the most fundamental level will remain non-negotiable. This, in fact, is the logic of the "open option" strategy.

Proliferation has assumed critical proportions as a result of the collapse of the USSR, and control over nuclear weapons (especially the non-strategic variety) is a serious concern for a variety of reasons. At the same time, there is another type of proliferation—small arms proliferation (SAP)—which is threatening to not only destabilize states but destroy society itself. The winding down of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the CFE Treaty, vigorous arms exports by China, and increasing intrastate violence are tending to boost small arms proliferation through black, grey, and legitimate marketing processes. Unfortunately, analysts in the US do not seem to see "low end" technology arms exports to the Third World as destabilizing.⁷ Insecurity in its different elements gets exacerbated where SAP is linked with subnational separatism built upon ethnic and/or religious resurgence and criminal activities like narcotics trade and transnational terrorism. Increasing attention will need to be paid to phenomenon coming years; it is eminently suitable for Indo-U.S. cooperation.

The third aspect concerns the global trend of ethnic and religious consciousness, revivalism, and resurgence, linked to political ideologies and activism, giving rise to subnational separatism. This has become a major source of national and international insecurity. Transnational ideologies and external support to violent subnational separatism have become serious threats to the emerging international order, especially for pluralistic open societies and liberal democratic states. India, along with other liberal democracies and the international system, will need to work on priority to evolve norms and responses to these new challenges to security.

Regional Security

Most future security problems are likely to be regional and region-specific. However, great care needs to be exercised in defining the "region," especially its strategic and security dimensions. The commonly used concept of "South Asia" is not only grossly misleading but also introduces serious distortions in perceptions.⁸ Most

of the perceptions from Indian "hegemonism" arise from the arbitrary, inadequate, and artificial definition of its role in "South Asia."⁹ It is this logic which inevitably results in conclusions of the type in the reported in the Pentagon's Defence Planning Guidance (draft).¹⁰ In defining South Asia as a region, it is often forgotten that strong cultural and civilizational ties exist between India and neighboring regions (e.g. Tibet, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, etc). It appears that the prevalence of the very concept of "South Asia" has been fostered substantively by the Washington-centered world view, although many Indians are more than keen to also stay with the concept. For a balanced and effective understanding of the security calculus of the region it is important that a concept of a broader region—**Southern Asia**, or even the Asian Pacific region—is employed. India will need to alter its own perception and articulation and move beyond the South Asian formulations if it wishes to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and misperceptions inimical to its interests.

In the redefined regional context, India will need to reassess and chart out its long term strategy towards Pakistan. The political and economic context of that relationship is the most important aspect, although focus in the past has been more towards the symptoms (Kashmir, terrorism, etc) than causative motivations. The fundamental **ideological** conflict between India and Pakistan needs to be recognized and understood, and a strategy must be developed to seek a degree of harmonization. India will need to build its relations with China so that the negative elements of potential competition remain manageable. In both respects, a long term perspective is vital. A large number of confidence building measures have been initiated by India in recent years, but much more will be needed in an effort to reshape the security environment.¹¹ At the same time, India will need to make a firm decision concerning the acquisition of nuclear weapons in a nuclearized environment where adverse asymmetry has intensified dramatically in recent years. Although a non-nuclear environment would have served India's strategic interests better, the reality of nuclearization and the virtual impossibility of denuclearization to credible assurance levels (except through global disarmament) demands that India acquires nuclear weapons to meet a credible minimum deterrence strategy. This, however, should not detract from its commitments and efforts supporting disarmament and nonproliferation; rather it should strengthen them.

A word about Kashmir. India needs to bring home to the international community that Pakistan has no locus-standi in this dispute. Pakistan comes into the picture only because it committed military aggression against another state and annexed parts of it—like Iraq in 1990. At the same time it has to be made clear that "self-determination" was incorporated into the UN Charter in a certain context and, to paraphrase President Yeltsin, it is not a pair of old socks! If the basic principles are not adhered to, the free will only be walking into the trap of irredentist and fundamentalist ideologies and states.

Maritime Security

India's economic and trade dependence on maritime security has been increasing rapidly since the early 1970s. The value of trade increased 28.5-times during the 20 years from 1970-71 to 1990-91. During the three years since 1987-88, India's trade has doubled. The rate of growth of per capita net national product (at 1980-81 prices) for the 1980-1990 period touched 3.25 percent compared with the average growth rate of 1.34 percent during the previous three decades.¹² The economic/trade and technological growth during the last twenty years has made it possible to introduce structural reforms and to begin integrating the national economy into the global economy. Strategic resources assume critical importance in this context. Of these, oil as an energy source can easily be identified as vital to India's techno-economic growth.

Not only has India's strategic dependence on the seas grown since the early 1970s, but it is likely to assume greater importance in the future. Over 97 percent of fast-expanding external trade is carried across the seas. This includes 36 percent of India's crude oil needs. At the same time, exploitation of the EEZ has resulted in nearly 40 percent of the oil and 81 percent of the gas coming from the offshore installations. Any disruption of trade or oil supplies will affect India's vital interests.

Security of the sea-lanes and safeguarding maritime interests (especially the EEZ) has rapidly moved up as one of the critical security and strategic interests of India. Future strategy will need to be shaped accordingly, and India will need to play a more active role in the maritime environment. This role should be vectored along a cooperative framework. To be able to play an effective role in the maritime environment, requisite strengthening of naval capabilities will need greater attention. At the same time greater interaction and cooperation with other states whose interests converge with India's interests should be stepped up. Efforts should also be made to explain to states and peoples in the region that such policies are not targeted against any country but are strictly in the spirit of collective security enshrined in the UN Charter.

At the same time, it is clear that the region to the west of India will remain critical to India's vital interests. Security of the sea-lanes of communications would be another vital interest. These factors should guide India's security policy in the coming years. India's political and economic policies are already shifting gears to reflect these needs.

1. Greater efficiency might have been achieved through authoritarian politics even within a democratic framework, as indeed happened in many countries during the same period. However, consensus seeking consultative politics lies at the very roots of modern India and the Indian people are conscious that its failure in the subcontinent led to the creation of Pakistan and Bangladesh, under different conditions.
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5. Jasjit Singh, *Defence and Development: Country Study India*, Study paper prepared for the International Commission for Peace and Food and presented to the Commission (October 1991).
6. **UN Resolution 2028 (XX), November 19, 1965.**
7. Richard A. Bitzinger, Chinese Arms Production and Sales, *RAND Note* (No. 3334-USDP, 1991).
8. Jasjit Singh, "India's Strategic and Security Perspectives," *Strategic Analysis*, August 1990, Vol XIII, No 5, pages 476-477.
9. *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.
10. For example, see Mohammed Ayoob, "India as Regional Hegemon: External Opportunities and Internal Constraints," *International Journal*, Vol XLVI, No. 3, Summer 1991.
11. See Jasjit Singh, "India And Pakistan: Security for Both at Lower Costs," *Times of India*, September 26, 1991.
12. *Economic Survey*, Government of India, for relevant years.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDO-U.S. COOPERATION ON ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

by

K. Subrahmanyam

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NPT AND PROLIFERATION

In the sixties, the conventional wisdom forecast that in the next twenty-five years some twenty-five countries would acquire nuclear weapons. That expectation happily did not materialize. In the seventies, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) acquired signatures from a majority of the world's states, and all the industrialized nations except France. At that time, twelve nations were described as near nuclear weapon states: Israel, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, Taiwan and the two Koreas. Nine have since departed or are going out of that list, leaving only Israel, Pakistan, and India. Of these, there is general agreement that Israel has been a nuclear weapon state with a very sophisticated and large arsenal for the last two decades. If there are any ideas of bringing Israel as a non-nuclear weapon into the NPT they must be the most guarded secrets in the world. India is the only country which has exploded a nuclear device and would qualify for the definition of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT but for the technicality of the cut-off date of 1 January 1967. Pakistan is the only country that has officially announced that it has developed all the components necessary to assemble at least one nuclear weapon. While India may not be willing to subscribe to the NPT or observe it in spirit, it has not challenged the treaty directly with similar announcements. Israel slid into nuclear weapon status even at the very beginning of the NPT. India experimented with peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) technology at a time when PNE experiments were undertaken in scores by the United States and USSR, when they were concluding specific agreements on the subject, and when the PNE was specifically mentioned in the NPT. After its first test, and when the world as a whole realized by 1975 that PNE had no real applications, India did not follow up its only test. India became the only country not to build up an arsenal following a nuclear test. In that sense, Israel and India have maintained a status-quo over a long period. This status-quo has been altered with the Pakistani announcement of its acquisition of components to assemble at least one weapon.

The situation in regard to these three states is somewhat different from those of Argentina, Brazil and North Korea where their accessions to a nonproliferation nuclear restraint arrangement took place before they acquired an acknowledged capability to assemble a weapon. Perhaps the situation is closer to that of South Africa which was believed to have crossed beyond the weapon assembly capability and now wants to divest itself of the weapons. How credibly such a transformation

can be carried out under international verification procedures will have lessons not only for Israel, Pakistan, and India, but for all nuclear weapon nations that plan to denuclearize.

Proliferation is not a problem restricted to these three nations only. While the United States and the Soviet Union (and now the successor states) are deproliferating to a significant extent—faster than what many ardent advocates of disarmament considered feasible a few years ago—Britain, France, and China continue to proliferate. The British are now entering a new stage of qualitative and quantitative proliferation with their Trident submarine program. While the United States (with exception of air to surface missiles), erstwhile Soviet Union, and Britain have agreed to eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons, the French and the Chinese continue to maintain their tactical arsenals. This creates a problem of credibility in regard to China which has given a "no first use" pledge. Why does a country that has pledged not to resort to the first use of nuclear weapons need tactical nuclear weapons? Britain, France, and China have also shown reluctance to join the disarmament process initiated by the United States and Russia.

The argument of British Prime Minister John Major, that Britain cannot join the disarmament process because its arsenal is a tiny one compared to the big two arsenals not only justifies the stands of France and China, but also of Pakistan, Israel, and India. NATO's position that nuclear weapons will continue to remain weapons of last resort (although it has no adversaries, nuclear or otherwise) provides powerful rationale for other states which still face powerful adversaries (both nuclear and nonnuclear).

An aspect of the proliferation phenomenon that has received only limited attention is the coupling between two nuclear weapon states. The United States has transferred weapon systems designed specifically to carry nuclear weapons to Britain and some weapon related technology to France. The Israel-South African nuclear linkage has been documented in Seymour Hersh's book, *The Samson Option*, and elsewhere. The China-Pakistan nuclear linkage is believed to have included transfer of weapon and production reactor design information. This will be a crucial factor in considering any regional nuclear restraint regime because such regimes will call not only for restraints among new nuclear weapon capable nations, but also strict safeguards in regard to the relationship between the concerned nation and its collaborators.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has yet to carry out an inspection of South Africa. It is possible that South Africa could transfer its nuclear weapons and fissile materials, if any, to Israel. Will a declaration by IAEA that South Africa is clear of nuclear weapons and fissile materials be acceptable to the international community? In the light of IAEA's experience with Iraq and the enormous difficulties in tracking down nuclear related facilities and materials in that

country, how will the world be persuaded that South Africa has no nuclear weapons or fissile materials somewhere in its vast territory? These are difficult problems waiting to be resolved, even in a nation that seems to have some stake in getting rid of its weapons and stocks of fissile materials before a new constitutional arrangement for power sharing with the black majority comes into force. Very few other nations have similar domestic compulsions to deproliferate.

North Korea, Argentina, and Brazil each have *sui generis* features which cannot be extended to others. North and South Korea got partitioned as a result of the Cold War and there are shared aspirations on both sides for unification though they may disagree on the terms. North Korea did not have a Chinese linkage or Chinese support in respect of its nuclear program as Pakistan is believed to have. The removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea provided a powerful inducement for the North to exercise nuclear restraint. Both South and North Korea had already committed themselves to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Brazil-Argentina case was not one of acquisition of nuclear weapons for security, since neither of them faced such threats. It was a competition between two military establishments who had been playing dominant roles in the politics of their respective countries to acquire prestige. The analogy of Brazil-Argentina may apply to the present case of Britain and France, which no longer face any nuclear threats and are maintaining their nuclear arsenals only for prestige.

A number of developments with regard to the NPT need careful attention in order to evaluate problems related to nonproliferation. France and China acceded to the NPT only after unexplainable procrastination, since the NPT had no adverse impact on their security interests. Perhaps their reluctance was associated with their aim to project their independence from an arrangement negotiated between the superpowers. The adherence of these two nations to the NPT has been welcomed because their past actions jeopardized the objective of nonproliferation. France came very close to providing Pakistan a large reprocessing plant and did provide Iraq with enriched uranium and other facilities, no doubt under IAEA safeguards—procedures which now turn out to be necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to insure against the risks of proliferation. China, according to U.S. sources, has provided Pakistan a weapon design, weapon-related technology, and a production reactor. Whether China's accession to the NPT strengthens the nonproliferation objective or legitimizes a nuclear weapon state's past proliferation activities with further implications for the future will continue to be debated. China's conduct over the next two decades will validate one or the other proposition. It should be understandable that China's accession to the NPT has not evoked the same degree of enthusiasm in China's neighborhood as it does in more distant parts of the world.

However, the accession to the NPT by France, China, and South Africa, and the regional arrangements between Brazil and Argentina, should make it easier to

arrive at flexible and pragmatic arrangements in respect to Israel, Pakistan, and India. Once these are fitted into a realistic framework of non-proliferation, there are possibilities of making the treaty universal. Since the number to be tackled is so small, there should not be major worries about the consequences of flexibility in regard to these three nations on other nations. A world of eight nuclear weapon states is not that much more unstable than a world of five.

The NPT comes up for extension in 1995. The treaty will be scrutinized for its strengths and weaknesses before it is extended. The treaty has no doubt contributed to the containment of proliferation, especially in the industrialized world. Barring the three cases of unacknowledged nuclear weapon/capable states (Israel, Pakistan, and India), the treaty has been able to bring within its fold all other nations which have a meaningful capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Argentina and Brazil, though not members of the Treaty, have agreed to regional nonproliferation arrangements and there is no reason why they should keep out of the treaty much longer.

A major criticism of the nonnuclear weapon nations about the continued buildup of nuclear arsenals and nonfulfillment of article VI of the treaty has been met substantially with the conclusion of the INF treaty, the START treaty, and the two unilateral declarations of the President of the United States on the 27th of September, 1991, and the President of the USSR on the 5th of October, 1991, eliminating their tactical nuclear arsenals (except in the case of United States, air to surface missiles). There are optimistic prospects for even further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons.

The two major powers (United States and Soviet Union) have declared that a nuclear war could not be won and hence ought not be initiated. The realization that a nuclear war is not fightable has not only negated a lot of strategic lore built in the last four decades, but has contributed significantly to the decline in the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons as the international currency of power. These developments have given a powerful boost to the pursuit of nonproliferation, not in the sense of limiting nuclear weapons to a few privileged nations, but towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear weapon free world.

One hears less these days of the assertion that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and, consequently, that there can be no nuclear weapon-free world. Such an argument can apply with far greater validity to chemical weapons, the knowledge regarding their manufacture being more widespread and verification of their elimination being far more difficult. Those who urge the banning and elimination of chemical weapons cannot logically oppose the concept of a nuclear weapon-free world.

While these developments constitute very powerful support for the extension of the NPT, there are a number of major criticisms regarding the treaty. There has

been no progress in regard to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This was a commitment on the part of nuclear weapon powers which has not been fulfilled. Consequently, this raises doubts regarding the credibility of their commitment to nonproliferation. This issue resulted in the fourth NPT review conference concluding without an agreed declaration, and it is bound to be a major focus in 1995.

The three declared nuclear weapon powers, Britain, France, and China have not joined the disarmament process and are continuing to proliferate. Declarations that nuclear weapons are weapons of last resort for some privileged nations and that some thousands of weapons are needed to deter the threat of unforeseeable risks caused by adventurous use of some stray weapons do not help the process of nonproliferation.

It is now obvious that a signature on the NPT does not guarantee that the signatory will not pursue nuclear weapons. The IAEA safeguards have been found to be inadequate to monitor the whole range of nuclear activities of nations, especially clandestine ones. The NPT has provided safeguards to ensure that nonnuclear nations abide by their obligations, although these have been found to be inadequate and ineffective. It has not provided for corresponding safeguards to ensure that nuclear weapon nations abide by their obligations in the Treaty. China's transfer of weapon-related technology to Pakistan no doubt took place before China joined the NPT, but no safeguards system operates to prevent or detect future transfers. The discriminatory nature of the NPT is not merely that it permits unlicensed proliferation rights to nuclear weapon powers, but also that it does not provide an adequate mechanism to ensure that nuclear weapon powers do not transfer technology and materials.

Following the NPT, the safeguards agreements initially stipulated a close watch over the reactors and plutonium reprocessing facilities in nonnuclear weapons states. Only after Pakistan developed uranium enrichment through the centrifuge method were their uranium enrichment plants sought to be brought under inspection. Then came Iraqi attempts to enrich uranium through electromagnetic isotopic separation (the calutron method). This history of the last two decades highlights that new countries in quest of nuclear weapons need not follow the beaten track set by the established nuclear weapon powers. Attempts to safeguard reactors and reprocessing plants may not effectively prevent nations from trying to make weapons through other innovative methods because, for some, cost is no consideration.

THE NEW PROLIFERATION THREAT

In the last few months, the new threat of nuclear proliferation arising out of the break-up of the Soviet Union has been covered extensively in the world media. Attention was drawn to it in the Security Council summit statements. This new

threat differs from the conventional threat envisaged in most of the proliferation literature which focused mostly on states attempting to acquire nuclear weapons largely through their own manufacturing effort. There was a small amount of literature on weapon acquisition by non-national actors, and that mostly related to terrorist threats. Suggestions about the possible breakdowns in command and control of established nuclear weapon powers were generally dismissed even while the enormous difficulties in new nuclear nations having effective command and control mechanisms were emphasized. Now the world faces a multidimensional threat arising out of the possible breakdown of the control over the Soviet arsenal. Aspects of this threat include:

- Transfer of tactical nuclear warheads from present holders to foreign nations and parties for monetary gain. Such transfers of sophisticated conventional weapons like the *Stinger* or *Strela* missiles have been reported in the past.
- Seizure of tactical weapons and warheads by armed gangs, local militias, and dissident groups or nonstate actors. Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze warned about such possibilities.
- Loss, theft, diversion, and miscarriage of tactical nuclear weapons awaiting dismantlement during transportation from storage. Subsequently they may be acquired by interested parties.
- Such diversions and retention by nations within the Commonwealth of Independent States.
- Similar possibilities in respect to fissile materials supplemented by availability of the services of unemployed skilled technical personnel.

Such transactions may happen within the boundaries of or outside the frontiers of the former Soviet Union. This spread of nuclear weapons cannot be monitored by watching fuel cycles; readymade weapons may move across national boundaries. No nation capable of spending a few million dollars for the purpose can be excluded from the possibility of such weapon or fissile material acquisition. This state of affairs is the nemesis of past strategic doctrines which led to the buildup of more than twenty thousand warheads. It is worthwhile to bear in mind this aspect while considering advice on remedying this situation tendered by the very same quarters which espoused such doctrines.

While the threat of a spread of tactical weapons from the former Soviet arsenal is a universal one and involves acquisition both by state actors and nonstate actors (including terrorist groups), and while perhaps the entire globe is likely to come under this threat, it is of particular concern to the neighborhood of the erstwhile

Soviet Union for a number of reasons. First is proximity. Second, Islamic nations south of the former Soviet Union have established close relations with the Central Asian republics and among the former are some nations which have both surplus cash and interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Third, this area is highly volatile and has seen two devastating wars in the past decade. Fourth, there is speculation about Iranian ambitions and the Iranians have a keen sense of Shiah rivalry with the Sunnis; they are not likely to take kindly to Pakistani nuclear weapon status. Last, Israel's nuclear weapon status is a continuing challenge.

The world is constantly being reassured about the strategic arsenals of the erstwhile Soviet Union located in four republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. These reassurances are credible enough, but the same cannot be said about tactical weapons. Already there have been mutual accusations between Russia and Ukraine about the transport of tactical warheads from the latter to the former for dismantlement. There is one report about missing warheads in Ukraine (*U.S. News and World Report* 6th April, 1992).

Unless there is a complete audit under international aegis of the tactical warheads and fissile material stockpiles, and guaranteed certification that nothing is missing, the world cannot feel reassured about the threats arising from the breakdown of the mammoth Soviet arsenal. It is also a moot question whether such an audit will result in a reassuring tally of the declared inventory; some of the reports about the state of original inventory maintenance in the former Soviet union create serious doubts about the possibility of a credible audit. In spite of that, an international audit is desirable for the world to have an assessment of the dimensions of the problem.

There are also serious concerns about the safe storage of existing stocks of fissile materials, additions arising out of dismantlement of the warheads, and their further safety in custody. India cannot help feeling—very likely many other nations share it—that the problem of the erstwhile Soviet arsenal appears to be dealt with as a matter of concern only to Russia, the United States, and perhaps to the major European powers. Such a feeling is not likely to promote confidence in India and other nations about the likely risks and threats that may arise out of the possible seepage of ex-Soviet weapons and fissile materials beyond its borders. This is an area where cooperation between the United States, India, and even the rest of the world is a necessity if anxiety is to be alleviated.

In the future, nations may have to watch all their neighbors to reassure themselves that loose weapons have not ended up in their hands. Further, international terrorist threats relating to use of nuclear devices or nuclear materials will have to be taken far more seriously. It may not be difficult for terrorist groups to validate and raise their credibility by sending reasonably accurate drawings of a nuclear device—which should be relatively easy to obtain, with so many skilled

scientists who worked on the weapons being out of employment. International terrorism may be entering a new era.

MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States is now reducing its nuclear arsenal drastically. This is a point of departure from the last four decades. The United States has subscribed to the declaration that a nuclear war cannot be won and should not be initiated. Whatever may be the declaratory statements of NATO and the U.S. Defense Department at the present juncture, economic, political, and strategic factors are likely to work inexorably towards further reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. India has never subscribed to the view that nuclear weapons are usable weapons of war. India has consistently maintained that, like bacteriological and chemical weapons, nuclear weapons must be banned and eliminated. The United States may not have as yet reached that point in respect to nuclear weapons. After the decisions on START I and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, one may say the United States is headed in that direction. This gives for the first time in the nuclear era a certain (not yet total) mutuality of interest between India and the United States. This was possible only after serious deproliferation was initiated by the Presidents of the United States and then-USSR.

Proliferation has always been India's concern. India was opposed to the galloping proliferation of nuclear weapons which has landed us in the present perilous situation in regard to the ex-Soviet arsenal. India was also equally opposed to proliferation by new nations. It set an example by not building up an arsenal after its nuclear test of 1974. Unfortunately, a world conditioned by nuclear fundamentalism could not understand the Indian perspective and misinterpreted it. The Indian offer to open up a dialogue with the United States on the issue of nuclear proliferation in the Asian region is indicative of the Indian appreciation of fundamental changes in the U.S. position and the commonality of concerns it sees the United States sharing with India.

India has reason to be concerned with Chinese and Pakistani nuclear capabilities and with their ongoing nuclear collaboration. These concerns have been appreciated in the United States. Senator John Glenn, speaking in the Senate on July 26, 1991, said, "If China continues to pose a nuclear threat to India and to provide bomb technology to Pakistan, prospects for a regional regime will vanish." That was months before Pakistan officially admitted having all the components to assemble at least one weapon and before the world started developing concerns about the breakdown of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

China, the republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East region in between, are all involved today in the issue of nuclear proliferation. This is the context in which India and the United States have to carry on a dialogue to reach an assessment of the nuclear situation in Asia and to arrive at an appropriate joint strategy, if possible, to attenuate the nuclear threat. In that sense it is a regional approach. But it involves three major established nuclear weapon powers, China, Russia and the US, a number of republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union whose nuclear status is indeterminate, the two unrecognized nuclear weapon powers (Pakistan and Israel), and nuclear-capable India. Though it leaves out the UK and France, this exploration of the problem is in fact global in its dimension and implications.

The nuclear policies and strategies of China and Pakistan are not quite clearly spelled out, and large ambiguities envelop their policies. China was the first state to come out in favor of "no first use". Therefore, the purpose underlying China's continued possession of tactical nuclear weapons after the United States and USSR eliminated them is not clear. Though China has joined the NPT, how much reliance can be placed in its declarations about its commitment to nonproliferation in the light of its past record? What about China-Pakistan collaboration and the report about China assisting in the development of a 50 MW production reactor? What is Pakistani's strategy underlying its weapon development? The late Prime Minister Bhutto, the father of Pakistani bomb, talked in terms of Islamic civilization acquiring nuclear capability. Professor Stephen Cohen recorded in early 1980, after discussions with Army and Defence Ministry officials of Pakistan, that a Pakistani nuclear capability would, according to many Pakistanis "neutralize an assumed Indian force. Others point out, however, that it would provide the umbrella under which Pakistan could reopen the Kashmir issue; a Pakistani nuclear capability paralyzes not only the Indian nuclear decision but also Indian conventional forces and a brash bold, Pakistani strike to liberate Kashmir might go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive." ("Nuclear issues and security policy in Pakistan." Paper presented at 1980 Annual meeting of the Association for the Asian Studies.) Understandably any Indian approach to nuclear restraint will depend on an assessment of China's and Pakistan's politico-military strategies developed around their nuclear weapon capability. A common assessment between India and the United States on these issues will be crucial in shaping Indian perspectives on its security imperatives.

In this area there is an unfortunate overburden of history regarding U.S. relations with Pakistan and India during the Cold War. Among the Indian policy-makers there is an awareness that the United States is in the process of reassessing its relations and policies Cold War strategic imperatives. The improvement in Indo-U.S. relations is clearly a sign of that. India too is responding to these changes and hence the proposed joint naval exercise, which would have been unthinkable a few years ago, is now possible. However, this process of change in mutual

perceptions has still to register at a popular level in India. The draft Defense Guidance, as reported in *The New York Times*, which reflects the mind-set of the Cold War does not help to improve mutual understanding. Both governments have undertaken damage limitation operations in this regard.

At the popular level in India, the United States is seen as accommodative to the Israeli and Pakistani nuclear ambitions while being unmindful of India's legitimate security concerns vis-a-vis China. Surely those Indians who study U.S. strategic policies and perceptions understand that, objectively, it would hardly suit the U.S. vital national interests to have an asymmetric situation with a nonnuclear India having to face a nuclear China in collaboration with a nuclear Pakistan. That will not contribute to the progress of democracy, pluralism, and religious and ideological antifundamentalism. But previous declaratory policies make it difficult for Indian policy-makers to persuade the Indian people, media, and academics that the United States is in the process of reevaluating and reformulating its past policies.

All fundamentalisms—whether religious or NPT related—are counterproductive. Fundamentalist approaches ignore current realities and the changes that have occurred on the ground; they lead to prescriptions, by their nature, unimplementable. Pakistani Islamic fundamentalists having to struggle with an Islamic court's verdict that charging interest is unislamic, while still trying to carry out economic reform in today's world, is a case in point.

The crucial problem to be solved is not just getting the few remaining nations to sign the NPT or to bring in the three unacknowledged nuclear states into the fundamentalist NPT framework (which is not possible any longer). Rather, it is how to promote a security regime in the Asian region which will attenuate the dangers arising out of the threat to use nuclear weapons by irresponsible expansionist and ideological states fighting to stave off change, or by terrorist groups. Underlying all efforts to promote such a regime must be a credible verification framework; the U.S. axiom "trust but verify" continues to hold true.

One of the most fruitful areas for cooperation between India and the United States is to jointly identify crucial areas where verification is needed and to explore the ways and means of promoting them. The present situation in the Asian region in regard to nuclear security poses new challenges of a kind not faced elsewhere in the world nor handled in the arms control negotiations between the United States and USSR. As pointed out earlier, the unstructured and ill-defined situation in the erstwhile USSR generates formidable problems on verification. The second equally difficult problem is the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship and China's relationship with the Islamic countries in West and Southwest Asia, and, in particular, how to verify the nuclear transactions among them.

A widely canvassed proposal for nuclear restraint in the Asian region is to freeze the present capabilities of various nations. While such a proposition may seem

to have some positive aspects, there are also negative ones; it presents major difficulties in regard to verification. In dealing with the problem of verification in creating a nuclear weapon free regime in a situation where nations have already produced nuclear weapons or fissile materials, Dr. Theodore Taylor is of the view that: "Not for lack of trying very hard, I have been unable to conceive of technical means for providing very high assurance that such secret activities would be detected or prevented." (Technical Aspects of Verification in a Nuclear Weapon Free World," paper presented at the Pugwash workshop on The Desirability and Feasibility of a Nuclear Weapon Free World, 14-16 December 1991, London) (unpublished).

Dealing with the question of inspecting the disposal of nuclear warheads, a Congressional Research Service Issue Brief (IB - 88024, dated July 13, 1990) says "the standards of verification for superpower disposal of nuclear materials from dismantled warheads would be less demanding than that of assuring that there has been no diversion from peaceful uses in nonnuclear weapons states. The former needs give as detecting a violation large enough to suddenly upset a future super power balance, which would involve diversion of hundreds of kilograms or more of these materials. The latter seeks to assure detection of a diversion of as little as 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of uranium containing more than 20% of U-235." This problem gets more complicated when the state is an incipient nuclear weapon state with ongoing nuclear relations with a major nuclear power, as is the case with Pakistan. Any verification of a freeze would involve not only its application to Pakistan but to China-Pakistan transactions. Such problems need to be addressed in a joint Indo-U.S. study of a verification regime required for this region.

In regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear fissile materials of the ex-Soviet arsenal, attempts may be necessary to track down warheads and fissile materials in case they have seeped out. This would necessitate a degree of intrusiveness of verification almost analogous to what is sought to be provided in the proposed chemical weapons treaty. The moral and legal basis for such intrusive verification is the outlawing of chemical weapons. That raises the question, "if the ex-Soviet warheads and fissile materials break loose, will the present nonproliferation regime framework be adequate to tackle the threat?"

There is enormous scope for India and the United States to cooperate in developing ideas and concepts to make the world safer from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This requires mutual understanding and trust that both nations are committed to elimination of weapons of mass destruction in a realistic time frame. Any attempt to set the problem in strait jackets of conventional nuclear theology is not likely to produce positive results. Fresh thinking is needed on all sides. Let us engage in free, frank and constructive dialogue with reference to the realities on the ground. One hopes that is what the Indo-U.S. official level dialogue is aiming to achieve.

INDO-U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION: USCINPAC'S FIRST STEPS U.S. AND INDIA IN THE BIPOLAR CONSTRUCT

by

By RADM Larry E. Vogt

Nearly every conference and discussion on the so-called "New World Order" these days begins with a focus on the monumental changes in the Soviet Union and the demise of the bipolar world. International journals are full of articles analyzing the sweeping implications for Europe and the United States. In the rush to generalization and hyperbole, the fact that these changes in the international environment have had less impact in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is often missed. The fact is that the former Soviet Union was a Pacific and Indian Ocean power only in the military sense. Hence its demise has had less impact. Pacific and Indian Ocean nations have had more pressing concerns than the military balance between the U.S. and the Soviets. The delicate armistice on the Korean peninsula, the seemingly intractable civil war in Cambodia, Southeast Asian refugees, and tensions between India and Pakistan serve as prominent examples.

It is arguable that the more important change in the Pacific-Indian Ocean region is one that has been going on almost unnoticed for 15 years independent of Soviet changes. That change is the dramatic economic growth and rise of democratic pluralism. This progress has been accompanied by (or perhaps resulted from) a period of relative peace and stability throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean region.

USCINCPAC has observed many positive trends in Asia and the Pacific today that are key to the future of the U.S.:

- * The decline in communism and its continued failure in countries that cling to this bankrupt ideology. The former Soviet Union and Mongolia have succumbed to reform pressures; Vietnam is adopting more liberal policies; and even the Maoist version of communism in China is yielding slowly to pressures for greater freedom.
- * The likelihood of a global conflict emerging in the Pacific is at a historic low and still diminishing. Both China and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have great internal incentives to avoid conflict. Even in the regional hot spot, the Korean peninsula, we see some success of north-south dialogue, and a desire among major powers to avoid conflict and to press for greater contact and reconciliation between the Koreans.

- * The success of U.N. actions in the Persian Gulf has had an important impact in building support for future coalition actions. Japan and, to a lesser extent, Korea played important supporting roles in that action. Many Southeast Asian nations with sizable Muslim populations were caught in a delicate political situation. By and large, they were supportive of U.N. actions. The fact that it was a U.S.-led, international coalition on behalf of a tiny country like Kuwait, brutally victimized by its powerful neighbor, is a lesson that hasn't been lost on Asia-Pacific nations.
- * The further success of U.S. high technology weapons in the Gulf War has highlighted USCINCPAC'S successful strategy of maintaining technological superiority.

These positive accomplishments and favorable trends are most remarkable when placed in a historical context which highlights the poverty, turbulence and conflict so evident in the region twenty to forty years ago. There is clearly cause for cautious optimism.

At the same time, there are some disturbing trends which could upset the relative stability and growing prosperity of the region.

- * While economic growth, spurred by free market economies and trade is the success story, the distribution of that new-found wealth, both within the nations of the region and among them, is troubling. Individual prosperity and conspicuous consumption often dwell side by side with absolute poverty. Many South Pacific nations lacking natural resources seem condemned to nearly a single product or subsistence agrarian economy.
- * A by-product of the Cold War era and the spread of technology is the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons. Longer range delivery systems, precision guidance mechanisms, and more lethal munitions are relatively available on the world market. Of grave concern is the proliferation of chemical—and possibly nuclear and biological^Xweapons which could do great harm if they came into the wrong hands.
- * Population growth, urbanization, aging populations, and disease cut many different ways among the Pacific nations. But the increasing demand for resources, be it shelter, food, or medical and health care, will be an increasing drain on national resources. Of particular concern is the potential impact of the spread of the AIDS virus. Rising infection rates portend enormous impact on international travel and commerce.

- * Environmental degradation threatens the future of many resources. Pollution from rapid industrialization threatens water supplies, air quality, and coastal waters. Poorly managed resource extraction, be it timber cutting, mining, or fishing, could threaten the future of important industries and economies.

While the demise of the Soviet Union has not had a great impact on the region as a whole, it is probably fair to say that as regards Indo-U.S. relations, it may have a great impact. During the bipolar era, it was considered nearly impossible for the U.S. and India to engage in meaningful dialogue. The two were often at odds on many key policy issues. This manifested itself at the United Nations where India's voting record was perceived to favor the former Soviet Union. The U.S. was frequently chastised by the Indian press and placed on the defensive by misinformation originating from India's media. The positive atmosphere surrounding the Indo-U.S. symposium and the U.S. commitment to the growth of military-to-military relations demonstrate how much progress has already been in this relationship. USCINCPAC seeks to identify common aims as well as mutual concerns and to develop our relationship on this basis.

In terms of broadly defined goals—peace, prosperity, and security--the U.S. and India are in agreement. In a global context, both want to encourage responsible international behavior and oppose the opposite, as in the case of the recent Gulf War. After more than forty years of living in a bipolar world and accommodating certain limitations, both nations must overcome the inertia of policies which are no longer relevant and rethink old assumptions. Continuing restrictive political and economic policies would only be counterproductive to the important task of helping many nations, including the CIS and Eastern Europe, with political and economic reform.

In conjunction with friends and allies, the U.S. is providing economic assistance, aid for the needy, and technical advice. International aid is not limited to the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. Countries that have the resources also have a responsibility to help in any way they can. The U.S., therefore, encourages the development of new alignments that recognize the role of regional powers such as Turkey and the European community as leaders during this transition period.

India, with its roots in democracy and free enterprise, is in a unique position to play a global role as well. India has enjoyed a long and close relation with the former Soviet Union. For members of the CIS, the bipolar world was simplistic compared to the freedom they have now as they explore opportunities for new alignments in order to acquire economic assistance from the European community, Asia, and the U.S. Political and economic transition has been complex, confusing, and contradictory. Political pluralism and freedom of choice, something both the U.S. and India take for granted, must seem bewildering for those who have spent a lifetime doing only what they have been told to do. As the world's largest democracy, India can provide the CIS its collective wisdom on a republican form of government

and living in a multipolar world. India's leadership and experience can be invaluable to sovereign CIS nations in support of nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and counternarcotics goals.

What does living in a multipolar world, freed from past ties to the bipolar world, mean today? For the U.S. Pacific command, it means refocussing regionally to promote peace, stability, and predictability. It entails shifting USCINCPAC resources and balancing goals and objectives. USCINCPAC's current approach of maintaining strong bilateral relationships is key to doing just that. USCINCPAC seeks the involvement and cooperation of regional friends and allies to maintain stability and participate in the economic prosperity that results from common efforts. Bilateral ties and forward forces are used to address regional events and issues, and to encourage U.S. friends and allies to play a greater role in regional stability and share the responsibility for common security.

Limits on Indo-U.S. Relations

During the bipolar era, boundaries on Indo-U.S. relations were well known. Today, however, we are entering uncharted waters. While most of India's neighbors view a U.S. presence as benign and a positive factor in maintaining regional stability, there are some in India who view military-to-military relations as inconsistent with India's nonaligned status and leadership of the third world movement. There are even some who view this as a policy shift away from Pakistan and an endorsement for Indian regional hegemony. For those who still ask, "whither Indo-U.S. relations?" The U.S. response is that it has no plans for a regional security coalition in the Indian Ocean; nor does it desire to force India into an alignment with the U.S. The U.S. does not view its relationship with India, or any other nation for that matter, as a zero sum game with the U.S. belonging to one camp or another. USCINCPAC desires normal relations with Pakistan and India and encourages both nations to resolve their differences by peaceful means^Xas agreed to by Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972 at the Indian hill resort of Simla.

There are limits on U.S. military activities with India. The U.S. will not become embroiled in sectarian violence that threatens India from within. To do so would be for the U.S. to return to the failed policies of the Vietnam conflict. Nor can the U.S. conduct activities that are offensive in nature. These would have regionally destabilizing effects. Power projection and other offensive activities undermine continued support for U.S. military presence that is widely perceived as the mainstay of regional stability—and an accepted precondition for economic prosperity. USCINCPAC is mindful of its legacy of trust.

Budgetary reasons provide another constraint on Indo-U.S. military-to-military relations. USCINCPAC recognizes the extent of India's economic difficulties and the impact this has on India's military. Therefore, USCINCPAC will work cooperatively

to insure that programs are within India's means and, where possible, utilize title 10 funds to supplement service component programs. Aside from the budgetary aspect of India's fiscal problems, the U.S. does not want its relationship with India based on security assistance, a U.S. program in decline throughout the world.

The U.S. desires strong foundations for building solid relations based on their own merits, with no strings attached, and where convergent national interests are the supporting rationale. Furthermore, security assistance programs do not enjoy much support in the Congress. They are not being funded at past levels, and cannot be guaranteed in the future. There are also policy considerations that restrict our activities. For instance, the U.S. will not take sides in territorial disputes or recognize one claimant over another. Therefore, we do not participate in combined activities in disputed regions or territories.

Another policy concern is proliferation. A by-product of the Cold War era and the spread of technology is the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons. Longer range delivery systems, precision guidance mechanisms, and more lethal munitions are relatively available on the world market. Of grave concern is the proliferation of chemical—and possibly nuclear—weapons which could do great harm if they came into the wrong hands. This has caused considerable congressional interest in security assistance programs with the effect of scaling back DOD programs everywhere, even among our oldest friends and allies.

Exposure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons development program caused the world to shudder at the potential consequences of a nuclear bomb in the hands of a ruthless dictator. Non-safeguarded North Korean nuclear programs have the international community equally concerned. The breakup of the former Soviet Union has caused many political and military leaders to question the control and accountability of its nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the technology associated with developing these weapons is an international concern. The U.S. encourages India to sign the nonproliferation treaty and agree to the IAEA safeguards agreement as a responsible member of the international community.

Indo-U.S. Cooperation Programs

The mission of the U.S. Pacific command is to support our national interests and counter threats to these interests. There are a wide variety of threats to these interests today. They range from a major regional conflict in Korea to insurrection, territorial disputes, religious/ethnic conflict, international terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and instability. USCINCPAC's strategy for supporting these interests has two important elements: first, USCINCPAC must maintain its forward presence; second, it needs as many good friends and allies as it can get. This has been the USCINCPAC strategy since the end of World War II. During this interval,

USCINCPAC forces have conducted countless exercises, training exchanges, and visits throughout Asia and the Pacific. These activities have enhanced understanding, interoperability, and regional stability, and have furthered our national interests. In some cases, they paved the way for coalition response to conflict; in others, they supported humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations require fast response to save lives and stabilize crises. U.S. combined training efforts are meant to complement our partners' capabilities in order that they can carry out their primary duties. While the U.S. is able to provide unique capabilities and a wealth of experience, we do not want to usurp host nation forces' primary role as security guarantors. We depend on host nation forces to provide the infrastructure and knowledge of the situation. Recent aid to Kurdish refugees and flood relief in Bangladesh are examples of the speed sometimes necessary to save lives and to work with coalition partners. While USCINCPAC cannot predict when or where the next crisis will occur, there are two things that are certain: U.S. forces will be tasked to respond quickly, and they must be prepared to work side-by-side in cooperation with other nations.

Another factor to consider is the continuing revolution in communications that instantly places people of all nations in touch with current events. This information can reach virtually every spot on the globe. For on-scene commanders, this means that news services such as CNN also will be there to heighten the sense of drama for a global audience. This also means that if something goes awry, it will be seen and read about in every world capital the same or next day. There's an old expression that says "bad news travels fast." Today, it travels far as well. In the future, military leaders can expect to have their actions second-guessed by the media. They must be prepared with honest answers to difficult, sensitive questions. These are hard realities, but ones that military leaders live with in an age of satellite communication.

With these realities in mind, the U.S. Pacific command and its service components have proposed modest proposals to advance Indo-U.S. relations. USCINCPAC's goal is to normalize military-to-military contacts and further Indian Ocean regional stability. As a result of the end of the bipolar era, India's foreign policy, dictated by India's self interests, has been steadily converging with U.S. interests. For example, both share similar concerns for international terrorism, the spread of AIDS, religious extremism, illegal drug trafficking, support for human rights, regional stability, and unrestricted navigation in the Indian Ocean and the adjoining Persian Gulf region. There is a genuine desire to improve relations by leaders in both nations.

In support of these common interests, a series of high-level exchanges have been initiated. Visitors to the U.S. include former defense minister Pant, former

Chief of Army Staff General Sharma, former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nadkarni, former Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Mehra, and current Chief of Army Staff General Rodrigues. On the U.S. side, former USCINCPAC Admiral Hardisty, former CINCPACFLT (currently Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) Admiral Jeremiah, former CINCPACAF and current U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General McPeak, Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command General Hoar, current CINCPACAF General Adams, Former Commander of USARPAC Lieutenant General Kicklighter, current Commander of USARPAC Lieutenant General Corns and current USCINCPAC Admiral Larson, who I accompanied to India last October. There are more high-level visitors planning trips to India in the coming year, including current Chief of Army Staff General Gordon Sullivan who will visit both India and Pakistan in June.

While it has been essential for senior leaders to meet, exchange ideas, and endorse further expansion of this relationship, it is time to move on to the important people programs where "the rubber meets the road." The service component programs proposed by the U.S. and approved by India have been part of USCINCPAC's regional policy for many years. Similar programs are conducted routinely with most of India's neighbors.

To achieve the Command's near-term objectives, the U.S. and India must first overcome perceptions developed over many years. Policies, institutions, and programs were put into place to prevent unauthorized contact and limit areas of discussion. As a result, U.S. and Indian policies resulted in limited freedom of action, increased misunderstandings, and perpetuated myths and barriers to cooperation. The opportunity to build a lasting foundation between the military forces of both nations means shaping the future differently. This process must be a gradual one in order not to overwhelm policy makers by the pace of activities, and it must allow for long-range evaluation. The army, navy, and air force cooperation plans are, by design, intended to be a go-slow process that enhances people-to-people programs through education and training. Management programs and doctrinal comparisons are similar to confidence building measures that establish levels of trust and overcome barriers to cooperation. The focus is more appropriately on people than on hardware.

Preparation for crisis response begins with the types of cooperation programs that have been approved. These programs focus on people, training, logistics, and fundamental peacetime commitments to safety and good maintenance of expensive military equipment. It is also about being good international neighbors. USCINCPAC objectives are to promote friendly relations and increase interoperability in Asia and the Pacific. Indo-U.S. military-to-military activities generally fall into one of the following categories:

- * Reciprocal visits: This is one of the first steps between countries that result in mutual trust and a better understanding of military roles,

capabilities, and missions. Face-to-face discussions between military leaders further good relations, guide, shape, and set the tempo for future relations at all levels. Army, navy, and air force senior officer visits have already provided the kind of background knowledge and professional understanding to improve Indo-U.S. capability to work together. Discussions generally focus on bilateral policy issues, review on-going activities, and result in agreement on specific combined activities.

- * Professional seminars and conferences: International seminars develop better mutual understanding of each nation's intent and interest. Seminars and conferences are usually directed toward one specific subject and are usually attended by nations that already have cooperation programs with the U.S. at varying levels of activity. Examples include the USARPAC-sponsored Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) which provides a forum for discussing common military management problems in a professional environment. Normally attended by officers (major through colonel) PAMS expose common problems to the widest range of tested or potential solutions, techniques, and methodologies. It stimulates ideas, and promotes understanding. The Pacific Area Senior Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) has resulted in mutually agreed upon common operating procedures. PASOLS is an annual USCINCPAC-sponsored multinational military and defense department forum for Asia-Pacific nations to discuss logistics matters in support of national security, regional stability, and internal development. The objectives are to enhance logistics self-sufficiency, improve logistics management capabilities, and encourage regional cooperation. Participation is usually at the senior officer level.

The USCINCPAC-sponsored spectrum management conference and workshops include briefings and demonstrations of newly developed frequency management and electro-optical compatibility analysis systems. Past conferences provide Asian and Pacific countries an opportunity to air their views on issues, policies, and procedures of spectrum management. This has become increasingly important to many countries experiencing a rapid growth in communications-electronics systems of all types with a corresponding increase in spectrum congestion. Likewise, Pacific Air Forces hosts a Pacific air chiefs conference every two years. And, of course, the Indo-U.S. strategic symposium provides an informal, unofficial forum for Indian and U.S. analysts, officials, military officers and scholars to discuss the current state and the future possibilities for Indo-U.S. security relations, thus establishing a framework for future cooperation.

- * Information exchanges: Exchanges foster mutual understanding, build rapport, and impart useful views and information on military matters

of common interest at all levels. Exchanges improve the ability to work together and support peace, stability, security, freedom, and prosperity in the region. Exchange of functional experts encourages professional development and developing professional relations. These exchanges increase the respective knowledge of staff and command procedures. They also provide insight into the major professional issues under consideration in the respective service components and practical experience in working with foreign staffs. One element of this program is the subject matter expert exchange. These visits are tailored to specific needs and often entail leadership visits by commandants of schools, academies, military colleges, the Training and Doctrine Command and similar air force and navy schools.

- * Individual training: Activities in this category include observer training, on-the-job training, officer, NCO, and enlisted exchanges, and formal attendance at selected service schools. Opportunities for individual training enhance understanding at many levels and foster an exchange of expertise and professional growth for military personnel. They apply to basic noncommissioned officers up to mid-level officers, and maximize the use of international military education and training (IMET) funds. Courses and schools available include the basic noncommissioned officers course, leadership development, junior and senior command courses, and the war colleges of the service components including the International Fellows Program at National Defense University. Many trainees stop in Hawaii enroute home after classroom training in the U.S., with minimal extra cost, to participate in observer training with USARPAC. Observer training serves as an instrument to exchange views on military matters of common concern in a wide variety of fields and specialties including safety, training, logistics management, weather and operations. Observer training, officer and NCO short-term exchanges, personnel exchanges, and military schools encourage mutual confidence and respect, and provide interesting and challenging duty with cross-pollination of professional and cultural ideas.
- * Small unit Training: The last category of programs are the service component-sponsored small unit overseas exercises. These exercises vary in size and provide first-hand experience working with U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen to broaden professionalism and to increase understanding of operational procedures through actual interaction with friendly forces. Combined training activities enhance interoperability and professional exchanges between U.S. and Indian forces. Participation may consist of observers or player cells or entire units, with the size and type of combined training activities agreed upon by service components of both nations. They can be conducted in both the

U.S. and India.

CONCLUSION

If there is an enemy stalking the seams of the international security order, it is instability. The uncertain future that the U.S. and India face will be affected by diversity in Asia-Pacific nations and sweeping changes to the international order. Historic tensions and animosities internal and external to nations in these regions compound Indo-U.S. national security concerns and widen mutual vulnerability to instability in the future. Trends toward economic growth and democratic reform have resulted in a decline in communism and support for U.N.-sponsored coalition efforts such as the liberation of Kuwait. Given the interaction of diversity with the previously outlined realities and trends, USCINCPAC must continue to maintain close bilateral relations with Asia-Pacific nations in order to remain actively engaged in the region.

USCINCPAC and its service components have proposed many non-traditional military activities as the next step in expanding Indo-U.S. relations. USCINCPAC believes that the emphasis on people-to-people programs effectively supports the national interests of both countries and enhances regional stability without relying on traditional security assistance programs. These activities also increase capabilities, readiness and build coalition potential. Furthermore, the cooperation programs maintain a balance between India and other Asia-Pacific nations that share a long history of programs with the U.S. These programs promote the secure and stable environment necessary for economies to grow, democratic ideals to flourish, and aggression to be deterred.